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ABSTRACT
Rationalist theories of coalition formation have 
centered on one and only one principle: that individual
conduct is totally determined by the endeavor to relate 
means to ends as efficiently as possible. Specifica11y , the 
theory holds that human conduct is whoily determined by 
rationality.
Rationalist political theory is extremely useful for 
gaining insight into the field of coalition formation and 
maintenance. Work on coalitions often in turn derives from 
n-person game theory. It has attempted to predict the 
formation of coalitions? distribution of spoils? and the 
allocation of power among major social groups in divided 
soc i et ies.
Rational choice theory suggests that decision makers 
consider the costs and benefits associated with alternative 
actions when deciding what to do. According to this 
approach? it is plausible that factional groups in divided 
societies consider the benefits and costs when deciding 
whether to form and whether to maintain a coalition.
This dissertation presents an examination of coalition 
theory? by presenting a case study of the Lebanese Forces 
during the Lebanese civil war? which began in the mid-1970s. 
Interviews with representatives of the Lebanese Forces have 
been conducted and analyzed. These and other data were used
to demonstrate the applicability of the rational choice 
model to the case of the Lebanese Forces.
v i i
INTRODUCTION
Pity the nation that is full of 
beliefs and empty of religion.
Pity the nation that wears a cloth 
it does not weave? eats a bread it does 
not harvest? and drinks a wine that 
flows not from its own wine-press.
Pity the nation that acclaims the 
bully a hero» and that deems the 
glittering conqueror bountiful.
Pity a nation that despises a 
passion in its dream? yet submits in its 
awakeni n g .
Pity the nation that raises not its 
voice save when it walks in a funeral? 
boasts not except among its ruins? and 
will rebel not save when its neck is 
laid between the sword and the block.
Pity the nation whose statesman is 
a fox? whose philosopher is a juggler, 
and whose art is the art of patching and 
mimick i n g .
Pity the nation that welcomes its 
new ruler with trumpetings? and 
farewells him with hootings? only to 
welcome another with trumpetings again.
Pity the nation whose sages are 
dumb with years and whose strong men are 
yet in the cradle.
Pity the nation divided into 
fragments? each fragment deeming itself 
a nation.
Kahlil Gibran? The Garden of the 
Prophet <193^) [Emphasis 
added.1
This dissertation examines the "theory of coalitions" 
in the context of modern Lebanon. Coalition theory is a
v i i i
theoretical perspective that is concerned with coalition 
formation and maintenance involving three or more players, 
all of whom are presumed to be independent decision makers.
An evaluation of coalition theory may be useful in 
understanding the operation of coalitions in a highly 
divided society, such as Lebanon. The central question with 
which the theory is concerned is: under what conditions will 
individuals and groups join together to form alliances and 
preserve coalitions.
An examination of coalition formation is presented, 
which begins with a basic explanation of the theory and a 
critique of some of the principal works related to it.
There follows a statistical test of the theory; and the 
implications of the results thus derived for the coalition 
under examination are discussed.
The dissertation focuses upon a relatively new 
political movement— the Lebanese Forces— operating in a 
specific political setting, modern Lebanon. By doing so, it 
is possible to evaluate the applicability of coalition 
theory, while also clarifying the pattern of actual 
coalition behavior in an important political system of the 
contemporary Middle East.
Our study of the process of coalition formation in 
Lebanon attempts to relate the Lebanese case to general 
models of coalition behavior. A reasonable question is:
Why conduct a study of political coalition behavior i_n
Lebanon7 Anyone familiar with Lebanon would be justified in 
saying that the idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
Lebanese environment are decisive in understanding the 
operation of the nation’s political system. While it is not 
claimed that the features of Lebanese politics are unique or 
more influential than is the case for other political 
systems, these idiosyncracies are of sufficient importance 
to warrant detailed discussion.
The point to be made here is that many of the 
idiosyncratic and "non-political" forces— operating in 
Lebanon are often different from those of most other 
political systems, such as history, religion, ethnicity, and 
the like— take on particularly crucial political 
significance within Lebanon. Again, this is not to assert 
that religion, to cite merely one example, has never 
affected political behavior in other societies. Much has 
been written, for example, about the role of religion in the 
political history of Europe, of Latin America, and in 
settling the American frontier. However, in these settings, 
religion has not as a rule cont- i nued to play as central a 
role, for as long a period in the country’s political 
history, as is true of Lebanon.
Throughout history, Lebanon has been a refuge for 
persecuted religious minorities. To outsiders, the 
resulting multiplicity of religious communities within 
Lebanon appears confusing; some Lebanese authorities have
x
counted eighteen different religious sects and denomina­
tions. However, the religious communities that are 
significant in the political life of the country are not 
overly difficult to perceive and understand. They belong to 
three major religions: Christianity, Islam and the Druze 
faith. Each of these will be examined more fully in future 
chapters.
A dynamic factor that tends to maximize conflict 
within and among the religious sects of Lebanon is the lack 
of cohesion within each reliqious subculture. For example, 
Christians are divided into Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek 
Catholics and the Gregorian (Orthodox) Armenians. Moslems 
are in turn divided into Sunnis and S h i ’ites. The third 
religious community consists of the followers of the post- 
Islamic sect, called the Druze.
Among all the sects and within them, conflict has long 
been present. Each sectarian group is in turn segmented 
along geographic, clan and class lines, so that none of the 
principal sectarian Z u ’a m a ’(chiefs) can represent all of one 
sect. As will be explained more fully, at times Z u ’ama’ of 
one sect have fought with each other more than they did 
against those of another sect (e.g., Khoury vs. Chamoun vs. 
Gemayel vs. Franjieh vs. Iddi). Such conflicts at the 
Z u ’ama’ level often have reflected the conflicts underlying 
and suspicions existing within each sect.
In addition to the religious division, a wide variety 
of conflicting ideologies, belief systems, and political 
preferences also exist and compete within the Lebanese 
Christian community. Thus, as will become apparent, various 
political parties have emerged, such as the Social 
Democratic Kata’ib Party, the National Liberal Party <N L P >, 
al-Tanzim, the Guardians of the Cedar, and others.
The central question of this study is: Why have
several of these rival factions coordinated their war 
efforts and joined together to form the Lebanese Forces? A 
more general question is: Why do groups in general, like
the Lebanese Forces, form (e.g., the resistance movements in 
Nazi Germany, the liaku i s in France, or the Par t i sans in 
Italy)? Under what circumstances do rival groups and forces 
form coalitions? Why are coalitions with some groups 
preferred to coalitions with other groups? What are the 
benefits derived from joining a coalition? The Lebanese 
Forces, created to resist effectively both foreign 
occupation of Lebanon and the concerted effort to destroy 
the Lebanese political system, have grown today into an 
influential political movement committed to the 
transformation of Lebanon into a modern society with 
democratic and pluralistic institutions.
The Lebanese Forces as a political movement has no 
close parallel in the West and, therefore, does not conform 
closely to Western experience. Indeed, the name "Lebanese
x i i
Forces" implies a political movement whose membership cuts 
across all confessional groups and is nationalist in its 
orientation. Actually, the movement is overwhelmi no 1v 
Maroni te in its composition.
The Lebanese civil war has usually been perceived 
primarily as a conflict between the Christian right-wing and 
a Moslem-Palestinian left-wing. While such a view is 
partially true, it falls short of reflecting the complexity 
and diversity of the rival groups. It fails to call 
attention, for example, to the destructive conflicts within 
the major Lebanese communities. In reality, the "Moslem 
left-wing bloc" actually has included some Christian 
elements, as well as Moslem leaders, who did not accept the 
more extremist leftist ideology. While the "Christian 
right-wing bloc" was somewhat more cohesive, it was by no 
means completely homogeneous. However, for the purpose of 
this study it would be appropriate to employ the right-wing/ 
left-wing dichotomy, after pointing out the shortcomings of 
this pattern.
What is the logic behind joining a coalition? The 
doctrine of "rational choice" suggests that decision makers 
calculate the benefits and gains, along with the negative 
results associated with alternatives when deciding upon a 
course of action. It is plausible, therefore, that 
individuals and groups of the Lebanese Forces would consider 
the positive and negative consequences of such participation
x i i i
when deciding whether to join the Lebanese Forces and, after 
that, whether to remain in the organization. Almost every 
human act, individual or collective, involves making choices 
under environmental constraints. The environment delimits 
the range of available choices, without necessarily reducing 
the range to a single alternative.
What model of group formation explains the formation of 
the Lebanese Forces? Keeping in mind the environmental 
constraints that exist in Lebanon, does the rational choice 
model provide the most reasonable explanation of why people 
join a coalition? If not, what other model then can explain 
this phenomenon?
In order to examine the issue of coalition formation 
and behavior in the Lebanese setting systematically and 
objectively, the first chapter of the dissertation describes 
certain distinctive elements of the Lebanese political 
system. This system, as we shall see, has been influenced 
by various internal and external forces leading to the 
creation of a unique political milieu that exists nowhere 
else in the modern world.
Chapter two discusses the major work that has been done 
to date regarding coalition theory, and it examines some 
common elements, as well as the differences, found in 
scholarly literature about political coalitions. This 
section examines why individuals, groups, and nations form 
coalitions. Rational choice theory places all of these
x i v
types of group formation (interest groups? alliances, and 
coalitions) together under one theoretical umbrella.
Chapter three deals with the background and the 
emergence of the Lebanese Forces. A detailed analyses is 
presented, concentrating upon the creation, evolution, 
ideology, and goals of the movement.
Chapter four analyses the impact of external (regional 
and global) influences upon the behavior of the Lebanese 
Forces. Lebanon’s political development has been remarkably 
affected by events in its regional and international 
environment. As the evidence will show, the policies and 
behavior of the Lebanese Forces have been determined to no 
inconsiderable degree by factors operating within the 
external environment.
Chapter five presents the results of the interviews 
conducted with members and leaders of the Lebanese Forces. 
Again, the interview data are used to provide a test of the 
rational choice model as it applies to the formation and 
maintenance of the Lebanese Forces.
Finally, the concluding chapter elucidates the 
applicability of rational choice model solely through the 
stage of the coalition formation. The evidence indicates 
clearly that in fact political i rrat ionaIi tv in time became 
the hallmark of coalition maintenance in contemporary 
Lebanon. This reality in turn ultimately led to the 
termination of the coalition called the Lebanese Forces.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LEBANESE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The topic that provides the central focus of this 
study— the Lebanese Forces as an influential political 
movement in the contemporary Middle East— can only be 
intelligently understood when it is examined within the 
broad context of modern Lebanon’s political development. 
While it is no doubt true that every nation’s political 
development contains certain distinctive elements, the 
Lebanese political system truly deserves to be called 
"unique." In recent history, it has been characterized by a 
combination of forces and influences shaping Lebanese 
political life that exists nowhere else in the modern world. 
This combination has been a major contributing factor in 
earning independent Lebanon the title of "improbable 
nation.” Along with all other political parties and 
movements that have appeared in Lebanon since independence 
was achieved in 19^3, the Lebanese Forces have been 
momentously affected by the political environment within 
which the movement emerged and has operated.
It is not possible to present and discuss all of the 
salient elements in modern Lebanon’s political environment 
as fully as might be desired. (Separate chapters, for 
example, could easily be devoted to such subjects as the 
emergence of "confessional ism" within Lebanese society and
1
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its impact upon national political life* or to the equally 
important issue of French, Arab, American and other foreign 
intervention in the Lebanese political system since the 
early nineteenth century.) These and other significant 
elements in the Lebanese political context have been 
analyzed in considerable detail in a wide variety of 
valuable background studies.*
Since it must be limited and selective, our treatment 
of the Lebanese political environment will concentrate upon 
the following important elements. First, the main features 
of Lebanese geography are presented for the benefit of the 
reader who may be unfamiliar with this extremely important 
factor which affects, for example, the Lebanese society’s 
pattern of "communal" life. Second, this is followed by a 
somewhat detailed examination of the principal "communities" 
within modern Lebanon. As the reader will discover, 
Lebanon’s communities are organized mainly along reli q i ous 
lines. Increasing communal rivalry and suspicion, for 
example, were primary influences leading to the outbreak of 
the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s.
Third, the principal features of the Lebanese economic 
system are identified. These also play an important part in 
explaining the outbreak and continuation of political 
violence in recent Lebanese political life. Fourth, brief 
attention is devoted to French— and most recently, American- 
-political intervention in Lebanon. As our discussion
emphasizes, this is a very old phenomenon in the political 
experience of Lebanon.
Fifth, the thirty-five year period of relative 
political stability in Lebanon (from 1943 until the mid- 
1970s) is examined. This was the era in which the 
relationship among the main Lebanese political organizations 
and forces was governed by the provisions of that remarkable 
political arrangement or truce known as the "National 
Covenant," negotiated by the nation’s political leaders 
during the closing months of World War II. Designed to 
assure political stability and to avoid violence among the 
nation’s rival political groups in the post-colonial period, 
for almost a generation this pact served remarkably well to 
preserve political stability and national cohesion.
Sixth, attention is devoted to those forces and 
tendencies which combined to undermine the consensus that 
had been reflected in the National Covenant and, by the 
1970s, had plunged Lebanon into the abyss of one of modern 
history’s most violent and destructive civil wars. This 
conflict of course continues to the present day. These 
forces not only destroyed Lebanon’s political unity, but 
they also raised fundamental questions about the future of 
Lebanon as an independent nation.
Finally, political developments within modern Lebanon 
are examined against a background of the broad problem of 
"consociationa1 democracy," as experienced by several other
pluralistic, and often highly fragmented, societies in the 
modern world. Insights provided by the theory and practice 
of consociational democracy in other nations shed light upon 
the political experience of contemporary Lebanon.
In some measure, each of the factors identified above 
has played a part in determining the emergence, evolution, 
ideology, behavior, and future of the Lebanese Forces.
Lebanons A Geographic Profile
Lebanon is a country of roughly four thousand square 
miles (somewhat smaller than the state of Connecticut) of 
which the Christian enclave— the mountains and the shoreline 
from East Beirut north to Byblos— occupies about a fifth of 
the total. The country’s geographical structure is quite 
simple and comprises four consecutive elements running 
parallel to the sea: a very narrow coast line where the
capital, Beirut, is situated; the Mount Lebanon range; the 
Biqaa Valley east of it; and behind the Biqaa Valley, the 
Anti-Lebanon range.
Lebanon shares a 200-mile internationa11y recognized 
border with Syria to the north and east. To the south its 
45-mile border with Israel marks the United Nations- 
sponsored cease-fire line agreed upon by Lebanon and Israel 
in 1949. However, this agreement was broken by Israel in 
1967 and 1903. In March 1984, the government of Lebanon, 
supported by Syria, itself broke the agreement of May 17,
1983 (Congressional Quarterly 1986, 166). Lebanon’s
southern border with Israel, therefore, remains unsettled 
and legally undefined in terms of international law.
Lebanon’s geographical position jeopardizes its 
security. Its only two neighbors, Syria and Israel, remain 
hostile to one another, and each attempts to exploit the 
underlying diversity and disunity of Lebanon to pursue its 
own strategic advantage. Both countries are far stronger 
than even a politically unified Lebanon could aspire to be 
and have vested security interests in the outcome of the 
continuing Lebanese crises.
Sometimes called the "Switzerland of the Middle East," 
Lebanon has traditiona11y attracted people throughout the 
region to its mountains during the hot Middle East summer. 
The character of the Lebanese mountains, with their snow- 
covered peaks, and the fertile Mediterranean coast, are very 
different from the more desert— like region that comprises 
present-day Syria and its southern neighbor, Israel.
Lebanon has also served throughout history as a sanctuary 
for political refugees. The mountains of Lebanon have 
traditiona1ly provided refuge for threatened individuals and 
minorities. Fleeing from conquering invaders or religious 
persecution, minority communities have found relative 
security in the isolated valleys and mountain hillsides of 
Lebanon, making it a mosaic nation of various groups.
The "Communities” of Lebanon
As is true of most societies within the Middle Fast, 
the "community" structure is an al1-important fact of the 
Lebanese society. In no country is that factor as crucial 
as is the case in Lebanon.
The term "community" is defined by reference to 
religion. Religion in Lebanon is more than solely a private 
belief system. It represents a major element of self-and 
family identity and of communal values as well. In Lebanon, 
the pivotal question: What religion does an individual
profess? This is mainly a matter of birth or family 
religious background. In other words, a child born into a 
Maronite family is considered part of the Maronite 
community— for the rest of his or her life. This fact will 
in turn affect the individual’s economic and social status, 
where he lives, his educational opportunities and record, 
his career plans— literally, every major sphere of life..
The Maronites. The traditional "home" of the Maronites 
is M t . Lebanon, around Beirut and central region. The 
Maronites trace their ancestry back to their patron St. 
Maron, who founded the community in the Orant.es mountains of 
Northern Syria about 400 A.D. (Kleem 1976, 1). The 
Maronites are a Christian people almost inseparable from 
their Church. From its inception, the group gathered around 
a monastery and created a local Christian community, thereby 
becoming truly monastic in every sense. This made for the
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adoption of many habits and customs characteristic of such 
communities) i.e.) the influence of the simplicity of daily 
life* the emphasis on perfecting their way of life, the 
stress laid upon the reading of the Scriptures) as well as 
upon their participation in Christian worship in the 
community. Originally) the language of these people was not 
Arabic but Aramaic (Dib 1971) 18S).
The Maronites emerged as the economic "power structure" 
of Lebanon; they became very successful merchants) 
businessmen) traders) and bankers; and they were econom­
ically dominant within the country. MaroniteS) for example) 
were largely responsible for making Beirut the financial and 
trading center of the Middle East.
Since independence) all Lebanese governments have been 
controlled by the Maronites and reflected their interests.
A fundamental question at stake in the civil war is the 
continuation of Maronite control of Lebanon by what has now 
became a minority community within Lebanon.
In recent years> however) the Maronite community has 
also become increasingly fractionalized and internally 
divided. The historic position of the traditional political 
parties within the community has been challenged— most 
successfully by a group representing a new generation and 
outlook) called "the Lebanese Forces)" led by a relative 
unknown) Samir Geagea. The Lebanese Forces is a group of 
militant Maronite nationalists who resist any idea or
a
tendency that would endanger the traditionally dominant 
position of the Maronites within the Lebanese society.
The S h i ’ites. Traditiona1ly, the S h i ’ites have been 
the most backward) poverty-stricken) and depressed element 
of the Lebanese population. That condition has worsened in 
recent years. Until the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the 
S h i ’ites had no other country to "protect" their interests. 
They felt threatened both by the Maronites and by the 
surrounding Sunni Arab states; these States usually 
supported the Sunnis community in Lebanon.
Although no census has been taken since World War II, 
most informed observers are certain that the S h i ’ites have 
now become the largest single community in Lebanon. This is 
the case for primarily two reasons: (1) the high birth rate
(around 3% annually) among S h i ’ites, compared to low rates 
among Maronites; and (S) continued emigration of Maronites 
to the U.S.A. and other countries.
Increasingly, the S h i ’ites have become a politically 
alienated and disaffected element; they have little "stake" 
or interest in continuing the pattern of Maronite rule in 
Lebanon. They find little to support or commend in the 
policies and programs of various Maronite governments in 
Beirut. They see little value or gain in these programs for 
the S h i ’ite population. The Sh i ’ites have, therefore, 
become increasingly receptive to various "revolutionary"
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messages and programs, which call for radical change within 
Lebanese society.
The traditional locale of the S h i ’ites is southern 
Lebanon, around the cities of Tyre and Sidon. Living in the 
south, closest to Israel, in recent years, the Shi’ites have 
been especially affected by the activities of the 
Palestinians and by Israel’s "retaliat ions." The PLO 
undertakes strikes against Israel, and the S h i ’ite people 
and villages of south Lebanon suffer the consequences! Yet 
the S h i ’ite community has also become increasingly 
fragmented and torn by internal rivalries. Today, there are 
two main S h i ’ite political movements.
One of these is AMAL, whose leader is Nabbih Berri and 
whose patron saint is the martyred S h i ’ite religious leader 
Sheikh Musa el-Sader, who was killed mysteriously during a 
visit to Libya. In contrast to its rival Hizballah, AMAL is 
considered "moderate" in its political orientation and 
demands. For example, AliAL seeks to preserve Lebanese 
independence and does not want Lebanon to become sub­
ordinated to an outside power, such as Iran.
The second main Sh i ’ite group is Hi zba11 ah (or "the 
Party of God"). It is a militant and newer S h i ’ite 
political movement affiliated with Iran and believed to be 
responsive to the views of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. It
actively seeks the replacement of the National Covenant and
the affiliation of Lebanon with Moslem states. It views
10
AMAL as much too moderate and accomodationist. (The 
provisions of the National Covenant will be explained in 
detail at a later stage.)
The Sunnis. Nearly all of Lebanon's Sunni population 
live mainly in the coastal region of Tripoli, Beirut and 
Sidon. The Sunnis are considered the third largest among 
the major religious communities of Lebanon.
Economically5 socially, and educational1y , the Sunnis 
come between the more advanced Maronites and the much less 
advanced Sh i ’ites. They have always preserved close ties 
with other Arab states, notably Egypt. Great admiration 
existed, for example, among the Sunnis for Egypt’s president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.
The Druze. The Druze community in Lebanon numbered 
only about 250,000 in the late 1970s, or around 8*/. of the 
national total (Cobban 1985, 21). The Druze were by far the 
smallest of the country’s religious communities. 
Nevertheless, the Druze played a key role in the emergence 
of the Lebanese system. An offshoot of Ismailism (which 
itself is a splinter group within S h i ’ism, one of the two 
major branches of Islam), the Druze first appeared as a 
community in Wadi el-Taym in South Lebanon. For over a 
thousand years they have inhabited the northern regions of 
Mount Lebanon, gradually spreading southward since the later 
Middle Ages over former Druze and S h i ’ite territory.
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The village organization of the Druze community has 
generally remained subordinate to the sect’s strong family 
ties. Traditionally, the families were bound into a 
pyramidal structure of clans, each dominated by one of the 
great warlord families. In view of these facts, the 
political behavior of the great Druze leaders were usually 
driven with a succession of long-lasting factional 
rivalries. From the early eighteenth century down to the 
present times, for example, the principal tribal division 
within the Druze community has been that between the 
"Yazbeki" and the "Junblatti" families or factions.
As we observed, the last official census in Lebanon was 
taken in 1932. It showed that the Christians had a slight 
majority of the population (55*/.), with the Maronites the 
largest single Christian denomination. On the basis of the 
census, an agreement was reached in 1943 that the President 
of Lebanon would be a Maronite and the prime minister would 
be a Sunni Moslem. This agreement was called the National 
Covenant of 1943, and it remained the formula, however 
obsolete, it may have become, upon which the weak and 




Aside from its industrious people and largely self- 
subsistent agricultural base* Lebanon is quite poor in 
natural resources. As a results its modern economic 
structure has developed around trades bankings commerce and 
tourism. Until 1975s Beirut was a hub of internationa1 
trade and regional finance; a center of educations 
communications shipping and transportation; a focus for 
entertainments art and fashion; and the home of a specials 
perhaps uniques multinational society.
The Lebanese economy is not a typical Arab economy. It 
is not based on the extraction of petroleum but on trade 
ands to a lesser extents industry and agriculture. Lebanon 
was atypical in other ways, too. To an unusual degrees it 
was committed to the principle of a flexibles private 
enterprise and free-wheeling form of laissez-faire 
capitalism; its 1 i teracy rate was 88*/.; and by regional 
standards its per capita income was very high.
There were also other characteristics of a 
sophisticated economy. One was, quite simply, prosperity. 
With the exception, perhaps, of the Palestinian camps and 
some areas in the south, Lebanon was, at least by regional 
standards, a prosperous country with a large, relatively 
successful, socially mobile middle class. As explained, 
this was especially true of the Maronite community.
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Banking was particularly important, as development of 
oil production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began to generate 
the first huge oil revenues. As a result, by 197^, there 
were 73 commercial banks of various sizes, 29 of which are 
completely Lebanese owned and the remainder either foreign- 
or jointly-owned (Hoye et al., 1982).
French Influence on Lebanon
In the 1920, the French achieved one of their long-term 
regional ambitions: At the San Remo Conference, France
received a "mandate" under the League of Nations for Syria 
and Lebanon. The French had long been very interested in 
trade with the Levant. For example, they desired the silk 
of the Middle East, especially Lebanese silk. Due probably 
to the rich soil and water Lebanon, produced a finer grade 
of silk even than did China. Lebanese silk was cheaper and 
was accessible through the opening of the Suez Canal.
By taking sides with the Christian Maronites against 
their political rivals, the French were also able to achieve 
their goals in Lebanon. Relying upon the means of education 
through the French language and their missionaries in 
Lebanon, in time France had the opportunity to lay claim, in 
the form of a pro tectorate, to becoming the dominant 
colonial power of this part of the Mediterranean. By the 
time World War I broke out, there were 300 foreign schools
1<+
along the Levantine littoral, with a total enrollment of 
25,000 students (Hoye et al., 1982).
In modern history, the Maronites have regarded the 
French as providing protection against absorption into a 
Moslem-controlled Syria. Most Maronites spoke French, were 
educated in French schools, wore French clothes and 
participated in French culture. Adoption of French culture 
was for the Maronites a form of identification, a way to 
demonstrate their separation from the Arabs and Islam. So 
Francophile were the Maronites that their children routinely 
recited, "Inna faranca ummana el-hanuna" [Trans.— "Truly, 
France is our benevolent mother"] (Randal 198^, ^7).
Roots of the Political Conflict
One readily associates Lebanon with the ancient 
Phoenicians, with the invention of the alphabet, with 
Carthage, and with maritime trade. In the seventh century 
A.D., and shortly before the rise of Islam, a small Maronite 
community, fleeing the persecution of their fellow 
Christians, had begun their exodus from Northern Syria 
seeking refuge in the Lebanese mountains.3 Thus did the 
historical function of Lebanon as land of refuge for the 
oppressed begin.
From the middle of the eighth century onwards, the 
Abbasid Caliphs began relying upon Orthodox Sunni Moslem 
tribes to quell Christian resistance in Lebanon. In the
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tenth centuryj the "great divide"— or division between Sunni 
Islam and Shi'ite Islam— also led various heterodox sects 
(e.g., Druze and Alawites) to seek refuge in Lebanon.
Around the same time, Maronites and other Christians, 
who were being persecuted in northern Syria, fled to 
Lebanon, and the Maronite Patriarchate established its see 
in the mountain, thus underlining the historical function of 
Lebanon as a refuge for the oppressed.
When the Crusaders reached the East in the eleventh 
century, the Christian community in Lebanon was under 
increasing pressure, as Islam was being reinforced by the 
nomadic Turks of Central Asia. In 1^53, the Moslem Turks 
conquered Constantinople, put an end to the Christian 
dominance, and the whole Eastern Mediterranean became Mare 
I si arnica (Dau 198^, 378).
For the Christians of Lebanon, an increased feeling of 
isolation led them to look for local allies. Their choice 
fell on the Druze, by far the largest and the most powerful 
community in the country. In the second half of the 
sixteenth century an alliance was formed between the 
Maronites and the most prominent Druze family, the M a ’an, 
led by Fakraddin.
For many years thereafter, the political history of 
Lebanon was dominated by the Maronites and the Druze. With 
the migration of Arab tribes, Sunni and S h i ’ite, primarily 
to the coastal areas and the plains, and with the growing
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presence of several Christian groups (e.g., Maronites, Greek 
Catholics and Gregorian Armenians), the modern "confes­
sional" structure of Lebanon began to emerge and take 
definite form.
Under the rule of the M a ’an family, the Maronites 
reinforced their power and enjoyed political preponderance. 
Later, this power was exercised by the Shihab family which 
became the successor of the M a ’an family in asserting its 
power over the whole country.
Under the rule of Bashir II Shihab (179^-18^0), an 
alliance between the prince and the Maronite clergy helped 
the Maronites to expand over the whole of Mount Lebanon. 
Gradually, the Maronite community was becoming the human 
backbone of the Lebanese mountain system, and the Maronite 
clergy the institutional foundation of the Christian 
communi t ies.
Toward the end of Bashir’s rule, religious differences 
and strife assumed country-wide dimensions, with an 
intensity which had never existed before. This set the tone 
of future Lebanese political life and led to the direct 
intervention of the Western powers— principally, France— in 
the internal affairs of Lebanon. Overt French intervention 
came about as a result of the invasion of the Egyptian 
leader, Ibrahim Pasha, followed by the Egyptian occupation 
of Lebanon (1831-18^0).
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The principal contribution of the Egyptian occupation 
to Lebanese sectarianism was the splitting of the Mountain—  
a coastal mountain range? where the Maronites and the Druze 
communities have historically had their roots— into two 
hostile? armed and suspicious camps: Christian and Druze.
The rivalry between them was capable of plunging the country 
into a religious holocaust at the first intentional or 
unintentional provocation (Hitti 1957? 257-64).
The Ottoman Turks were very eager to foment inter- 
communal strife in Lebanon so as to establish direct rule 
over the Mountain? by playing the role of arbitrator. As 
for the Moslem communities (Druze? S h i ’ite and Sunni)? they 
were determined to regain the ground lost to the Christians 
during the rule of Bashir II. Moslems resented the 
privileges accorded by Bashir II to the Christians and were 
eager to remind the latter that? under the law of Islam? 
Christians could only be second-class citizens.
For centuries— from the Moslem conquests in the seventh 
century down to modern times— within Islam? Christians were 
dhimmi. This meant that the Christian minority existed as a 
protected trust? living on the fringes of social life? 
Christians never were full members of the Moslem community? 
sharing neither its responsibilities nor its rights.
Conditions were ripe for a communal clash? and it was 
triggered in the autumn of 1841 when the Druze feudal lords 
attempted to regain control of the lands that had been
l a
confiscated by Prince Bashir II and distributed to Maronite 
peasants. Soon the Druze began attacking Christian villages 
and massacring their inhabitants.
During the following decades external influences mainly 
determined the political development of Lebanon. In 1842, 
in an agreement between the Ottomansj on the one hand) and 
the five Great Powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, 
Russia) on the other, Mount Lebanon was divided into two 
districts (qa'im maqamiyah), one Christian in the north, and 
the other Druze in the south. Each was to be governed by a 
q a 7 i m maqam appointed by the Turkish Pasha (Qubain 1961,
12). In June, 1860, Druze and Moslems attacked Christian 
villages killing some 10,000 Christians and destroying 360 
villages (Abakarius 1920, 60). In 1861, the Europeans and 
the Ottomans made public their proposal for the 
reorganization of the system under the Reolement Orqanique 
of 1861. The new system was hierarchial. Under the 
Reqlement Orqanique of 1861 Lebanon became an autonomous 
entity, ruled by a Christian non-Lebanese Ottoman official 
(Meo 1965, 35). This accord established the Mutassarri fiyya 
<governorate) system and abolished feudalism in the Mountain 
(Hitti 1962, 441).^
Under the new administration, Lebanon was divided into 
seven districts, according to the prevailing religious 
confessions in each. The ruler (Mutassarrif) was aided by a 
central administrative council of twelve. This council was
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to be made up of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek 
Orthodox, one S h i ’ite, one Sunni, and one Greek Catholic 
(Salibi 1965, 110). The Realement Oroanioue of 1861 lasted 
until the outbreak of World War I, when Lebanon was subject 
to Turkish military rule.
The State of Greater Lebanon 
In January of 1919, the Paris Peace Conference gave 
France a "mandate" over both Lebanon and Syria. In accord 
with the terms of the mandate and with the consent and 
cooperation of the Representative Council of Lebanon 
(elected in 1925), French authorities drafted a constitution 
on May 22, 1926, thus legalizing the newly created "Greater 
Lebanon" (al-Hassan 1963, 5^). The Constitution reflected 
the new political realities of Greater Lebanon, and it 
further institutionalized the confessional nature of the 
Lebanese political system.^
It would be useful here to elaborate on the bearing of 
the new constitution on future political developments in the 
country. The Constitution drafted in 1926 endowed Lebanon 
with modern political institutions, in what was essentially 
a serious attempt by the French to institutionalize the 
existing political pluralism in the country. Thus the 
Constitution accepted the de facto existence of the various 
communities and made provisions for the protection of their 
respective rights.
The Moslems and their leaders regarded the modern 
concept of political pluralism and the creation of 
democratic institutions as alien to the Islamic political 
outlook and tradition. The Moslem state is basically 
theocratic in nature. Full membership in the political 
community is reserved only to those who accept Islam» 
irrespective of their nationality. In theory, the Moslem 
Umma ("nation") is composed of all those who profess the 
teaching of Islam. The status of the Christians is, 
therefore, that of dh immi % non-Moslem subjects living under 
Islamic law and enjoying protection, in return for paying 
the poll tax. Christians have no share in the political 
power structure of the State. For the Moslems, therefore, 
equal legal status for the Christians, and a French-imposed 
power-sharing formula for Lebanon, were not acceptable.
The attitude of the Moslem population, and 
particularly of the Sunni, towards the new Lebanese state 
remained hostile for a considerable period. The ideology of 
Lebanese nationalism based on secular principles was 
unacceptable to the religious1y-motivated Moslem masses.
For the latter, religion has always claimed priority above 
other symbols of identification. Accordingly, union with 
Moslem Syria and other Moslem Arab countries remained one of 
the primary objectives of the Moslem leadership. This lack 
of loyalty towards the Lebanese fatherland as created in 
1919 hindered the emergence of a viable political community
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in Lebanon, and it encouraged continuation of a strong 
communal spirit and sectarian loyalties.
The concept of a separate Lebanese identity with 
distinct characteristics based on historical, social and 
political factors was thus unacceptable to the Moslem 
leadership, for whom Islam and Arabism were (theoretically 
as well as practically) inseparable and indivisible. The 
idea of a secular Lebanon, based on pluralism and liberal 
democratic concepts, was regarded as a device conceived by 
French colonial authorities to isolate Lebanon from Moslem 
Syria and the Moslem Arab world generally. Thus ever since 
the creation of a modern Lebanese political entity, the 
loyalty of its Moslem communities, particularly of the 
Sunnis, was always directed toward Damascus and the Moslem 
Arab countries.
Independent Lebanon
A central debate about the Lebanese identity began in 
1920. The Moslem community, especially the Sunni element, 
felt it had been artificially and unjustifiably separated 
from the great Sunni majority in Syria and the Arab world 
generally. By contrast, Christians, especially Maronites, 
remained adamant about the distinctiveness of Lebanon and 
the finality of its independence.
The efforts of the Lebanese Christians to establish a 
state became increasingly nationalist. They have always
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expected the Moslems to give up their notion of Arab 
nationalism and declare their allegiance to Lebanese 
nationalism. However, the strong ties of the Christians, 
especially the Maronites, with France led the Moslems to 
regard them as potential traitors.
The year 19A3 saw the termination of the French mandate 
and the proclamation of an independent Lebanon. This period 
witnessed the emergence of an important verbal agreement, 
better known as the National Fact (al-mithaq al-watani).
This was regarded as an essential constitutional agreement 
legitimizing the existing political institutions and 
confessional power-sharing among the various communities of 
Lebanon.
In fact, this verbal agreement was no more than a 
modus vivendi between two political personalities— the 
Maronite President Bishara al-Khoury and the Sunni Prime 
Minister Riyad as-Sulh (representing the Lebanese Moslems 
and Druze). These leaders claimed to represent the two most 
powerful communities in the country, the Maronite and the 
Sunni (Hudson 1968, ) . These individuals reached an
agreement with regard to power-sharing in the formal 
governmental structure— and to the principles of policy 
formulation in internal and external fields. This 
understanding preserved the existing power relationship 
between the communities and informally legitimized the 
confessional basis of the Lebanese political system. As a
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result* the pattern of representation of the communities 
according to their proportional numerical strength in the 
state apparatus— parliament* administrat ion, courts and 
armed forces— was firmly established.
For more than three decades the principles of the pact 
were not subjected to any serious alteration or challenge. 
Yet the Lebanese state was unsuccessful in its efforts to 
integrate the various communities into the Lebanese 
"nation," which enjoyed a merely nominal existence. Under 
the pact, the governmental structure and its infrastructures 
did not produce the wished-for results. As a result, the 
problems of national identity and national loyalty posed 
important obstacles to the creation of a viable political 
community within Lebanon. Nation-wide institutions 
continued to play a minor role in the various spheres of 
nat iona1 1 ife.
Throughout this period several attempts were made by 
various groups— especially Christian intellectuals— to 
secularize Lebanon. However, these attempts always met 
fierce opposition from Moslem circles. The main objective 
of the Moslem communities remained the alteration of the 
balance of power in the country in their favor. No efforts 
were made by the Moslem political leadership to modernize 
the existing political institutions in the country or to 
familiarize its followers with democratic liberal 
principles. The Western concept of a "pluralized" Lebanon—
2^
which would serve as the center and meeting point of Western 
and Middle Eastern civilizations— remained alien to the 
Moslems. The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Moslem 
intellectuals was engrossed in non-Lebanese socio-political 
issues, constantly attempting to solve their identity 
problem by referring to Arab, Moslem, Marxist and, lately, 
Palestinian ideals.
Consequently, the principles of the pact, which were to 
serve as guidelines for policy formulation in Lebanon, were 
seldom respected by the major political forces in the 
country. The first principle related to the attitude of the 
Christian communities, particularly the Maronites, towards 
the Western world. Under the pact, Maronites agreed to 
limit their political ties with the West and to refrain from 
asking for Western political and military "protection," as 
in the past. It was a crucial concession, when one 
considers the Christians’ long-established cultural, socio­
political and economic ties with Europe.
The second principle of the pact related to the 
attitude of the Moslem communities, particularly Sunni, 
towards Moslem Syria and the Moslem Arab world. Under the 
terms of the pact, Moslems were required to accept the 
existence of an independent Lebanese political entity, 
thereby respecting its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. They agreed to refrain from demanding unity with 
Syria or with other Moslem Arab states. Yet in reality,
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throughout the post-independence period) as often as not the 
behavior of both the Moslem and the Christian leadership 
totally negated the first and the second principles of the 
pact.
The third principle of the National Pact dealt with 
foreign policy formulation. According to this principle) 
after independence) the Lebanese state was to pursue a non­
interventionist policy in regional and international 
conflicts; it was to support any move or action which 
strengthened relations between Arab states and fostered 
unity within Arab ranks. In inter-Arab conflicts Lebanon 
was to adopt a policy of strict "neutrality)" refusing to 
side with any Arab nation against another. Yet throughout 
the post-independence period) Lebanese Moslem political 
leadership in fact constantly attempted to drag the Lebanese 
State into inter-Arab conflicts.
The 1958 Civil War
In 1958) Lebanon experienced the most serious crisis in 
its modern history until the 1970s. For more than five 
months— May to early October— the country witnessed 
continuous civil disorder) including violent skirmishes 
between Christian and Moslem forces. The civil war shook 
the very foundations of the Lebanese republic. The whole 
country was divided into two opposing camps. On one side 
stood the Maronite President) Camille Chamoun, enjoying the
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support of most Christian political forces? and on the other 
side was the predominant1y Moslem opposition.
Several factors produced the 1958 crises. It was 
largely events external to the Lebanese domestic scene that 
caused this violent crisis to erupt. The rise to power of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and in the Arab world must be 
regarded as the main catalyst that ignited the 1958 civil 
war. During the 1950s a strong wave of pan-Arab nationalism 
spread throughout the Arab world. Nasser became the symbol 
of this newly emerging movement and the idol of the Moslem 
Arab masses. Moreover, the 1958 Union between Egypt and 
Syria (the United Arab Republic) accelerated the crisis in 
Lebanon, where Nasser found a fertile soil for the 
realization of his political objectives. After 195^, there 
was also a growing tendency among Lebanese Moslems, 
particularly the Sunnis, to look towards Egypt for support 
(Salibi 1965, 198). It was, therefore, obvious that Moslem 
sentiments would be directed towards Nasser and Nasserism, 
in the hope that Lebanon’s integration into the United Arab 
Republic would put an end to Christian dominance in the 
country.
Ever since the Egyptian Revolution in 1952, most of 
Lebanon’s Moslems leaders had been pressing President 
Chamoun to adopt a pro-Nasserite policy toward inter-Arab 
disputes, as well as to adopt a more anti-Western attitude 
in international diplomacy. This, of course, was in
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violation of the third principle of the National Pact which 
clearly stipulated that the Lebanese state should adopt a 
neutral attitude in inter-Arab disputes, as well as in 
international affairs. This pressure on President Chamoun 
finally led him to adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine— a 
resolution passed the U.S. Congress in January, 1957, 
declaring that "if the President determines the 
necessity...Cthe United States] is prepared to use armed 
forces to assist...any nation or groups of nations 
requesting assistance against armed aggression from any 
country controlled by international communism." Chamoun 
evidently anticipated greater Western economic and military 
aid to counter the increasing Nasserite threat 
(Congressional Quarterly 1986, 171-72).
The 1958 civil war ended with a formula of "no victor, 
no vanquished"— a principle which meant the maintenance of 
the political status quo. The events, however, left Lebanon 
bitterly divided on certain major issues. The civil war did 
not result in any solution for such vital problems as 
national identity, the future of the political and economic 
systems, and Lebanon’s role in regional and internationa1 
politics.
The Beginning of the End
Some ten years later Lebanon experienced another 
prolonged political crisis, which can be regarded as a
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prelude to the present civil war. The 1969 crisis was 
mainly due to the presence in Lebanon of armed Palestinian 
groups and their confrontation with the State of Israel.
The key issue posed by this group was alignment for or 
against the Palestinian guerrilla movement) which appeared 
on the scene after the war in 1967. This crisis, which 
lasted from April until late November, erupted as a result 
of violent clashes that took place in several Lebanese 
cities between the Lebanese police and demonstrators who 
demanded that an end be put to all restrictions on 
Palestinian activities in the country. These clashes led to 
the resignation of the government of Prime Minister Rashid 
Karami, following which no Moslem Sunni leader was able to 
form a government.
Thereafter, Lebanon was virtually divided into two 
camps on the issue of the armed Palestinian presence within 
Lebanon. On the one side stood the Lebanese parties 
enjoying the support of the Christian communities— chiefly 
the Kata’ib. On the other side was a combination of 
political forces— Arab nationalists, Syrian nationalists, 
and Marxists— who drew their support from the Moslem 
communities. The Christian parties demanded the disarming 
of the Palestinians and regarded their armed presence as a 
serious danger to the cohesion of the state. Many Moslems 
actively campaigned, however, for the right of the 
Palestinian guerrillas to enjoy freedom of action in the
country and to carry on the armed struggle against Israel 
from Lebanese territory.
A public opinion poll taken in 1969 showed that 73 
percent of the Moslems, compared to 26 percent of the 
Christians, expressed support for the FLO (Barakat 1977, 
31). As to whether Palestinian commandos should be allowed 
to operate from Lebanese territory, the responses were:
Source: Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of
Revolving Doors (1985), ^2.
An agreement negotiated in Cairo in 1969 concluded 
between the representatives of the Lebanese state and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization temporarily ended the 
1969 crisis. The agreement was a clear victory for the PL 0. 
It granted the Palestinian resistance movement the right of 
security and of administrative control inside the Lebanese 
refugee camps. It also recognized the right of the PLD to 
use Lebanese territory for continued operations against 
Israel.^
In 1973, however, Lebanon witnessed new and heavy armed 
clashes between Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese 
Army, as Palestinians hardened their attitude following the 
P L O ’s expulsion from Jordan in the preceding months.













Palestinian activity. Once again the overwhelming majority 
of Moslems supported the Palestinians against the Lebanese 
army and state, while the Christian population opposed them.
The Disintegration of Lebanon 
In 1975 the destructive Lebanese civil war began. The 
Lebanese army, widely viewed as the main pillar of the 
Lebanese state, was totally paralyzed because of the 
negative attitude of the Moslem leadership to its deployment 
in the conflict. This problem finally led to the collapse 
of the Lebanese Army in 1976. The Moslem communities, 
especially the S h i ’ite, strongly supported the presence and 
activities of the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. In 
fact, many S h i ’ites actively joined the PLO and fought 
against their Lebanese compatriots. Meanwhile, the PLO 
seized available opportunities to exercise control over more 
Lebanese territory.
Concurrently, the Syrians intervened in Lebanon in 
order to pursue their long dream— the creation of "Greater 
Syria." Before Lebanon and Syria became French Mandates on 
April 28, 1920, Lebanon had been divided into two regions: 
Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria. This division was created 
during the Ottoman period. Mount Lebanon included Zogharta, 
Batroun, Bishari, Jubail, and Kisrwan, all inhabited mainly 
by Maronites. Greater Syria included Tripoli in the north, 
Beirut in the south, and Beqa’a, Zahle, Tyre, and Sidon.
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Both Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria were ruled by a 
governor who resided in Damascus. It was not until the mid- 
19^05 that Lebanon and Syria became separate entities* 
completely independent from France. Syria* however, had 
never officially recognized Lebanese independence and its 
territorial integrity; and Damascus never established 
diplomatic relations with Beirut. Under the pretext of 
safeguarding Lebanon’s unity and protecting the Palestinian 
guerrilla movement, more than 35,000 Syrian troops came to 
occupy 65*/. of Lebanese territory. Their presence became 
another key issue dividing the communities of Lebanon.
Political Context
Although democracy is an important idea in both the 
Western and Eastern worlds, each understands it differently 
and approaches it differently. Arend Lijphart has 
distinguished a variety of democracy in which "the 
centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are 
counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of 
the leaders of the different segments of the population" 
(Lijphart 1977, 1). Through a variety of anti-majoritarian 
devices— such as grand coalitions, the rule of 
proportionality and material vetoes— it is argued that 
political leaders of the several subcultures can by their 
deliberate decisions bring stability to an otherwise badly 
divided society (Dix 1980, 303).
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In many ways, Lebanese "confessional" pluralism 
resembles Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy. 
Lijphart introduced an important variable which is relevant 
to cases of fragmented) but stable? democracies which he 
called "consociational democracies)" involving the behavior 
of the political elites. The leaders of the rival 
subcultures may engage in competitive behavior and aggravate 
mutual tensions and political instability? but they may also 
make efforts to counteract the immobilizing and 
destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation (Lijphart 
1969, 213). Consociational democracy violates the principle 
of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from 
normative democratic theory (Lijphart 1969, 215).
Subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and 
interests may coexist by relying upon this concept.
Conflict arises when they are in contact with each other.
As Quincy Wright (1951, 196) states: "Ideologies accepted
by different groups within a society may be inconsistent 
without creating tension, but if the groups are in close 
contact the tension will be great." Lijphart, therefore, 
recommends the existence of distinct lines of cleavage 
between subcultures. This, he asserts, has the advantage 
"of limiting mutual contacts and, consequently, of limiting 
the changes of everpresent potential antagonisms to erupt 
into actual hostility" (Lijphart 1968, 25).
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According to Hrair Dekmejian, "despite periodic 
external and internal crisis? after 1946 Lebanon survived as 
a pluralized democracy for over thirty years" (Dekmejian 
1978? S 5 2 ). How Lebanon survived that long and the nature 
of its current crisis, are questions that can be understood 
in large part by reference to the idea of consociational 
democracy. Lijphart’s model offers a number of concepts 
that may, or in some cases may not, be illustrated by the 
case of Lebanon.
Over the years Lebanese elites (Z u ’ama or traditional 
sectarian leaders) have demonstrated a remarkable ability 
for minimizing inter-sectarian conflicts, although they have 
been less successful at sustaining inter-elite cooperation.
Lebanon’s mu 11iconfessiona1 elite had its origin in the 
Ottoman period (Dekmejian 1975, 13). Under the French 
Mandate, the cartel became institutionalized; the first 
grand coalition was put together in the Cabinet and the 
Chamber of Deputies, representing five of the largest 
communities, as later reflected in the National Pact of 1943 
(Zuwiyya 1978, 7 —8). Before the pact, Lebanese history had 
witnessed much fragmentation and recurrent violence. After 
1943, however, different elite cartels were put together 
under almost every president and these provided some sense 
of stability, with the exception of the years 1958 and 1975. 
The emergence of Palestinian activism after the Arab defeat 
in 1967, ensuing Israeli attacks against PLO bases on
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Lebanon, the weakness of the Lebanese Army, and ongoing 
Palestinian attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory 
combined to erode the ability of Lebanese elites to maintain 
this earlier pattern of cooperation.
Many observers have believe the recent turmoil in 
Lebanon is partly rooted in the disparity between Moslem and 
Christian representation among the ruling elite, aggravated 
by the increase in the Moslem population over the Maronites 
since the last census of 1933 (Crow 1963, 489). To gain a 
better understanding of the function of the confessional 
political system, one must grasp the ethno-religious and 
historical determinants of the Lebanese situation. As noted 
earlier, the aim of the National Pact had been to maintain 
societal and political stability and harmony by preserving a 
balance of confessional power (Rondot 1955, 353). 
Confessional equilibrium was equated with proportional 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies and in the 
government, based upon the respective size of the various 
religious communities. It will be recalled that the 
agreement provided a fixed ratio of representation in the 
Parliament and in the government generally: six Christians
for every five Moslems (three Sunnis and two S h i ’ites).
A very significant pattern exists in Lebanon that is 
seldom seen in other countries: When politicians lose 
influence in the elite cartel, they frequently try to 
broaden the scope of conflict in order to attract foreign
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supporters to defeat their opponents. This phenomenon 
indicates that the notion of "nationalism" in Lebanon, as 
usually understood in the West, is very weak. Conflicts 
among Lebanese elites may involve both Lebanese nationalism 
and Arab nationalism.
A dynamic factor which tends to maximize conflict 
within the Lebanese elite cartel is the lack of cohesion 
within each subculture. As we have already observed, 
Christians are divided into several groups: Maronites,
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and the Gregorian (Orthodox) 
Armenians. In turn, Moslems are divided into the Sunni and 
S h i ’ite branches. Even among a single group— S h i ’ite— there 
has been growing fragmentation. The third religious 
community consists of the followers of the post-Islamic 
sect, the Druze. Thus among all the sects, and within them, 
conflict is ever present. Each sectarian group is segmented 
along geographic, clan, and class lines, so that none of the 
principal elite members can represent the entire sect.
According to Lijphart, a multiple balance of power is 
preferred for the maintenance of democracy. The larger the 
number of subcultures, and the more equal their sizes, the 
greater the propensity for balance. In Lebanon, the greater 
emigration of Christians (especially to the United States), 
combined with the Moslem birth rate in Lebanon and Moslem 
immigration from Syria and Palestine, seem to have tipped 
the demographic balance in favor of the Moslems. However,
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there has been little unity among the Moslems. A multiple 
balance among all the sects could be adequate to maintain a 
consociational system.
With the exception of 1958 and 1975, the record of the 
Lebanese elite in conflict management has been relatively 
good. Had it been otherwise, the Lebanese political system 
would not have survived. On the other hand, the dominant 
elites seem also to have lacked a social conscience, having 
done little in the areas of unemployment and social services 
for the society (Hudson 1968, 11-18). An additional major 
systemic weakness has been the inability to effectively use 
the Lebanese Army effectively, especially against the 
Palestinians, who are not considered one of the principal 
confessional groups within Lebanese society.
The existence of encapsulated social units, which do 
not interact frequently with other units, may theoretica11y 
be conducive to peace. But unlike Switzerland, the 
sectarian groups of Lebanon were not geographically isolated 
from one another. Much of the Lebanese population is 
intermingled, both in urban and rural areas. Increasing 
modernization has tended to reduce the geographical 
separation that once characterized Lebanese confessional 
groups.
The Middle Eastern political environment is one of the 
most unstable subsystems within the international system.
The Arab sphere itself has been torn by long-standing and
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conflicting communal and dynastic loyalties. In this 
context* three kinds of external conflicts have affected 
Lebanon’s delicately balanced confessional system: (1) the
struggles among the Arab states; <S> the Arab-Israeli 
confrontationj and (3) the Soviet-American cold war. All of 
these have led to frequent external interventions in 
Lebanese domestic affairs. As* by many criteria* the 
weakest state in the area* Lebanon has often become a 
convenient political and military battleground for its 
neighbors.
For these reasons and because of historical hatreds and 
fragmentation * the Lebanese system has always been fragile. 
There occurred during the period of consociational democracy 
a relative stability* but whenever the existing tensions
were aggravated* conflict resulted (Hottinger 1966* 86-
0105). How effective cosociationa1ism could be in 
stabilizing the Lebanese system in the absence of external 
factors— such as the Arab-Israeli conflict— would seem to be 
a relevant question; but the elimination of such factors is 
difficult, if not impossible. The actual partition of the 
state, as a result of the civil war, is a real possibility, 
though this would by no means end the conflicts among the 
various parties to the conflict. Discouragement of external 
intervention must come from within the state. This in turn 
would require real cooperation at the elite level and a 
strong sense of nationalism among the Lebanese communities.
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Whether these conditions can come about remains, at best, an 
open question.
Unlike the West, Arab society revolves around the clan. 
Traditiona11y , leaders settled disputes informally, and they 
routinely oversaw the minutiae of their subjects’ personal 
lives. In Lebanon, those leaders are called, Z u ’ama 
(singular Z a ’im). Who are they?
A Z a ’im is "a political leader who possesses the 
support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains 
this support by fostering or appearing to foster the 
interests of as many as possible from amongst his c 1iente1e 
(Hottinger 1961, 128-29). Z u ’ama are found in the Moslem, 
Maronite and Druze communities. Historically, the Z u ’ama 
did— and still do— serve as military chieftains, with an 
armed following; in turn, they provided defense and 
protection to those under their influence. The Z u ’ama also 
provided jobs for their people, tried to "promote" them 
within the government, and got their "share" of government 
positions for their clients.
Curiously, in spite of Lebanon’s unprecedented 
prosperity since World War II and predictions to the 
country, the institution of the Z u ’ama has in fact continued 
and has adopted itself to the environment of the new, modern 
Lebanon. To win the support of their clientele, the Z u ’ama 
must be of the same confession as their followers. This
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approach has strengthened communal political socialization 
at the expense of national political socia 1ization.
In Lebanon? therefore? democracy was not built on a 
comprehensive countrywide attachment to the nation.
Citizens may be aware that they are Lebanese? but this is 
not as important to them as being a Maronite? Orthodox 
Christian? Sunni? S h i ’ite? Druze? or member of some other 
community. A former President? Bashir Gemayel? once
Qdescribed this system as "a farm more than a nation....'
Consequently? political parties are not as important in 
Lebanon as in most other democratic states. Of the ninety- 
nine representatives in the Chamber of Deputies? no more 
than one-third have ever been party representatives? and 
since 1943 no party or combination of parties has ever 
formed a government and led the nation. (This can be seen 
more clearly in Appendix I.) The representatives are? for 
the most part? powerful Z u ’ama? prominent businessmen? and 
large landowners who form loosely organized and continually 
shifting political blocs.
Political parties have often existed in Lebanon 
primarily as loose collections of personal cliques that have 
penetrated little beyond the upper crust of society. In 
Lebanon parties have served largely as the instruments to 
promote the interests of powerful individuals and small 
elites. Generally? parties have appealed to the members of 
one sect? the party’s political ideology has been in harmony
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with the group’s dominant values. The name of the party may 
indicate an ideological stance common to persons of all 
sects, but in reality its actual following is very 
homogeneous.
Many Lebanese parties customarily operate private 
militia, the ranks of which are filled with men and women 
who are well-trained, disciplined, and equipped with modern 
arms and heavy weapons. In times of civil disorder the 
militia protect the villages, regions, and urban quarters in 
which the party is strong. These armed forces are beyond 
the control of, and are rivals to, the government. The 
Lebanese army and national police have traditionally 
refrained from interfering in conflicts among these separate 
militia forces.
The Civil War
In 1975, a conflict first erupted between the 
Palestinians and the K a t a ’ib Party. This conflict 
subsequently widened and threatened the very existence of 
Lebanon. The Palestinian problem is only one of the many 
other tensions involved in the Lebanese war. This conflict 
can no less be viewed as a religious struggle between 
Christians and Moslems. Yet it is also in some measure a 
class conflict, pitting the poor against the wealthy. 
Moreover, it is a political struggle among rival Z u ’ama. 
These Z u ’ama were of course driven by personal ambitions,
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but they also fought over questions of political, social, 
and economic reforms. In addition, there was a fundamental 
polarization between those who emphasized Lebanon’s 
"Arabism" and those who stressed Lebanon’s "Lebanism" (or 
independence from the Arab world).
In recent years, Arab nationalism has emerged as a 
major political phenomenon in the Middle East, and the 
Lebanese Moslems— especially the Sunnis— are by no means 
immune to its appeals. The familiar Western-derived notion 
of Lebanese "nationalism," based on secular principles, has 
been and remains totally unacceptable to the religiously- 
motivated Moslems masses. For the latter, religion has 
always claimed priority over other symbols of identifica­
tions. Union with Moslem Syria or other Moslem Arab 
countries remained one of the primary objectives of the 
Moslem leadership. The concept of an independent Lebanese 
identity, proposed by Lebanese nationalists (mainly the 
Kat a’ib), with distinct characteristics based on historical, 
social, and political factors, was unacceptable to the 
Moslem leadership. For the latter, Islam and Arabism were 
(theoretically, as well as practically) inseparable and 
indivisible. The idea of a secular Lebanon based on 
pluralism and liberal democratic concepts was regarded as a 
device conceived by Christians and their Western supporters 
to isolate Lebanon from Moslem Syria and the Moslem Arab
world. Thus? since the independence of Lebanon? the 
question of Lebanese identity, still debatable.
Fighting broke out within Lebanon in April, 1975, when 
an unidentified gunman attempted to assassinate Sheikh 
Pierre Gemayel— founder (in 1936) of the Christian Kata’ib 
Party. The Kata’ib Party was the largest political party in
modern Lebanon. It was also an important and influential
Lebanese political organization, which was dedicated to 
promoting nationalism, modern liberal democracy and state- 
assisted private enterprise. Sheikh Pierre Gemayel was the 
father of President-elect Bashir Gemayel and the next 
president, Amin Gemayel. In retaliation, the Kata’ib
militiamen ambushed a bus passing through the town and
killed its twenty-eight passengers, most of whom were 
Palestinians. Soon thereafter the fighting spread, with 
Christians confronting the combined forces of the 
Palestinians, their Moslems allies, and the heavily-armed 
Druze, who were ever ready to even old scores with their 
traditional Christian enemy.
The Lebanese have always tend to revise history to fit 
their view that the war was not among Lebanese groups at all 
but between foreign forces who were using Lebanon as a 
battle-ground. This claim usually contains some truth, 
though it can hardly be said that the Lebanese were without 
serious grievances against one another. For many years, the 
ruling elite— Moslems and Christians alike— had exploited
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the country; and the state had been deficient in providing 
education, health care, and other social services to 
disadvantaged groups, especially in non-Christian areas. 
Although it seems fair to blame the Palestinians for 
disrupting Lebanon’s fragile political equilibrium, it was 
the Lebanese themselves who did most of the fighting.
In June of 1976, Syria sent regular units into Lebanon 
on a "peace-keeping mission." This intervention was 
legitimized later in October, when an Arab Summit Conference 
created an "Arab Deterrent Force" in Lebanon, based on the 
several thousand Syrian troops already there. Yet no well- 
informed person was under any illusion that Syria’s goal was 
simply to restore peace. Though the Syrians have as yet 
made no move to annex Lebanon outright, the Maronites are 
convinced of their determination to "Islamize" it.
Ironically, however, Syrian forces initially entered 
Lebanon as allies of the Christians in 1976, when Christians 
were facing the main threat from Palestinians. Syria 
intervened militarily in June of 1976, with the proclaimed 
aim of preventing the Pa 1 est i n i an-l'ef t i st coalition from 
achieving a military victory. Such a victory would have led 
to partitioning of Lebanon, new foreign intervention, and 
generally negative consequences for the Palestinian and Arab 
cause. Syrian forces, therefore, helped drive Palestine 
Liberation Organization guerrillas and their Moslem and 
leftist allies from vantage points threatening the Christian
enclave. Until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 
Syria presided over an uneasy truce in Lebanon. The Israeli 
forces subsequently evacuated Lebanon; but with 35,000 
troops in the country, Syria exercises a potent influence. 
Damascus has permitted Lebanon to retain the trappings of 
sovereignty, but few of the actual powers. Yet the Syrian 
government has not at the same time made clear its long-term 
objectives in Lebanon.
The Emergence of the Lebanese Forces
As noted earlier, a conflict first erupted between the 
Palestinian and the Kata’ib Party in 1975. Within a year 
after this fight broke out, a faction within the 
predominantly Christian militia joined together to form what 
was later called the Lebanese Forces <LF)» created in 1976. 
Bashir Gemayel was elected President of the Lebanese Forces’ 
Council of Leadership. These united forces included 
fighters from pre-existing Lebanese Parties, such as: the
Social Democratic Party, the National Liberal Party (NLP), 
the Tanzim, the Guardians of the Cedars, and others not 
affiliated with any political party. On November 26, 19B0, 
after the approval of all parties belonging to the Lebanese 
Forces, the Council of Leadership of the Lebanese Forces, 
presided over by Bashir Gemayel, was created and its 
functions defined clearly.
^5
The first event that led to a joint military operation 
was the incident at Tel al-Za’tar. Strategics 1ly, Tel al- 
Za'tar was important since it dominated all of East Beirut 
and the port area. The National Liberal Party took the 
initiative in attacking Tel al-Za’tar, in cooperation with 
some other militia, such as al-Tanzim. The Kata’ib joined 
the fight later. In June 22, 1976, " The battle to occupy 
Tel al-Za’tar, the most important battle of the fourteen 
months war, has begun" (Chamoun 1977, 110-11). On August
12, 1976, Tel al-Za’tar fell into the hands of the Christian 
parties. The success of this operation underscored the 
importance of coordinating efforts under a joint military 
command. Prior to the Tel al-Za’tar operation, Christian 
militia had often been fighting separately and ineffective­
ly. As the new Lebanese Forces took form, and as the often 
anarchical wartime militia cohered into an outwardly 
disciplined, regular military force, resistance efforts 
toward the Syrians and the PLO became more organized and 
effective. The necessity of a common defense took on a 
dynamic of its own, independent of any political differences 
that existed among party leaders. Added to this, there was 
a widespread realization on the part of all the participants 
that, as Benjamin Franklin advised Americans, they had "to 
hang together or they would hang separately."
In Lebanon, this unification, however, was not achieved 
without considerable friction. For example, the Christian
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militia in northern Lebanon, called Marada, posed a 
difficult problem. For various reasons, basically 
political, the leader of el-Marada, Tony Franjieh, was 
k i l l e d . I n  order to achieve unification, it was important 
for the Kata’ib to consolidate its control over other 
Christian militia. The chief obstacle was the family headed 
by the 2 a ’im Suleiman Franjieh, who had emerged as deeply 
pro-Syrian and anti- Israe1i . In June, 1978, Kata’ib units 
led by Samir Geagea— who today commands the Lebanese Forces- 
-attacked Franjieh’s stronghold in the north and killed the 
patriarch’s oldest son, Tony, his wife and child, along with 
thirty-two followers. This battle, which broke the family’s 
military power, intensified a long-standing Franjieh-Gemayel 
blood feud, which continues to embitter Christian politics 
in Lebanon to this day.
The bloodiest clash, however, occurred on July 7, 1980, 
when Lebanese Forces fighters surrounded Chamounist bases 
throughout Fast Beirut and along the coastal road leading 
north. The destruction of the Chamounist "Tigers," as they 
were called, and their absorption into the Lebanese Forces, 
meant that for the first time nearly all the Christians 
fighting units were represented by a single organization. 
Never before had nearly all the Christian sects and factions 
been represented by one single man or organization. And 
never before had the Maronites been able to dominate the 
other Christian sects, which collectively, were as large as
the Maronite community. Following this action, as mentioned 
earlier, the Council of Leadership of the Lebanese Forces 
was created, presided by Bashir Gemayel.
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Bashir Gemayel From an Address at the Lebanese 
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C in Arabic 3 .
Marada derives its name From the mountain oF the 
Maradites who, during the Islamic conquest oF Syria, 
Fiercely resisted the Arabs. The Arabic root oF the 
word also contains a reference to rebellion, so that 
the Maradas also render their name as "revolutionaries" 
or "rebels." Their military leader was Tony Franjieh, 
son oF the Former Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh.
CHAPTER TWO
COALITION POLITICS AND THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM
A crucial fact about the political movement that is the 
central focus of this study— the Lebanese Farces— is that 
ever since Lebanon became independent, all of its political 
parties have been compel led to join and participate in 
political coalitions. As emphasized in the previous 
chapter, this dominant reality has been dictated by the 
unique nature of the Lebanese political environment, 
especially its "confessional" nature.
Since 194-3, political life in Lebanon has been 
characterized by the proliferation of political parties, 
movements, and splinter groups. In turn, these have 
reflected the growing heterogeneity of the Lebanese social 
order, by the existence of several rival ideologies and 
causes (such as the Palestine Liberation Organization), and 
by the growing involvement of foreign governments and 
political movements in Lebanese political contests. Because 
of the extremely strong ties of confessional ism which have 
traditionally bound individuals and groups in Lebanon, 
politically the nation has long been regarded as a "special 
case" or exception to most of the principles governing 
democratic politics in the West. In many respects, Lebanon 
is simply not comparable to other nations. (The closest 
Western analogy might be the case of Ireland, where
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religious ties also tend to be a dominant factor of 
political life.) In nearly all cases, Lebanese political 
parties have been controlled by a single ethnic or religious 
group, whose interests it represents and promotes. An 
interesting fact about political parties within Lebanon also 
(making them comparable to party organizations in the State 
of Israel) is that they frequently operate their own 
newspapers, old folks’ homes, youth clubs, and other party- 
run institutions. Lebanese political parties, in other 
words, have an influence far beyond what most Western 
observers would view as the usual "political arena."
This is merely another way of saying that Lebanon’s 
political system reflects the enormous diversi tv of the 
society within which it operates. Upon close examination, 
it will be found that political interactions and 
relationships in Lebanon nearly always involve some 
combination of tradition and modernity, feudalism and 
capitalism, confessional ism and secularism, democracy and 
plutocracy, rugged individualism and communal ism. As 
emphasized in Chapter One (and additional details will be 
supplied in future pages), in Lebanon party names, labels, 
and avowed platforms can be, and frequently are, highly 
deceptive and misleading to one who is accustomed to the 
political dynamics of Western democracies.
In the light of these realities, it is inevitable 
perhaps that the decision-making process of the Lebanese
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government since independence tends also to be a mixture of 
rational and irrational? predictable and unpredictable 
forces. As often as not? the latter category of influences 
prove to be decisive in shaping the actions (or what may 
often be more significant for modern-day Lebanese 
governments, the non-ac t ions) of the government in 
responding to a wide range of internal and external 
problems. To cite but one example at this stage: Political
life in contemporary Lebanon is not explicable without an 
understanding of what is sometimes called "the politics of 
revenge" that often motivates the relationship between one 
political movement in Lebanon with another.
While the uniqueness of the Lebanese political system 
must always be kept clearly in mind, at the same time a 
basic assumption of the analysis in this chapter is that 
what political scientists call "coalition theory" can shed 
light upon the political dynamics of Lebanon. On that 
premise, an effort will be made here to apply a number of 
concepts associated with coalition theory to the behavior, 
objectives, tactics, and future of Lebanese political 
parties. Doing so will accomplish a two-fold objective. It 
enables us to gain new insights into the operation of the 
Lebanese political system; and it also provides an 
opportunity for "testing" certain propositions identified 
with coalition theory in a Middle Eastern or non-Western 
set t i n g .
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The discussion begins by depicting a typical pattern of 
"coalition politics" within modern Lebanon. Next? several 
theories of coalition formation are briefly presented? and 
their applicability to the specific case of the Lebanese 
Forces is examined. Finally? the chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of political 
coalitions within Lebanon. Needless to say? this subject is 
of major importance in determining the influence and future 
of the Lebanese Forces.
The "Magic Formula"
As noted in the previous chapter? the two leading 
politician in Lebanon— Riyad al-Solh and Bishara 
al-Khoury— came to a political agreement? known as the 
"National Covenant" (al—Mithaq al-Watani)? according to 
which political power was distributed among the religious 
sects. The Maronites controlled the presidency? the Sunnite 
Moslems the prime ministership? and the S h i ’ite Moslems the 
presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. Representation of 
the other religious groups in the Cabinet was also 
recogni zed.
In the Chamber of Deputies? all seats had been 
distributed among the various religious communities in 
proportion to their numerical strength. There were to be 
six Christian members to every five Moslems. This is why 
the Chamber’s total membership is always fixed in multiples
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of eleven. Currently, it is ninety-nine. The Chamber was 
thus an institution reflecting in itself the religious and 
social structure of the Lebanese State.
The National Covenant introduced Lebanon’s coalition 
formula which gave formal support for political legitimacy. 
In the Lebanese context, therefore, the coalition formula 
has been conceived of more as an instrument of stability and 
1iberty than of achievement and efficiency.
Late in 1943, therefore, Lebanon achieved a surprising 
degree of national solidarity, based on an alliance of 
interests shared by the leaders of the country’s largest and 
most influential communities. These leaders commanded the 
support of their co-religionist, as was well demonstrated in 
the Lebanese elections of 1943. At that time, the 
traditional political leaders of the various communities in 
Lebanon were unchallenged from within. Political parties 
hardly existed, except for the Lebanese Communist Party 
(LCP), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party <SSNP), the 
Kata’ib and al-Najjada. All of these were very small and 
relatively insignificant at the time (Suleiman 1967, 264). 
Class awareness hardly existed either, and consequently 
political loyalties were channelled into action through the 
mediation of the traditional political leadership.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the gradual 
erosion of the role of the Z u ’ama, as explained in Chapter 
One, has brought with it an increasingly widespread
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opposition to the present political system of Lebanon. As 
matters stand, the customs of government formation and the 
style of Lebanese politics leave the putting together of 
coalition cabinets very much to the President, with the 
cooperation of the leaders of the major religious 
communities; it also enables certain Z u *ama to remain in 
office almost forever, regardless how they may discharge 
their responsibilities.
It is clear that traditional group loyalties may 
explain a good deal of the support that leaders receive in 
Lebanese elections. As mentioned earlier, religion is 
usually a binding factor among these communities, although 
at times it may also be divisive. Traditiona11y , religious 
leaders have been politically allied with the leading feudal 
families, and the resulting coalitions tended to produce 
social and political monopolies within the country. For 
example, among the Maronites the position of the Patriarch 
is supreme; he is not only the chief religious spokesman for 
the Maronite community but also has evolved into a central 
political figure in Lebanon, as well. His stand in 
elections or during a national crisis frequently has a 
decisive effect on the course of events. For example, in 
November 1989, when Patriarch Sfier announced his support 
for Rene Mu'awwad, the newly elected President, the position 
of political rivals like General Aoun was weakened and 
threatened. Among the Moslems, on the other hand, religious
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leadership has traditionally been less powerful, although it 
sometimes exercises considerable influence upon political 
1 i f e .
In the long run, confessional policy may be the main 
dimension of politics in Lebanon. This reality has been 
demonstrated by the civil war, and the resulting split in 
one of the nation’s most important institution, the Lebanese 
Army.
In the early days of the 1975-1976 civil war, the army 
dispersed. Host of its members joined factional militia, or 
simply deserted to their homes and did not participate in 
the war. The Lebanese army is also divided into 
confessional balance. The soldiers are 60 percent Moslem,
^0 percent Christian; the Commander-in-Chief is Maronite 
Christian; the Chief of Staff is Druze Moslem; brigadier 
generals and lieutenant colonels are 50 percent Christian 
and 50 percent Moslems. Majors are 55 percent Christian, A5 
percent Moslem; full colonels are 70 percent are Christian, 
30 percent Moslem.
Officers in charge of the main administrative divisions 
of the army were distributed as follows. Personnel was 
headed by a Sunni Moslem; Intelligence (Deuxieme Bureau) by 
a Maronite; Plans and Operations by a S h i ’ite; Logistics and 
Supplies by a Maronite; and Public Affairs by a Druze Moslem 
(Assavad 1976, 12-13).
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Thus, it was no surprise to anyone familiar with 
Lebanon that this unique situation was unstable and broke up 
into a number of small armies. These small armies became 
important contenders in the civil war. One of these forces 
was called, the Lebanon’s Arab Army headed by Lieutenant 
Ahmad al-Khatib. This group subsequently fought on the side 
of the Leftists and Palestinians. A second group, known as 
The South Lebanon Army, was backed by Israel. This group 
patrolled a 50 mile-long and 6 mile-deep area immediately 
north of the Israeli border that Israel calls its "security 
zone." The South Lebanon Army was headed by Major S a ’d 
Haddad, who died of cancer in January 198^ and was succeeded 
by Brigadier General Antoine Lahad.
The third group, the bulk of the Lebanese Army, led by 
General Michael Aoun. This group claimed to be the only 
"legitimate" army within the country. This claim, however, 
in time became a very controversia 1 issue, considering an 
important development in the country. Late in 1989, the 
Lebanese president elect, Elias al-Harawi, fired General 
Aoun as Commander— in—Chief. However, at this time General 
Aoun is still in control of the what is left of the Lebanese 
Army and is still occupying the Presidential Palace.
The Coalition of Contrasts
In contrast with Western democracies, coalitions in 
Lebanon are the mechanisms through which, by a process of
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representation, the main confessional groups are brought 
together to govern in a spirit of consensus. Scholars often 
tend to highlight the unique procedures governing the 
selection of the executive branch of the Lebanese government 
and the consequences of a strongly developed tradition of 
sectarian politics. With a few exceptions, religious 
communities have been partners in government throughout the 
period covered in this study. The inherent fragmentation of 
Lebanese society have given rise to a peculiar set of 
conditions, in which the most politically primitive 
institutions are combined with a high degree of political 
sophistication.
The necessity for coalition politics in Lebanon is 
defined and explicitly recognized in the National Pact. The 
Pact spelled out the shares assigned to the various 
confessional communities in the formal governmental 
structure, and the agreement specified a number of basic 
principles regarding the governing of Lebanon and the 
orientation of its policies (Rondot 1947, S3).*
The Lebanese political system is essentially a 
presidential system. By the provisions of the constitution 
the president has been able to wield complete control of the 
cabinet, since he has the power to appoint and dismiss the 
prime minister and other ministers (Article 53).
Yet before nominating a premier, the President conducts 
extensive consultation with par 1iamentary leaders and often
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with all members of Parliament. In addition, the president 
must retain the confidence of the main religious sects, the 
major economic interest groups, and the various rural and 
urban Z u ’ama.
Therefore, the president's most important political 
task is the maintenance of the confessional balance within 
all governmental bodies, especially the cabinet. But beyond 
preserving the confessional balance, there is the equally 
complicated task of putting together in the cabinet an 
acceptable governing coalition. Since there are often too 
many elites and interests in Lebanon to satisfy by receiving 
appointments at the cabinet level, those who are excluded 
will form the opposition.
If the presidency is the center of gravity of the 
Lebanese government, the Z u ’ama in their sectarian settings 
represent disparate and decentralized centers of power, 
without whose cooperation the nation could become ungovern­
able. For example, in 1969, for seven months Prime Minister 
Rashid Karami was unable to reconcile the conflicting 
demands of the rival Z u ’ama in Parliament to the degree 
necessary to permit forming a new government.
After 1943, the composition of the Cabinet represented 
a balance among the various religious interests and, from 
the point of view of the political spectrum, between left- 
wing and right-wing elements in the Chamber of Deputies. 
However, the Cabinet is always at the mercy of the President
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and of an uncertain Parliamentary coalition- The average 
tenure of a Cabinet in the Lebanese system is around eight 
months.
Cabinet Coalitions: Their Strengths and Weaknesses
Unlike the revolutionary Cabinets that exist in Syria, 
Iraq or Iran, which may initiate radical policies that 
outreach popular expectation, the greatest utility of 
Lebanon’s cabinet has been its use as an instrument of 
reconciliation and stability. It is not a forceful body 
with broad and firm policy lines. While it executes the 
public business, it is only one of several forces, however, 
that share in the formulation of policy. There are in 
addition the traditional and often powerful families, 
wealthy bankers and other financial interests, religious 
leaders, political parties, and the newer voluntary 
associations. Of these elements, the traditional "feudal" 
families have often been the decisive political force, and 
these families continue to exercise great powers over their 
followers even today. Their followers continue to expect 
protection and reward from them rather than from the central 
government (Salem 1967, 496).
Unlike most cabinets in other democracies the Lebanese 
Cabinet is not merely the instrument of one group, although 
it usually contains a high percentage of the traditional 
ruling families. Concern with consensus and representation
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of the sects in selection of cabinet members has also been 
accompanied by criticism and obvious weaknesses in the 
Cabinet’s operation. At times, a person with no notable 
qualifications is appointed to the Cabinet only because he 
satisfies confessional and regional requirements. While no 
one Lebanese sect is regularly assigned a particular post in 
the cabinet (except for the position of premier and vice 
premier), in practice a kind of balance is usually 
maintained between Maronites and Sunnis, Greek Orthodox and 
Druze, and Greek Catholic and Sh i ’ites (see Appendix II).
The existence of coalitions in Lebanon has been the 
most crucial factor in its survival as an independent 
nation. Since 1969, Lebanon’s domestic politics have been 
significantly affected by the presence and activity of the 
Palestinian organizations. This was true to such an extent 
that even the 1970 presidential election campaign, which 
ordinarily would have been the center of attention, was 
overshadowed by the F i d a ’iyyun (PLO guerrillas) issue. Both 
major political forces— the Christian right-wing and Moslem 
left-wing— affirmed the "sanctity and rights of the Fi d a ’i 
action." But these groups were divided with regard to the 
implications for Lebanon for future Fida’i operations (Havat 
1969, 3). The left-wing believed that such action should 
take place from Lebanon, "regardless of the consequences," 
while the right-wing declared its opposition to any action 
by the PLD that would endanger the security, or encroach
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upon the sovereignty, of Lebanon. This division within the 
Lebanese leaders ultimately led Prime Minister Rashid Karami 
to resign. Karami claimed that no government could accept 
either view without splitting the country (Nahar 1969, 1).
The presence of the Palestinian guerrillas remained 
Lebanon’s major problem. However, as the months passed, the 
Palestinian conflict was no longer merely a division between 
the right-wing Christians and the Palestinian guerrillas and 
their supporters. Increasing1y , the issue involved a 
polarization between the Christian and Moslem populations of 
Lebanon. Fundamental issues of state management and 
national policy, the potential religious hostility within 
Lebanon, and the political implications of the division of 
government and administrative posts on a confessional basis- 
-questions long swept under the carpet— increasingly came 
into the open. In the absence of an effective political 
forum, a resort to arms became the method of resolving these 
i ssues.
The confessional formula relied upon to form the 
Cabinet is so deeply embedded in Lebanon that there seems 
little chance of its elimination in the future. The 
persistence of this formula is well demonstrated with the 
newly—selected Cabinet which maintained the confessional 
division in its formation. In November 1989, the Lebanese 
president Elias al-Harawi, a Maronite Christian, asked Salim 
al-Hoss, a Sunni Moslem, to form a "National Unity Cabinet"
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which was to be equally divided between Moslems and 
Christians. The coalition formula for comprising the 
cabinet was still dictated by the constitutional structure 
of Lebanon, a structure in which the President of the 
Republic remains the decisive political force both in theory 
and in fact.
The L ebanese Forces
As the foregoing clearly indicates, a unique and 
paradoxical situation of political management exists in 
Lebanon. Despite of all its shortcomings, the Lebanese 
political system was based on a genuine attempt to build a 
pluralistic polity that would accommodate the needs of an 
extremely heterogeneous society.
The Lebanese civil war has usually been perceived as a 
conflict between the Christian right-wing and a Moslem- 
Palestinian left-wing. While such a view is partially true, 
it falls far short of reflecting the complexity and 
diversity of the rival groups and, sometimes, the 
destructive conflicts, within the major communities. In 
reality, the "Moslem left-wing" bloc actually has included 
some Christian elements, as well as moderate Moslem leaders, 
who did not adopt the more extremist leftist ideology. The 
"Christian right-wing" bloc was somewhat more coherent, but 
it was by no means completely homogeneous. However, for the 
purpose of this study it would be appropriate to employ the
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right-wing/left-wing dichotomy, after pointing out the 
shortcomings of this pattern.
Rabinovich and Zamir (1976-77, 496) identified a "pro 
status quo camp" and an "anti status quo coalition." Yet, 
curiously enough, in Lebanon the "right-wing" camp is an 
instrument of change. The Lebanese Forces— which in time 
became the most powerful group within the "right-wing" camp- 
-has called for change in several aspects of national life. 
This group, the main focus of this study, has worked, for 
example, towards the transformation of the Lebanese feudal 
system into a more modernized pluralist democracy. In 
addition, it has supported the objective of dismantling the 
traditional Z u ’ama institution and creating a new 
"developed" system, where primitive traditional allegiances, 
previously given to the Z u ’ama, are now directed at the 
nation. (The next chapter will identify and explain the 
goals and objectives of the Lebanese Forces in greater 
detai1.)
In August, 1976, a united leadership for the Lebanese 
Forces was created. Bashir Gemayel was elected President of 
the Council of Leadership. These united forces included 
fighters and members from the Social Democratic Kata’ib 
Party, the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Tanzim, the 
Guardians of the Cedars, and other individuals not 
affiliated with any political party.
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The Kata’ib. The Kata’ib was established in 1936 by 
Pierre Gemayel, as a Christian parami1itary organization, 
and formed branches abroad among the emigrants. In 1958, 
the Kata’ib played an important role in fighting the Moslems 
insurgents against the government. Among these parties, the 
Kata’ib was the most powerful militarily, claiming the 
ability to field 40,000 men.
The Kata’ib were militant nationalists» who sought the 
expulsion of "aliens," such as the Syrian and Palestinians. 
They also feared the Christian nature of the country; their 
role as "middlemen" between East and West would be lost if 
they relinquished the traditional control of the presidency 
and army.
This party played an important role in the movement for 
the independence of Lebanon by mobilizing the Christian 
masses against the French occupation. After independence, 
the party’s primary goal was to protect the Lebanese entity 
against its various challengers, and to maintain a demo­
cratic and pluralist state.
The Kata’ib also supported popular causes, such as 
campaigning against corruption, and decreasing unemployment. 
In addition, it adopted a relatively moderate position on 
social and political issues in the hope of reducing tensions 
between Christian and Moslems. Despite the fact that the 
Kata’ib party is a modern organization, it never had a 
Kata’ib deputy who belonged to the Moslem sects.
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The National Liberal Party (NLP). The NLP was the 
second largest party in the country. It was founded in 
1959, by Camille Chamoun. The party was centered around the 
personality of Camille Chamoun? who was the president of the 
Lebanese Republic during the 1958 civil war.
The NLP can hardly be classified as a political party 
in any real sense. It lacked most of the characteristics of 
political parties in the Western world: it had little
organization, avowed no program, and it almost never issued 
a policy statement. One might consider it more as a 
political grouping centered around the most charismatic 
Maronite Z a ’im.
The NLP advocated dialogue with Lebanese Moslems and 
quasi-autonomy for the Christians. The party has lost clout 
in July 1980, when its "Tigers" militia was almost wiped out 
by a Kata’ib surprise attack.
NLP was able to attract a number of prominent deputy 
members of other sects to its rank, such as the S h i ’ite 
Mahmud Ummar, the Druze Bashir al-A’war and The S h i ’ite 
Qadhim al-Khalil, who was also the vice-president of the 
NLP.
The Tanzim (Organization). The Tanzim was founded in 
1968 by F u ’ad Shimali as a secret organization with the name 
"Movement of the Cedars" CMouvement des Cedres, Arabic 
Harakat al-Arzl (Vocke 1978, 78). It is an extremist 
organization affiliated with the Maronite League.
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Al-Tanzim had a small but well organized militia. Most 
of its members were urban and professionals— doctors, 
lawyers, and engineers.
The Guardians of the Cedars (Hurras al-Arz). The 
Guardians of the Cedars was an ultra-extremist group, who 
favoring the "partition" of Lebanon. Its slogan was "each 
Lebanese has to kill a Palestinian" and it demanded that all 
Palestinians leave Lebanon. The spiritual leader of the 
Guardians of the Cedars, S a ’id A q 1, claimed that the 
Lebanese were not Arabs, but Phoenicians.
In mid-1989, the leader of Guardians of the Cedars, 
Etian Saqr (Abu Arz), was fired from the Command Council of 
the Lebanese Forces because of his stand on the issue of 
cooperation with the Arab League. Abu Arz, insisted on 
maintaining cooperation with Israel than with the Arabs.
Organization of the Lebanese Forces (L F ). On November 
S6, 1980, after the approval of all groups belonging to the
Lebanese Forces, the Council of Leadership of the Lebanese 
Resistance Forces, presided over by Bashir Gemayel, was 
established and its functions defined clearly.
The parties and groups cooperating to form the Lebanese 
Forces ranged from moderate to ultra-extremists. Before the 
Lebanese civil war started, during earlier times of 
"normalcy," these parties had their own fundamental 
disagreements and conflicts. Examples will be presented in 
the following chapter.
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Why did these formerly rival groups join together to 
form the Lebanese Forces? The answer is that they had a 
number of aims and goals in common. These included 
resisting the occupation of Lebanon by foreign forces and 
the determination to oppose such occupation with all the 
means available. This might seem a very simple explanation 
for a complicated phenomenon. At this stage, however, it is 
not the differences among the groups comprising the Lebanese 
Forces, but the similar i t ies that must be examined, with a 
view to showing the similarities behind all the dis­
similar iti e s .
Although Lebanese Christians are split into innumerable 
religious and political factions, it is nevertheless evident 
from the public statements of these different groups that 
there is an understand ino "Christian consensus" on several 
points. These include: the need for all foreign troops to
leave Lebanon; the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty; 
national Christian-Mos1em reconciliation; and the urgent 
need to resolve the problem of finding a homeland for the 
Palestinian people, which is recognized as an i nternat i ona1 
problem, not exclusively a Lebanese problem.
The Lebanese Forces was created to resist effectively 
both the foreign occupation of Lebanon (mainly, by the PLO) 
and the concerted effort by rival political groups to 
destroy Lebanon’s democratic institutions. (As a result of 
opposing the latter goal, the Lebanese Forces became
transformed from a "resistance movement" into an established 
political institution, seeking to preserve the status quo.) 
There are the fundamental facts that, despite their 
differences, all these groups were in the same situation, in 
the sense that they shared a common enemy; that all their 
destinies were inseparably linked to the hope of their 
victory; and that all had to seek moral, political and 
material support from the West to achieve their goals. 
Moreover, there was another reality of equal importance: 
any local activity whatsoever was meaningless and achieved 
little, so long and insofar as this activity remained purely 
local. For each of these groups, the rule applied that they 
had to extend their activity beyond their customary zone of 
influence to include the occupation area. In turn, in order 
to do so successfully, they had to gain the support of a 
majority of the Lebanese population. However, due to the 
complexity of the Lebanese political setting, the success of 
these groups in achieving this goal proved to be limited. 
Another shared objective was to achieve a Christian-Mos1em 
reconci1iation, if possible.
A key fact about the composition of the Lebanese Forces 
is its domination by the Kata’ib Party. Kata’ib militiamen 
comprise 80 percent of the strength of the Lebanese Forces 
coalition. As explained earlier, other organizations 
comprise the other 20 percent of this coalition. Moreover,
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it is obvious that no solution or decision is acceptable 
without the consent of the Kata’ib party.
It is important to mention here that the creation of 
this coalition was not without considerable cost. In the 
chaotic situation of the Lebanese civil war* for example, 
some groups within the "Tiger" militia of the National 
Liberal Party (NLP) were more interested in promoting their 
own material wealth rather than the public good. On July 7, 
1980, other units of the Lebanese Forces attacked posts and 
offices belonging to the Tiger militia. The ensuing 
destruction of the Tigers and their absorption into the 
Lebanese Forces was an essential step in creating a unified 
command. The coordination of the militia effort under a 
unified Lebanese Forces command grew out of an awareness on 
the part of all the participants that it was the best and 
most rational decision amongst the other alternatives. 
Interestingly enough, this awareness to coordinate efforts 
was demonstrated after the unification was achieved by 
force.
Coalition Politics
As has been emphasized, the political process in 
modern-day Lebanon has, to a large extent, been a matter of 
making, maintaining, and breaking coalitions. This fact is 
of course also true of several other nations in the modern 
period. It is not surprising, therefore, that great deal of
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scholarly activity in recent years has focused upon theories 
of coalition behavior. There seems to be agreement among 
those scholars to view coalitions as primarily the outcome 
of protracted baroainino over the distribution of some 
payoff by rational, self-interested individuals and groups 
belonging to the coalition.
Under what circumstances do individuals or groups join 
coalitions? Why are coalitions with some groups preferred 
to coalitions with other groups? What benefits can a group 
derive from membership in a coalition? Even today, the 
answers to these questions are far from clear. The evidence 
indicates that the answers vary from group to group, from 
time to time, and from place to place. An examination of 
the coalition behavior of some groups involved in them might 
reveal at least tentative answers to these questions.
A coalition is defined by Kelly (1968, 6E-63), who 
stated:
"By a coalition we mean a group of individuals or 
groups of individuals who:
1. agree to pursue a common and articulated 
goa 1 ;
E. pool their relevant resources in pursuit 
of th is goal;
3. engage in conscious communication
concerning the goal and the means of 
ob ta i n i ng it;
A. agree on the distribution of the payoff 
received when obtaining the goal."
In the course of time? two categories of theories 
concerning coalition formation have emerged. The theories 
comprising the first category explain and predict coalitions 
only on the basis of the size of the actors and the size of 
various configurations of actors joining a coalition. 
According to this theory, individuals or groups charged with 
forming coalitions usually strive to form what is called 
minimal winnino coalition; a coalition which is big enough 
to have a majority (or a winning coalition), but no bigger 
than necessary, so that unnecessary "payoffs" do not need to 
be made. The best known approach in this category is 
Riker’s "minimum size theory" (Riker 196E; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1973).
The second category of coalition theories comprises 
what is called "policy-oriented theories." All of these 
theories deal with coalition formation processes, in which 
policy issues are the primary consideration. In particular, 
these theories seem to require the presupposition of some 
policy (or ideological) compatibility by the partners in the 
coalition (Axelrod 1970; de Swaan 1973). The remainder of 
this chapter will be devoted to a review and analysis of 
these contending views on coalition formation, especially as 
they relate to the Lebanese political system.
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Size Principle Coalitions
Some studies of political coalitions have suggested 
that a minimal winning coalition will always form. Riker 
(1962) and Gamson (1961) proposed the idea of what is called 
the size principle. This principle states that, under 
conditions satisfying certain assumptions, "participants 
create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure 
winning [control of the government! and no larger" (Riker 
1962, 32-33). That is, the parties will form a coalition to 
reach a majority with the smallest number of actors, 
regardless of the placement of these actors along the policy 
or ideological continuum.
Riker’s size principle is based on the assumptions that 
the actors in coalition politics are rational, that they 
have access to all relevant information, and that the 
political contest is a zero sum game. A zero sum game is 
one in which an actor or group of actors wins exactly what 
the other actor loses. In reality of course, decision­
makers act rationally at times, but certainly not all times. 
Moreover, they almost never have access to all relevant 
information, and coalitions in conflict situations are 
seldom engaged in a zero sum game. Even in total war, for 
example, the game is usually variable sum. This means that, 
depending on the strategies adopted by the decision-makers, 
what is won by one side and lost by the other need not 
necessarily add up exactly to zero (Hinckley 1981, 51-64).
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If all belligerent, for example, decide to avoid the use of 
poison gas in time of war, they may all win, even though 
eventually one side "wins" the war.
In a cabinet or a parliament, just forming a coalition 
big enough to win may normally assure victory. In world 
politics, however, once a coalition is formed, it may well 
have to defeat an opposing coalition in war. Moreover, any 
attempt to form a "minimum winning coalition" may ultimately 
be foiled by the inherent difficulty of measuring power.
What individuals and groups initially thought to be just 
enough power to win may, in the end, turn out to be 
insufficient. Even if that does not occur, a minimum 
winning coalition may have to fight long and hard to win a 
war at great cost, while a much larger coalition might win 
more easily and less expensively.
Accordingly, Gamson (1964) modified his version of this 
theory to include the role played by ideology in- coalition 
formation. He introduced the notion of "non-uti1itarian 
preference" (Gamson 1964, 82-110). This idea holds that 
when actors can select partners from among equally vital 
allies, they prefer those actors whose ideology is closest 
to their own. Yet even Gamson recognized that his concept 
of non-utilitarian preferences is only applicable under very 
limited circumstances.
Riker's and Garrison's models of coalition formation lead 
them to conclude that the potential winning coalition can
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win the same payoffs, but the distribution of payoffs among 
members of the winning coalition will follow the parity norm 
(Gamson 196^, 101). The concept of parity norm means that 
each actor will receive a share of the payoff that is 
proportionate to his contribution to the coalition.
Policy-Distance Theory
A second approach to coalition behavior was advanced 
and gained wide acceptance from the early 1970s onward. A 
number of scholars contended that the primary motivation of 
actors (or parties) in joining a coalition is ideolog ical 
compat ib i1i ty. According to advocates of this view, 
therefore, coalitions will consist of actors (or parties) 
adjacent to each other on the policy scale, regardless of 
their size (de Swaan 1973, 118).
Axelrod (1970) employed many types of analyses (e.g., 
mathematical and historical) in advancing his hypothesis 
that coalitions will consist only of ideologically adjacent 
parties. He maintained, in essence, that only those 
coalitions will form whichs (1) are winning; (2) are 
connected, in the sense of consisting only of parties 
adjacent to one another on the ideological continuum, with 
no "gaps?" and (3) are minimal, i.e., no unnecessary parties 
on either the left or right political extremes are included 
in the coalition (Axelrod 1970, 165-87).
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Axelrod proposed the conflict of interest concept 
(e.g., policy preferences), by positing a spatial model 
which locates actor preferences for positions of salient 
issue dimensions along a single policy spectrum (Axelrod 
1970, 1A8). After examining, the Italian experience (1953- 
1968), for example, Axelrod proposed the hypotheses which 
formed the basis of his theory. The two main hypotheses 
were: (1) the less conflict of interest there is within a
coalition, the more likely it is to form; and (2) the less 
conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more 
likely the coalition will have a long duration after it is 
formed (Axelrod 1970, 167).
Regarding the "minimal connected winning" (MOW) 
coalition, Axelrod found that these coalitions (in contrast 
to non-MCW coalitions), were twenty nine times more likely 
to form than in the absence of the above factors (1970,
177). In a separate study, Felker (1981, 357-70) replicated 
Axelrod’s MCW coalitions with data from the political 
experience of Weimar Germany. His findings were that MCW 
coalitions were eleven time more likely to form than were 
non-MCW coalitions.
In another version of this approach, de Swaan 
introduced the "policy distance theory," which is based on 
the assumption that a rational actor (or party) is mainly 
interested in joining an ideologically compatible coalition. 
Essentially, while Axelrod’s theory of coalition formation
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was based on the single criterion of minimizing "conflict of 
interest" among coalition partners, the theory of de Swaan 
is based on the criterion of minimizing the difference 
between the actor’s (or party’s) own ideological position 
and the position expected of the coalition.
De Swaan subjected his theories to statistical testing, 
using a large data base consisting of about one hundred 
cases of coalition formation in nine European countries 
(including Israel). The results showed that the theories 
which performed well included the policy dimension theory 
and others that do not require highly complex calculations. 
Moreover, according to de Swaan, the predicted successful 
coalition formation in a given situation is the set of 
possible winning coalitions which is "undominated." (That 
means those coalitions in which each of the actors included 
is better off in it than in some alternative coalition.)
Coalitions seem to be an inevitable result of inter­
action among sovereign units in international politics. 
"Wherever in recorded history a system of multiple 
sovereignty has existed, some of the sovereign units 
involved in conflict with others have entered into 
alliances" (Wolfers 1968, 869). Alliances can be formed to 
deter aggression, counter another military threat, gain 
advantage of territory or other resources, or create a 
stable peace necessary for the pursuit of other activity (de 
Mesquita and Singer 1973, SA1>. These general observations
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are directly applicable to the problem of coalition 
formation and maintenance in Lebanon.
The political crisis in Lebanon is far more complicated 
than just Moslems versus Christians or Left versus Right.
No study of Lebanon is complete unless it includes the role 
played by foreign forces* especially Syria and Israel. 
Originally, both countries intervened to achieve their own 
interests as well as to maintain a balance-of-power among 
the conflicting groups. In time, a war "by proxy" developed 
within Lebanon? with Israel allied with the Lebanese Forces 
and Syria supporting the Pa1estinian-Mos1ems bloc.
This relates directly to the situation in Lebanon since 
1943. Zinnes (1970? 359) has suggested that states will 
form alliances to establish a b a 1ance-of-power and prevent 
the appearance of a winner. Basically, her theory 
contradicts Riker’s predictions that winning alliances will 
appear and that they will be minimum winning coalitions. 
However, de Mesquita hypothesized that nations may be 
prompted into war as a result of the uncertainty produced by 
the change in alliance (de Mesquita 1979, 113-38). He 
examined six independent variables for their relationship 
with war. They are: (1) the polarity of coalition
activity; (2) the extent of coalition activity within one 
alignment (tightness); (3) the extent of coalition activity 
across separate alignment (discreetness); (4) a change in 
(1); (5) a change in (2); and (6) a change in (3). His
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results suggest that the change in coalition activity is 
more important than its polarity, tightness, or 
discreetness.
Another significant contribution in this field of 
research is the attempt by Harvey Starr to evaluate the 
factors affecting the redistribution of resources among 
coalition participants. Starr’s (1972, 7-13) research was 
concerned with coalition payoffs during war. He examined 
how wartime payoffs are influenced by the attributes of the 
war coalition. Starr attempted to explain the distribution 
of payoffs by different models of coalition activity: those
emphasizing the initial distribution of resources nations 
bring to the coalition; those emphasizing the likeness, in 
ideology or community, of the coalition partners; and those 
emphasizing the extent of their participation and commitment 
in the war. Starr developed and tested twenty-one 
hypotheses with a variety of measures. His finding showed 
that the three variables (mentioned above) are important, 
although the participation and commitment variable shows 
more significance (Hinckley 1981, 135-36). Clearly, some of 
these hypotheses are directly related to the political 
situation of this study. This is well demonstrated by the 
creation of the Command Council of the Lebanese Forces.
This council is composed of eight representatives of the 
four principal militias (recently, three) forming this 
coalition. These representatives have equal voting rights
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on any decision or policy. As mentioned earlier? the 
likeness in ideology of these groups is the most important 
factor in the formation of this coalition.
Rational Choice Theory
The foregoing discussion has attempted to offer 
insights into how coalitions are created. The question 
arises: What (if any thing) ties all of these various
theories together? It is evident that they all belong to 
the rat ionalist subfield of coalition theory. They assume 
that most of the time decision makers carefully consider the 
positive and negative consequences associated with 
alternative actions when arriving at decisions.
Rational choice theory is an approach used in studying 
the individual’s political behavior. Specifically, rational 
choice theorists claim that individual political conduct is 
basically a result of relating means to ends as "effi­
ciently" as possible. This means that the individual has a 
set of goals or objectives, and he will try to achieve these 
goals with as few adverse consequences as possible.
Rational choice theory first appeared as an economic 
approach to the study of human behavior. According to 
proponents of this theory, a rational person "maximizes 
expected utility," using the least possible input of scarce 
resources per unit of valuable output to achieve his goals. 
Various models of this theory assume that a rational
81
decision maker will calculate carefully the utility of 
available alternatives. After doing so, he will choose the 
alternative with the greatest expected utility based on his 
"decision calculus." This approach to decision making is 
relevant to some aspects of political life* especially to 
coalition behavior.
De Mesquita (1981) has described rational choice models 
as based on the idea that political decision-makers do what 
they believe is in their best interest. According to this 
viewpoint, decision-makers normally pursue the self- 
interests of their states, their groups and of themselves. 
For this reason, rational choice theory has often been 
associated with "realist" models of world politics. De 
Mesquita (1986, 157-76) presented the core of expected 
utility as follows: (1) Individual decision-makers are
rational in the sense that they can order alternatives in 
terms of their preferences; (2) The order of preferences is 
transitive; (3) Individuals know the intensity of their 
preferences, with that intensity being known as utility; (^> 
Individuals consider alternatives means of achieving 
desirable ends in terms of expected utility (that is, the 
utility associated with those outcomes times the probability 
of achieving alternative outcomes); and (5) Decision-makers 
always select the strategy that yields the highest expected
qutility. This model, it can be argued, can be applied to
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any policy-maker? with any goals and values? who acts to 
achieve them.
Rational choice has been used most often to explain 
voting behavior and political participation (or non­
part ic ipat ion) ? but it is also useful for understanding 
elite decision making. Riker and Ordeshook (1973? 62-63) 
use a formula to explain the decision whether or not to 
vote. Their formula is:
R = PB - C + D
R is the expected utility an individual derives from 
voting; P is the probability that the individual's vote will 
make a difference in the election outcome? B is the benefit 
the individual receives? if his preferred candidate or party 
wins? C is the cost of voting? and D is the social 
satisfaction derived from voting.
The key variable in this formula? however? is D which 
includes long-run participation values: e.g.? the belief
that good citizens have an obligation to vote? and the 
enjoyment of involvement in the political process. Without 
this variable? voting would be "irrational" (unless it were 
costless) since P is so small.
The principal costs of voting include the gathering of 
information necessary to make a choice? registering to vote? 
and taking time to go to the polls. Some commentators have 
pointed out that, since minimizing costs increase utility
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according to this model, we would expect the "rational" 
voter to minimize his informational costs by using voting 
cues (party position on the issue) and to be satisfied with
his lack of information (Popkin et al. 1984, 151).
Another decision calculus that can be applied almost to 
any decision-making setting is the decision by members of
parliamentary bodies to run for higher offices. Thus, David
Rhode (1979) used a very similar model to analyze decisions 
by members of the U.S House of Representatives on whether 
to run for higher office (governor or senator). Two 
"expected utilities" were calculated— one for the presently 
held office (El) and one for the higher office (EE). For 
each office, the expected utility is a function of the 
probability o f ■winning, the value of the office and the 
costs of running. According to this theory, the congressman 
will run for higher office only if EE > El (Rhode 1979, 1-
E6). Yet, one important variable which Rhode did not take 
into account was t i me. If an ambitious person feels that he
may not get a better opportunity in the future, he might go 
with his "best shot," even if ES < El.
To illustrate this point, for the first time in 
Lebanon, a leader of a political party was able to capture 
the highest office in the nation. In 198E, Bashir Gemayel, 
the leader of the Lebanese Forces, was elected president of 
Lebanon. Despite the fact that he was assassinated after 
his election, it was obvious that his decision to run for
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this office was built on a rational calculation. From that 
time on, the Lebanese Forces started to be considered as a 
platform for the new prominent individuals to achieve higher 
pos i t ions.
In his criticism of rational choice theory, Herbert 
Simon (1985) recognized that people often do appear to 
behave in a rational manner; but he goes on to say that even 
if one can obtain clues to the reasons people behave the way 
they do, it is impassible to predict behavior based on these 
c 1ue s :
behavior depends on the structure of the 
actors’ utility functions, and because 
it depends on their representation of 
the world in which they live, what 
they attend to in that world, and what 
beliefs they have about nature (1985,
300) .
Another problem with rational choice theory is 
illustrated by the debate concerning what motivates people 
to join together in groups to provide for "collective 
goods." (Collective good is a "benefit" or a commodity 
which, most basically, cannot be denied to anyone once it 
has been produced at all, nor does one person’s consumption 
of it reduce that of others.) While many scholars hold that 
the existence of diverse social forces are a sufficient 
cause for the formation of interest groups, rational choice 
theorists disagree. Mancur Olson (1965, 5-52) has argued, 
for example, that no rational, self-interested person will
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join an interest group organized to influence public policy 
unless he is coerced into doing so by compulsion or the use 
of selective benefits. Rather* he will rationally choose 
not to join, since he will personally benefit fully without 
incurring the costs of joining if the group with which he 
shares an interest is successful in achieving its goals.
This is known as the "free rider problem."
Assessing Coalition Theories 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to offer some 
insights into how coalitions are formed and maintained. A 
major limitation of these theories is that the answers to 
questions regarding coalition formation in times of civil 
wars or other highly conflictual situations are still 
unavailable or inconclusive. With the exception of the 
studies conducted by Axelrod (1970) and de Swaan (1973), the 
proponents of these theories all arrived at the conclusion 
that coalitions are mainly formed in accordance with the 
minimum coalitions or size principle. All the studies, 
including those of Axelrod and de Swaan, predicted that the 
coalitions formulated would be winning coalitions; their 
studies disregard the existence of loosing coalitions.
A significant source of predictive error in these and 
other formal theories of political behavior is their 
assumption of a political universe that is too restrictive 
for the real world of politics to which they are applied.
86
Particularly questionable in this regard is the depiction of 
coalition formation as an isolated event, portraying 
political actors as being motivated exclusively by a desire 
to maximize their own or their group’s political power.
This is well demonstrated in a typically divided society 
such as Lebanon, which is characterized by a devaluation of 
compromise positions and a preference for efforts to obtain 
the complete goals of o n e ’s own bloc— even at the risk of 
possible complete victory for the opposition. This is shown 
by recent events in Lebanon where all attempts for reaching 
a compromise to solve the Lebanese crisis have failed.
It is very important to understand the cultural and 
religious dynamics of Lebanon before any attempt to make 
judgments about any political behavior. For example, an 
important factor fostering violence and turmoil in Lebanon 
must be noted: this is what might be called the revenge
f ac tor. Traditionally, in the triba11y-based societies of 
the Middle East, exacting "revenge" for wrongs suffered was 
a time-honored and accepted mode of justice, after a person 
or a tribe suffered a wrong (like injury or murder). It was 
taken for granted that any injury or hurt would in time be 
"avenged" by the injured party, his family, or tribe. It is 
clear that this ancient idea is still deeply embedded in the 
Lebanese ethos. According to Bashir Gemayel, "To grasp the 
true nature of this region one must overcome Western
07
concepts and perspectives and take hold of sensibility 
rather than rationality."4
In addition, formal theories of political processes 
have often been based upon a model of rational action which 
assumes that the actor is a si nole individual with definite 
preferences. However, other students of political behavior 
identify groups or par t i es, rather than individuals, as the 
most influential actors. Many coalition behavior theorists 
also assume the uniform commitment of political actors to 
their goals. However, in reality— and most certainly in 
modern Lebanon— splinter groups often emerge. These 
sometimes render the parent group ineligible for coalition 
partnership; or at least, such groups cause a serious 
weakness within the coalition. This problem is very 
significant, especially if we are examining a coalition in a 
complex political context, where the payoff is viewed as 
nothing less than surv i v a 1, and not merely gaining 
ministerial portfolios.
Another important consideration to account for in any 
study of coalition is the time factor. For example, the 
civil war in Lebanon is not yet over. The Lebanese Forces 
still exist, although many splinter groups have emerged and 
one party was expelled from the governing coalition. 
Therefore, the survival of the Lebanese Forces is still 
quest i onab1e .
Endnotes
1. For detailed study of Lebanon’s political process see 
Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions Politique du Liban 
(Paris, 1947), 23.
2. See also Starr, Coalitions and Future Uar (Beverly 
Hills and London, 1975).
3. See also de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn., 
19B1) and Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy Making 
Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968).
4. Bashir Gemayel from an address at the Al-Bustan Hotel, 
Beit Meri, Lebanon on April 2, 1982 Ein Arabic!.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEBANESE FORCES: AN INSTITUTION TOWARDS THE FUTURE
This chapter is devoted to a detailed presentation and 
examination of the emergence, evolution, ideology, and goals 
of the Lebanese Forces. As anyone who is familiar with 
recent developments within the Middle East is aware, the 
Lebanese Forces have become an increasingly influential 
actor within the Lebanese political arena. The behavior and 
goals of this organization have become crucial in 
determining not only the political future of Lebanon, but 
they have a decisive impact upon overall regional stability, 
and upon relations among other Middle Eastern nations, as 
wel 1 .
As our discussion will demonstrate, the Lebanese Forces 
appeared as a dissident, and initially not overly 
influential, faction within the Christian (meaning mainly, 
the Maronite) community of Lebanon. By the 19S0s, the 
Lebanese Forces had emerged as in some respect the most 
i nf1uent i a 1 political movement reflecting the viewpoints and 
demands of the Lebanese Christian population. Then, in what 
has come to be a predictable pattern of rapidly changing 
events within contemporary Lebanon, the dominant position of 
the Lebanese Forces was in turn increasingly challenged by 
other Christian-supported groups, which differed with the 
Lebanese Forces on such crucial issues as the most effective 
course for resolving what was widely (if not altogether
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accurately) called the "Lebanese civil war." As the leaders 
and members of the Lebanese Forces fully recognized) in 
reality the political conflict which had engulfed Lebanon 
for many years was no less a struggle for regional power and 
influence. Nearly all parties to the conflict had 
connections with, and were in some degree supported by, 
foreign nations, principally, Syria, Iran, Israel, and the 
United States. In a number of cases, this external support 
was clearly essential if the organization were to have any 
chance of achieving its objectives. This was a key fact for 
understanding one of the dominant objectives of the Lebanese 
Forces: restoring Lebanese independence, by freeing the
country of the military forces and sometimes politically 
decisive presence of foreign nations.
More than any other external influence, the Lebanese 
Forces regarded Syria as posing the most dangerous threat to 
an independent Lebanon. The "hard line" position of the 
Lebanese Forces on this question increasingly brought it 
into conflict with other Lebanese factions and groups. In 
time, even other Christian groups accepted the idea that 
negotiation with countries like Syria and other foreign 
nations— in which, of course, Maronites and other 
communities groups within Lebanon would necessarily have to 
make concessions— offered the only realistic prospect for 
restoring peace and stability to strife-torn Lebanon. Other 
objectives of the Lebanese Forces— such, for example, as
91
efforts to "professionalize" the nation’s armed forces, and 
to make appointments to, and promotions within, the 
bureaucracy dependent upon merit— also clashed with deeply- 
established viewpoints and practices within the Lebanese 
c u 1ture.
The political scenario depicted in this chapter is 
admittedly detailed, complex, and sometimes difficult to 
follow— even on occasion by those well informed about 
Lebanese history, traditions, and recent political 
experience. In the Middle East, political organizations and 
movements not infrequently change their names (and the names 
are not necessarily indicative of their ideologies and 
goals). Moreover, the civil war in Lebanon has been a 
prolonged and extremely destructive conflict. It has 
resulted in the loss of untold thousands of lives, among 
active combatants and civilians alike. Property damage (if 
it ever can be calculated accurately) will unquestionably 
total several billion dollars in losses— and this total 
grows larger with each passing week. On all sides, 
political leaders and prominent individuals, no less than 
ordinary citizens, have lost their lives. This fact has 
meant that what often seems to be endless and bewildering 
changes have occurred within the leadership ranks of all 
major factions and organizations involved in Lebanon’s 
internal conflict. This reality alone has meant that 
political developments in modern-day Lebanon are often
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difficult to understand, especially since needed background 
information by the news media about Lebanese political 
elites, political parties, and movements is often extremely 
limited. The existence of the Lebanese civil war has also 
meant that, in dealing with a number of key political 
questions, reliable data needed to answer them 
authoritatively— such, for example, as the size and exact 
composition of the Lebanese Forces— are largely unavailable 
to the investigator, if in some cases they exist at all.
The Transformation of the Lebanese Forces 
into an Institution
For our purpose, the analysis of the Lebanese Forces 
will be divided into six phases or stages, each char­
acterized by major turning points and significant 
developments leading to noteworthy changes affecting the 
operation and future of the organization.
The First Phase: 1975-1978. The initial phase was
characterized by the creation of a Christian resistance 
against Palestinian hostilities and Marxist-1 eftist 
organizations within Lebanon. As explained earlier, 
although the crisis had started between the Kata’ib party 
and the Palestinians, the conflict quickly escalated into a 
full-scale confrontation involving the Christian population 
and the Moslem community. Moreover, during this phase the 
Christian militia also had to resist the Syrian intervention 
into Lebanon.
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The organization known as Lebanese Forces was the 
creation of the right-wing Lebanese Front (a Christian 
grouping consisting of the political and religious leaders? 
and it defines the policy lines of the Christian community 
that are implemented and preserved by the Lebanese Forces.) 
It is important to note here that the Lebanese Forces was 
originally created as the military wing to execute the 
decisions of the Lebanese Front. Despite the fact that the 
Lebanese Front still has some influence upon the decision­
making process concerning the Christian community? with the 
passage of time the center of power among the Christians 
shifted towards the Lebanese Forces.
During this early phase also* the various Christian 
militia were fighting separately. Each party or group was 
defending its locality without coordinating its activity 
with other organization. Moreover? the FLO and its allies 
increasingly mounted offensive operations against the 
Christian towns. In the beginning? in contrast to the PLO? 
the Christian militia groups were not well organized or 
experienced in military operations. Actually? the first 
t i me the Christian forces coordinated their efforts occurred 
in July 1976? during the siege of the PLO stronghold of Tal 
al-Za'atar. On August 12? 1976? this camp? the most 
important base of the PLO? was finally overrun by Christian 
forces.
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Partly in response to the government’s inability to 
guarantee the protection of communal groups, but also 
because of the success of the Tal al-Za'atar operation) 
stronger incentives existed among the Christian leaders to 
coordinate their political and military efforts. 
Subsequently) in August 1976, the Lebanese Front created the 
organization of the Lebanese Forces. At this time) Bashir 
Gemayel was elected president of the Executive Committee of 
the Lebanese Forces.
The need for military coordination was further 
reinforced by the fact that in March 1976) substantial 
numbers of Moslem soldiers) under the leadership of 
l.ieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib) deserted from the Lebanese Army 
and formed the Lebanese Arab ftrmy, which joined the 
Palestinian-leftist coalition.
During this period) a series of minor intra-communal 
clashes took place within the Christian community. For 
example) Raymond Edd6, the leader of the moderate Christian 
National Bloc, advocated major concessions to the Moslems in 
an effort to share political power more broadly in Lebanon; 
Edd6 was opposed) however) to the Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon. On May 23-35, 1976) Kata’ib gunmen attacked Edd£, 
wounding him in the leg on the second attempt. To escape 
his political enemies) Edd6 finally took refuge in Paris.
And the civil war continues. So far, the conflict 
proved to be impossible to contain, and the Lebanese
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government demonstrated its inability to fulfill its duties. 
Thus, the leadership of Bashir Gemayel realized the need to 
fill in the vacuum and asstime the responsibility of 
providing the necessary needs for the Christian community. 
These services included transportation, sanitation and other 
functions it had the capacity to provide.
The Second Phase; 1978-198S . Throughout this period, 
intra-communal fighting was a major characteristic of 
Lebanon’s domestic affairs. Such conflict often cuts across 
political or ideological lines and pits individual political 
leaders or groups against one another, sometimes for no 
apparent reason other than personal dislike or disagree­
ments. Added to this, the boundaries separating the 
jurisdiction of each faction were often not clearly defined. 
This is true mainly because in the Lebanese political 
context individuals often change allegiances over time, 
depending on circumstances and the shifting allocation of 
power.
During this period also, an important development took 
place within the Christian community; it led eventually to 
the actual unification of the Lebanese Forces. Fierce 
fighting erupted between the Kata’ib party and the Marada 
militia headed by Tony Franjieh (the son of former Lebanese 
President, Suleiman Franjieh). In turn, this was followed 
by another violent clash between the Kata’ib and the Tigers 
militia of the NLP.
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By the end of 1978, and after a short period of 
cooperation, former president Franjieh and his Marada 
militia were quarreling with their partners in the Lebanese 
Front, (While Franjieh favored reconci1iation and 
cooperation with Syria, the Kata’ib and NLP called for the 
cooperation with Israel against Syria.) Moreover, the 
Marada militia assassinated the Kata’ib leader in Zghorta, 
Joud Bayeh; the victim’s family was subsequently denied a 
funeral service in its home town, which was under the 
control of the Franjieh’s forces. For these and other 
reasons, Franjieh was determined to deny the Kata’ib any 
influence in the north of Lebanon. Local Kata’ib members 
were denied any service in that region, and their houses and 
premises were burned and destroyed. In turn, a group of 
Kata’ib members, led by Samir Geagea, attacked the residence 
of Tony Franjieh, resulting in his death, along with other 
members of his family. Following the death of Tony 
Franjieh, incidents of revenge killing and kidnapping 
continued to take place at regular intervals on both sides.
As noted earlier, the factor of revenge is deeply
rooted in the Lebanese culture, and its importance was 
highlighted by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel in 1982. 
When a reporter asked former President Suleiman Franjieh if 
he was behind it, Franjieh reportedly answered that he was
sorry that he had not done it (Hijazi 1982, 1).
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At the end of January 1980, fighting erupted between 
the Kata’ib and the Tigers militia of the National Liberal 
Party. The conflict ended with the decisive victory of the 
Kata’ib; and this outcome in turn led to the unification of 
the various Christian militia. Subsequently, other militia 
groups (such as the Tanzim and the Guardians of the Cedars) 
announced the integration of their forces into the Lebanese 
Forces. On November 26, 1980, the Lebanese Forces was
formally established and its functions and responsibilities 
clearly defined.
Some observers of the Lebanese civil war explain these 
developments as primarily a struggle for power within the 
Christian community. This explanation is partially true. 
However, the main reason behind the development was the need 
to coordinate and organize the military power of the various 
Christian groups. In time, this action was blessed by the 
leader of the NLP, Camille Chamoun. Chamoun had a special 
admiration for the young Bashir Gemayel, and the widespread 
rumor was that Chamoun considered Gemayel as his political 
successor.
Bashir Gemayel, realized that it is essential for the 
various militia to join together in order to influence the 
war situation. If the resistance movements had not achieved 
this unification, their effect would probably have been 
relatively unimportant. But just because the existing 
situation forced extensive and complicated reorganizational
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efforts upon them* within the individual areas of activity 
an interplay gradually arose between them. Moreover, so 
long as the great common purpose— to fight external and 
internal enemies— was clear, so could there be a unified 
organization to help achieve this goal.
Despite the fact that violent clashes played an 
important role in the formation of the Lebanese Forces, the 
leaders of the various Christian groups realized the 
importance of joining forces under one command. Although 
these groups were far from being completely homogeneous, in 
times of crisis and danger differences are outweighed and 
cooperation is facilitated. For a coalition such as the 
Lebanese Forces to be formed, it must be recalled from our 
earlier discussion that the anticipated gains must be 
sufficient to overcome the anticipated costs incurred from 
continued incompatibility and lack of cooperation.
From the start, there was no superior organization or 
authority which could appoint an individual to a position of 
leadership within a system which was just emerging. Among 
the groups forming the Lebanese Forces, only the Kata’ib 
party had a developed system of cells at its disposal— a 
system which could be activated immediately, if and when the 
party leaders found it appropriate to involve the rank and 
file. At the same time, the leaders could be fairly certain 
of discipline within the party and of the members’ loyalty 
to the leaders’ directives.
9?
The growth of the Lebanese Forces during this phase 
had, therefore, to start from the bottom, with the gathering 
of like-minded individuals who shared a common purpose when 
some challenge arose. When this occurred, the group then 
became a closely-knit unit, within which one could debate or 
act in relative confidence. At the same time, the coalition 
became an instrument enabling its members to undertake 
actions that were beyond the capabilities of an individual 
alone. Groups and units began to form with the one common 
purpose of finding ways and means of exercising resistance 
against the forces occupying Lebanon, to the extent that the 
means were available to the Lebanese Forces to carry out 
such opposition. As the organization of the Lebanese Forces 
developed, and presented one differentiated task after 
another for solution, the need continued and increased to 
form new groups which could carry out the tasks and 
challenges facing the Lebanese Forces.
An important fact about the Lebanese Forces is that 
ever since its creation, the movement was taken over by 
individuals who, under more normal conditions, would most 
likely not be chosen to play leading political roles. In 
the newly-created Lebanese Forces, it was these unknown 
individuals, and largely young people, who now intervened to 
determine their country’s destiny. In the prevailing 
conditions of civil war, they were to work in a situation in 
which they could not use the normal means of political
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agitation, election, or other usual methods of rising in the 
hierarchy or of gaining a political mandate for the fateful 
decisions they made.
From a political perspective, one might have expected a 
waiting, resigned, or static situation during the Lebanese 
civil war. But in fact there existed a dynamic, almost 
explosive, state of affairs led by people who, until the 
civil war, were little known and unpretentious citizens. To 
this group, events suddenly assigned a task which they had 
neither expected nor sought.
Almost all leaders of the Lebanese Forces, therefore, 
had to begin their roles without the usual support in the 
traditional ruling organs of society and without any state 
agency appointing them to the posts of leadership, which 
they earned by their own efforts. Everywhere in Lebanon 
during this stage, it became evident that below the 
traditional political apparatus there existed a reservoir of 
talent and of politically and nationally-conscious persons 
who were able to formulate a novel, often revolutionary, 
political approach to Lebanon’s problems.
As already noted, one of these important figures, who 
had played the most influential role in the creation of the 
Lebanese Forces, was the young charismatic leader, Bashir 
Gemayel. Gemayel was one of the rare leaders who invoked 
popular emotions on both sides of the scale: joy and
sadness, love and hatred. But above all, he was designing a
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new path for Lebanon and was leading the way taking that 
course. Until his assassination in 199B, Gemayel was the 
center of political decision-making within the Christian 
community. History alone will judge what Bashir Gemayel 
actually achieved for his country. But for the young 
Christians* he became an inspiration for other generations 
to follow.
During this phase* when ideas remained vague as to the 
future of Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces became primarily a 
means for promoting the more purposeful functions which it 
advocated and which in time would be clearly identified with 
the movement.
The Lebanese Forces reached its zenith when Bashir 
Gemayel was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He 
strengthened the military potential of the organization by, 
for example, instituting military training in the schools of 
the Christian sector to build up reserves. He also gave the 
Lebanese Forces a broader political dimension and popular 
basis. Moreover, Gemayel put an end to anarchy and political 
banditry within the Christian area, in the process creating 
a model of order and security. Gradually, the old warlords 
and their private armies disappeared from the Christian 
region. They were being replaced by a single, organized 
army and a modern administration, as young officers with 
university degrees took the place of the old feudal leaders. 
What Bashir represented in Lebanon was a force of
10S
modernization— the kind of force that all Middle Eastern 
nations need if they are to escape permanent political 
instability and dependence on foreign powers. Yet critics 
have claimed that Bashir’s popular support was based only 
upon the Christian population, which was pitted against a 
Moslem majority within Lebanon for political control of the 
nat ion.
On August 23, 1982? Bashir Gemayel was elected
President of the Republic of Lebanon. On September 14,
1982, nine days before he was to be inaugurated President, 
Bashir was killed, along with 26 others. This marked the 
end of the second phase of the development of the Lebanese 
Forces and the beginning of the next stage.
The Third Phase; 1982-1985. This third phase started 
with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel which ultimately 
led to the disintegration of the Lebanese Forces, to chaos, 
and to the decline of its freedom of decision. Before 
Gemayel's assassination, the center of decision making 
within the Christian community was the Lebanese Forces.
With his death, the center of power was shifted once again 
towards the traditional Christian leaders.
Before his election to the presidency, Bashir Gemayel 
appointed his niece’s husband, Fedi Frem, as leader of the 
Lebanese Forces. During Frem’s two year leadership from 
1982-1984, the Lebanese Forces was exposed to many serious 
crisis. First, there was the massacres of the Palestinians
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in the Sabra and Shatilla camps. These massacres evoked the 
outrage of the international community against both the 
Israeli government and the militia of the Lebanese Forces, 
which were jointly held responsible for them. Moreover, the 
continuous denial by the Lebanese Forces that it took part 
in the massacres was an important factor producing a cabinet 
crisis in Israel, which led in turn to the removal of 
Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon from his post. After this, 
suspicion and caution clouded the relationship between the 
Lebanese Forces and Israel. After one year, in 1 9R3, Fedi 
Frern admitted publicly that these massacres had been carried 
out by "Lebanese elements" (Schiff and Y a ’ari 198^, H78).
Second, perhaps the sharpest decline in standing and 
military power of the Lebanese Forces was experienced in the 
heartland of the Druze community within the Shouf mountains. 
Violent clashes began in the Shouf in May, 1983, and 
continued, as the Druze sought to expel the Lebanese Forces 
from areas which the latter had occupied in the wake of the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The fighting in the 
Shouf mountains continued through the next several months.
In February, 1983, Druze militia, meeting strong opposition, 
captured the Lebanese Forces positions as far south as 
Damour. The battle of the Shouf mountains was characterized 
by savagery and bloodshed. As had been true in the 
nineteenth century, the Druze and Maronites were fighting 
each other with particular hatred. Once again, the old
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historical conflict between these two Lebanese communities 
had asserted itself. As illustrated by these events, the 
institutionalization of violence and revenge as permanent 
factors of daily life among the various religious 
communities of Lebanon have some disturbing implications for 
their future coexistence within a unified Lebanon. The 
continuous importation of weapons, the strengthening of the 
control over their areas by the various militia, and above 
all, the transformation of the Lebanese Forces into an 
institution are obviously important indicators of the 
institutionalization of violence, making it a seemingly 
permanent way of life.
Finally, the death of Bashir Gemayel created confusion 
and despair within the Christian community. Gemayel was 
very popular and charismatic, and his death created a great 
vacuum within the Christian leadership. Meanwhile, many 
Christians were comparing the leadership of Fedi Frem 
unfavorably with that of Gemayel, without considering the 
continuous changes in the internal and external 
circumstances. Among Lebanese leaders, Bashir Gemayel was 
clearly one of a kind. He had been able to hold his 
organization together, despite the natural Lebanese 
inclination towards divisiveness. This is well demonstrated 
in the following paragraphs.
On October 9, 198A, F u ’ad Abu Nader, a nephew of
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel (Bashir’s older brother),
was elected Commander of the Lebanese Forces. He succeeded 
Fedi Frem, whose two-year term as Commander had expired. 
Nader was regarded as a moderate, and his election was seen 
as strengthening Gemayel’s hold on the Maronite Christian 
community. It is important to note here that after Bashir’s 
death, his brother Amin Gemayel was chosen to be President 
of the Lebanese Republic. Yet, despite the fact that Fedi 
Frem was the President’s brother-in-law, he had been vocal 
in his criticism of the Gemayel government’s recent 
rapprochement with Syria (Facts on File 198A, 757).
During Abu Nader’s leadership, which lasted only several 
months, Amin Gemayel had been taking full advantage of his 
governmental and party positions and of the fact that 
Lebanese Forces was under the control of his nephew. In 
time, Amin Gemayel became increasingly supportive of the 
Syrian influence in Lebanon— a position that more and more 
alienated many of his followers. Several months later two 
prominent Lebanese Forces’ leaders, for example— Samir 
Geagea and Elie Hobeika— rebelled against Amin Gemayel’s 
leadership. These differences between Geagea and Amin 
Gemayel finally led to Geagea’s being expelled from the 
Kata’ib Party political bureau in March, 1985.
At that time, the first "uprising" within the Lebanese 
Forces took place. This development was the beginning of a 
series of revolts and illegal actions to seize control of 
the Lebanese Forces by dissident factions. Usually, control
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of the Lebanese Forces was exercised by legitimate 
procedures (elections) within the Command Council of the 
Lebanese Forces. Moreover, these revolts were an indication 
of the increasing tension between the president and the 
members of the Lebanese Forces. The leaders of the 
"intifada," Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika, ousted militia 
commander F u ’ad Abu Nader; and they made the Lebanese Forces 
militia independent of the Kata’ib Party. Geagea became 
commander of the Lebanese Forces, only to be replaced by 
Hobeika in May, following the former’s failure in the 
conflict over the future of the Christian community in the 
Sidon-Ji2zin area (Rabinovich 1995, 180).
The irony of these uprisings was the fact that they 
were basically directed against Gemayel’s pro-Syrian 
position. However, it was none other than the commander of 
the Lebanese Forces, Elie Hobeika, who subsequently signed 
the Damascus Accord, which would have given Syria more 
influence in Lebanon. Syria had brokered a December 27,
1985, peace agreement which came to be known as the Damascus 
Accord. The agreement was signed by Nabih Berri, the leader 
of the mainstream Sh i ’ite Moslem movement, called Amal; 
other signatories were his ally, Walid Junblat, head of the 
mostly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and Elie Hobeika, 
the commander of the Lebanese Forces. The pact asked all 
contenders to yield important privileges and concessions in 
return for peace under Syrian protection.
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The broad terms of the accord specified that Lebanon 
would remain an independent and free nation. However, 
Lebanon must hereafter coordinate with Syria all its Arab, 
regional, and international relationships. This fact in 
turn meant that Lebanon must accept the positions, 
alliances, and conflicts of any Syrian regime, at the time 
and in the future. In sum, under the accord, Lebanon was 
required to accept Syrian dictation in its international 
relationships, without any reservations. President Gemayel, 
who had no part in drafting the accord, subsequently refused 
to endorse it. Moreover, a number of other prominent 
Christians and Moslems expressed strong opposition to the 
accord, thereby demonstrating the widening split within the 
Christian ranks on a major matter of public policy.
After Hobeika became the only Christian leader to sign 
the Syrian-brokered peace pact designed to end the civil 
war, he was ousted in January, 1986, by pro-Gemayel forces 
led by Samir Geagea. In a speech given by Geagea on January 
20, 1986, he claimed that during Hobeika’s leadership, the 
decision-making process had been reduced to a monopoly, and 
that decisions were taken by the Lebanese Forces in an 
arbitrary manner, without any planning or a vision of the 
future.* Geagea, the Lebanese Forces’s chief of staff, was 
elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Lebanese 
Forces on January 24, and he immediately urged the
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renegotiation of the Damascus Accord (Middle East and North 
Africa 1987, 569).
The Fourth Phase; 1986-1988. This phase was char­
acterized by significant development within the Lebanese 
Forces. It started when Samir Geagea attempted successfully 
to transform the militia into a regular military force, to 
be known as the Free Christian Army. Some veteran militia 
men objected to these plans, which involved streamlining the 
8,000-man militia into a professionalized 5,000-man force; 
and all fighters were now required to undergo a rigorous 
three months training period at a n e w  Christian military 
academy (Facts on File 1986, 626).
Another important development was the transformation of 
the Lebanese Forces Executive Committee into a Command 
Council, comprising representatives of the Lebanese 
Christian parties currently serving as members of the 
Executive Committee. The new Command Council would include 
twenty—eight members who were representatives of various 
Christian groups. On December 8, 1986, Samir Geagea was 
elected President of the new Command Council; Karim 
Pakradouni was chosen as a Vice-President; and George Adwan 
became Secretary General for political affairs. Moreover, 
the Command Council now included two representatives of each 
of the principal political parties founding the Command 
Council: Maroun Helou and Moussa Prince (NLP), Ibrahim
Najjar and Boutros (Kata’ib), Jean Alam and Elias Matar
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(Guardians of the Cedars), Loutfallah Khlat and Bishara 
liatar (Tanzim) , and other members heads and officials in 
charge of the various departments.
By September, 1988, Geagea was able to control 
peacefully what was left of the Gemayel’s forces, and he had 
also seized Christian radio stations. Amin Gemayel was held 
under house arrest by Geagea’s forces before being allowed 
to leave for France with his family (New York Times 1989,
A). This development signified the end of Gemayel's 
military power and the creation of a united Christian front, 
with Geagea now emerging as the most powerful figure.
It is appropriate to describe 1988 as a turning point 
in the Lebanese war. That year witnessed the collapse of 
the 1943 National Pact and the disintegration of the three 
governing institutions; the presidency of the Republic, the 
premiership of the Cabinet, and the chairmanship of the 
Par 1i ament.
During this phase also, the Lebanese Forces became the 
central focus of political power within the Christian 
region. Lebanese Forces was transformed from a group of 
resistance forces into a regular army whose aim was 
defending and liberating Lebanon from foreign control. The 
exact membership of the Lebanese Forces is not available 
because of the lack of reliable data in Lebanon, but some 
estimates indicate that the number ranged between 8,000 and 
10,000 members (Roelofsma 1989, 37). After the
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establishment of the Lebanese Forces military academy, some 
six hundred officers and eight hundred soldiers successfully 
graduated from it (Adwan 1988). Another important 
difference between the regimes of Geagea and Hobeika was the 
fact that during Hobeika’s leadership the Lebanese Forces 
militia appeared to be unified. Yet despite appearances, in 
reality it was more of a confederacy. Geagea restructured 
Lebanese Forces7 military arm and created an elite of 
resistance fighters able to defend and sacrifice their lives 
to defend Lebanon.
Geagea also restructured various Lebanese Forces7 
departments and agencies and staffed them with well educated 
individuals. For example, security and civilian agencies of 
the Lebanese Forces had some 1,500 university graduates 
(Adwan 1988); a student movement with new responsibilities 
and a new organization emerged; a labor movement was 
founded; and a reorganization of the intelligence agency was 
under taken.
Moreover, these reforms involved the administrative 
bureaus and various branches of the Lebanese Forces. These 
included the general command; general secretariat for 
internal affairs; a national fund agency which administers 
Lebanese Forces affairs., coordinate relations among the 
various departments; enact laws and regulations and finally, 
suggest forecasts for better organization. On the other 
hand, the external administration 7s role is to try to
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fulfill the social needs in the Christian area. The 
external administration include civilian police, customs 
administration, and an agency to run the affairs of port 
Jounieh.
The creation of these bureaus and branches was a clear 
acknowledgement of the institutionalization of the present 
situation, which imposed on the Lebanese Forces the burden 
of administering the internal affairs of the Christian 
community. With the collapse of state institutions, it was 
now up to the Lebanese Forces to establish agencies and 
departments to provide essential services for the people 
within its area.
Obviously, as the government’s authority declined, the 
Lebanese Forces was the only available alternative to fill 
the resulting vacuum. Its ability to replace the 
established institutions of the government, along with the 
fear of partitioning the country, created a growing sense of 
concern within Lebanon and the Arab World concerning the 
objectives and behavior of the Lebanese Forces. Apparently, 
those were among the primary reasons for the eruption of new 
clashes between the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army. 
According to General Aoun, the Prime Minister of the 
Lebanese military cabinet, "We are responsible for the 
state, and the Lebanese Forces want a ministate..." 
(Roelofsma 1989, 36).
u  a
In addition, the Lebanese Forces attempted to follow a 
highly rational approach in making political decisions, as, 
for example, in the adoption of laws instead of making 
arbitrary decisions- The Lebanese Forces also applied the 
principles of merit and competence in allocating responsi­
bilities and making promotions within its ranks.
Another noteworthy, if paradoxical, characteristic of 
the Lebanese Forces was the high wages paid to its leaders 
and members. It needs to be noted, that when the Lebanese 
Forces was initially created, all of its members were 
volunteers who joined the forces willingly and with no 
salary. Vet in time, as indicated by Table One, the wages 
existing within the Lebanese Forces exceeded those of the 
pub lie sec tor.
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Table One
Comparison of Wages between the Lebanese Forces
the Public Sector















5 1 A 1.0A0 55.500 57
Head of 
of fi ce
3 1 31.AAO AA.AOO A 1
Head of 
section
A 1 53.7A0 37.800 60
Snd Ltn - - 58.360 36.500 58
L i eut - - SS.A60 33.800 50
So 1d i er - - • S3.7A0 55.500 6
♦Source: George Adwan, a speech given by the Secretary
General of the Political Affairs in the Lebanese Forces, in 
Arabic, July 58, 1988.
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Moreover, the Lebanese Forces offered its members 
generous family allowances. For example, an amount of IE 
percent of the minimum wage is paid for the spouse; (and 
contrary to the laws and regulations of the public sector) 
four percent of the minimum wage is also paid for the first 
child, and the allowance grows for every other child, with 
no ceiling on the total. These allowances are paid 
according to the following chart:
Private and The
Public Sector Lebanese Percentage of
Family Status (LP) Forces (LP) Difference
Spouse + 3 kids 3876 3935 1.3
Spouse + 4 kids ^A68 ^938 10.0
Spouse + 5 kids 5060 6110 31.0
Spouse + 6 kids 5060 7497 ^8.0
Spouse + 7 kids 5060 9117 80.0
^Source: George Adwan from a speech given by the Secretary
General of the Political Affairs in the Lebanese Forces on 
July 38, 1988 [in Arabic].
In addition to this, members of the Lebanese Forces 
were to receive free bread coupons and free food supplies, 
whenever these were available. Additional services 
accessible to the members entailed free medication, 
hospitalization, dental care and other benefits. As 
mentioned earlier, a leading objective of the Lebanese 
Forces was to provide services to citizens within the 
Christian region. Accordingly, the Lebanese Forces set up 
programs, departments and initiatives to achieve this goal.
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For example, a Social Welfare institution was established 
which provided medical assistance, monthly donations and 
educational welfare. Other innovations included a public 
transportation department; a council of development for 
Beirut; an organization to coordinate regional councils; a 
Southern office; a council for development of Deir el-Ahmar; 
an office for Bekaa and other regions; a department for the 
protection of the environment; a program directed against 
drugs and for the eradication of Hashish fields; and an 
electric energy project.
The Fifth Phase; 1989— 1990. This last phase to be 
considered is the most dangerous stage in the existence of 
the Lebanese Forces. On September 22, 198S, Amin Gemayel’s
six-year term as Lebanese President ended, without a 
successor having been elected by the National Assembly. 
Refore he left office, Amin Gemayel appointed an interim 
military government headed by a Maronite Christian, General 
Michel Aoun. Immediately, Moslems and pro-Syrian groups 
denounced Gemayel’s move and pledged support for a 
government headed by the Sunni Moslem, Dr. Selim el-Hoss.
The emergence of this rival government appeared to mark the 
institutionalization of a formal "partition" of Lebanon; and 
it raised widespread fears of a resurgence of new fighting 
between Christian and Moslem militia. The existence of two 
Lebanese cabinets as two separate entities appeared to 
symbolize the partition of the country.
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Not unexpectedly, on February 14, 1989, violent clashes 
erupted between the Lebanese Army, led by General Aoun, and 
the militia of the Lebanese Forces for control of Christian 
areas of Lebanon. This was a major turning point in the 
Lebanese political struggle. Now for the first time since 
it came into existence, the Lebanese Forces was forced to go 
on the defensive, since until that time, it had been in 
complete control of the Christian region. General Aoun 
announced that the Lebanese army would not tolerate the 
presence of a parallel military force or, in effect, a
I."state within a state."
Aoun and his Cabinet had sworn to uphold the Lebanese 
Constitution and were committed to the liberation of the 
country. Consequently, Aoun demanded that the Lebanese 
Forces stop levying illegal taxes and ordered the Lebanese 
Forces to leave Basin No. 5 at the Port of Beirut. In what 
some observers called a highly conciliatory move, Geagea 
compliantly accepted this demand, thereby relinquishing the 
source of an estimated $200,000 a month income from duties 
collected on freight shipped through the basin (Roelofsma 
1989, 37).
However, this incident proved to be only the beginning 
of ever fiercer fighting that ultimately tore apart 
Lebanon’s Christian community. In the conflict, the 
Lebanese Army was able to gain control of several parts of 
the capital from the Lebanese Forces militia. Trying to
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avoid more clashes with the Army, Geagea ordered his militia 
back to return to their barracks; but he refused to dissolve 
the Lebanese Forces militia. An interesting development was 
the wide support that General Aoun in time apparently gained 
from the Lebanese citizens, especially within the Christian 
areas. One could speculate that this fact was an indication 
of the declining support by the Christian element for the 
Lebanese Forces militia, and it possibly indicated the 
people’s preference for a legitimate Lebanese government to 
replace the status quo.
Another extremely important development affecting the
Lebanese Forces was the divisions that occurred within its 
ranks. On May, 1989, the Guardians of the Cedars, an 
extremist rightist group, was dismissed from the main 
Christian coalition, the Lebanese Front; accordingly, its 
representatives were removed from the Command Council of the 
Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces. The main reason for 
this split was the decision by the Lebanese Forces to deal 
with the Arab community. By contrast, the Guardians of the 
Cedars called for a defense pact with Israel. Moreover, 
many prominent Lebanese had also broken with the Lebanese 
Forces and had joined forces with General Aoun.
Meanwhile, the conflict between the Lebanese Army and 
the Lebanese Forces continues. The outcome of these violent 
clashes, however, has strengthened the position of General
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Aoun and has made him an influential figure in future 
political calculations.
Goals and Ideology of the Lebanese Forces 
Although the outcome of the civil war in Lebanon cannot 
be foreseen, the Lebanese Forces has its own proposal for 
the solution of the crisis. First, before any agreement can 
be negotiated, the Lebanese Forces has a fundamental 
precondition: total withdrawal of all foreign troops,
specifically including the Syrian and the Israeli regular 
armies, as well as all Palestinian and the Iranian armed 
forces. The Lebanese Forces are convinced that all various 
foreign military forces in Lebanon are a cause of 
instability and division for the Lebanese society. The 
Lebanese Forces, therefore, has renewed its pledge to put an 
end to the civil war which others are waging and supporting 
in Lebanon. Until this goal is achieved, the Lebanese 
Forces will continue to fight and resist. As members of the 
Lebanese Forces see it, the Syrian Army’s presence in 
Lebanon has been illegal since 1902. Until the withdrawal 
of the Syrian Army from Lebanese territory, therefore, it 
will be considered by the Lebanese Forces as an occupation 
force. Accordingly, the Lebanese Forces are ready to fight 
against all forms of occupation and until Lebanon recovers 
its sovereignty, freedom, independence and territorial 
integrity.
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Second* at the national level* the Lebanese Forces 
rejects any ideas as democracy based solely upon numbers, 
abolition of confessionalismj and the mistaken notion of one 
homogeneous Lebanese people. In the Lebanese Forces’ view, 
a majoritarian-type democracy in a mu1ti-cu1tura1 society 
would produce little more than factional tyranny and 
favoritism, thus, endangering the liberties of both 
individuals and communities. The Lebanese Forces believes 
that the key to any solution of the Lebanese crisis is the 
recognition of the plural nature of the Lebanese political 
system. As pointed out in previous chapter, the Lebanese 
people comprise of highly diverse social and cultural 
groups. Accordingly, any proposed solution to the civil war 
must be realistic and accept the fact of Lebanon’s great 
diversity (Lebanese Forces 1986). Thus, the Lebanese Forces 
strongly advocate the principle of pluralism. This 
emphasize on the concept of pluralism, however, does not 
mean that the Lebanese Forces has abandoned the concept of 
Lebanese national unity. Obviously, the Lebanese Forces’ 
call for the partition of the country has to be perceived as 
a rational approach designed to put an end to deeply-divided 
Lebanon. It is a last resort, in case all other peaceful 
and less drastic solutions have failed to resolve Lebanon’s 
crisis (this point will be discussed in later chapter).
Any new national reconciliation, therefore, must take 
fully into account, therefore, the pluralistic nature of the
IPO
Lebanese society. This would involve a political 
reconciliation which would recognize fully the nature of 
Christian, Moslem and Druze entities, through regulations 
giving them the right to decide internal matters specific to 
each community. Another related goal of the Lebanese Forces 
is creation of a decentralized Lebanese administration in 
all matters related to education, economics, justice, social 
development, and information. To the Lebanese Forces, this 
is a logical and realistic idea, because the centralized 
system that was adopted after Lebanese independence has 
evidently failed to operate successfully.
In order to carry out these goals, the Lebanese Forces 
has proposed the establishment of a federal system for 
Lebanon, based on the Western model. The new system would 
have separate legislative and executive powers, while 
recognizing the pluralistic reality of the country. A 
federation of communities, similar to the Swiss confedera­
tion, would express the desire of the Lebanese people to 
live together peacefully, without at the same time ignoring 
the unique characteristics of each community. Such a system 
would reflect the social, political and cultural realities 
existing within Lebanon and, the Lebanese Forces hopes, 
would guarantee the unique and valued characteristics of 
Lebanon.
Third, the Lebanese Forces has proposed the principle 
of neutrality in foreign affairs, which had been a provision
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of the 19**3 national covenant. The principle* however, was 
never actually respected by Lebanon’s communities. This 
neutrality is seen by the Lebanese Forces as an approach 
needed in order to avoid any struggle for influence among 
the regional or superpowers powers on the Lebanese scene. 
Such a neutrality— guaranteed by regional and international 
powers— would bring peace and long-term stability to 
Lebanon. Neutrality, for example, would prohibit Lebanon’s 
membership in any military and political alliances, since 
this might again put the fragile political balance of 
Lebanon in danger. With the rise in Lebanon of various 
fanatical groups and organizations often sponsored by 
foreign countries, and the continuing conflict between the 
Arabs and Israel, however, it could prove very difficult in 
the future for Lebanon to maintain a complete neutrality in 
regional and global affairs.
Finally, the Lebanese Forces believe in a 1iberal 
economy, the only kind of system that can enable Lebanon 
survive. In accordance with the Lebanese society’s long- 
established tradition, the Lebanese Forces advocates a free 
enterprise economic system, based on individual initiative 
and private ownership. According to Bashir Gemayel’s 
statement in 19S2: "We want a society of freedom. That
freedom is indivisible; therefore, a free system of 
government cannot coexist with an unfree economic system.
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Consequently, we declare our attachment to a free economic 
system as well as to a free Lebanon."J
It is important to note that there are some 
contradictions concerning the position of the Lebanese 
Forces regarding the proposed unity of Lebanon. Apparently, 
the Lebanese Forces has relied upon a pragmatic approach 
towards resolving the Lebanese crisis. Although, in 
reality, Lebanon has been partitioned since 1976, Geagea 
asserted that the Lebanese Forces oppose partition and will 
not propose a Christian Republic.^ Another approach asserted 
by the Lebanese Forces is that if a unified Lebanon cannot 
be achieved and maintained, the "smaller Lebanon" strategy 
should then be resorted to, whether in the form of partition 
or Swiss-style cantonization (Rabinovich 1985, 114).
Summary
No one can deny the important role played by the 
Lebanese Forces in preserving the existence of the Christian 
community in a war-torn country. Since its creation, the 
Lebanese Forces has been dedicated to resisting the PLO and 
the Syrian unannounced occupation of Lebanon. After the 
established Lebanese government was unable to provide the 
basic services to the population, the Lebanese Forces 
assumed this responsibility. Samir Geagea has transformed 
the Lebanese Forces from the status of a militia into a 
progressive political movement. Besides its responsibil­
1?3
ities to defend the Christian community, the Lebanese Forces 
is also dedicated to the reform of Lebanese society, away 
from feudalism towards greater individual responsibility.
However, unable to prevail on their own, the Lebanese 
Forces have looked for outside assistance from the Western 
world and the internationa1 community, and, as a last 
resort, from Israel. It is in this context that the foreign 
relations of the Lebanese Forces must be viewed. A more 
detailed analysis of these regional and international 
relations is presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
For all nations in the contemporary international 
systems internal political organizations and movements are 
influenced by a wide range of factors and variables. Among 
these* the international and regional environment within 
which internal political behavior takes places is often a 
decisive force shaping a political movement’s policies and
behavioi and sometimes determining a nation’s political
fu ture.
For reasons already identified in earlier chapters* 
this observation is especially applicable to the modern 
political experience of Lebanon. To recapitulate briefly, 
because of Lebanon’s history, geographical location, ethnic 
and social composition, religious systems, and the 
conditions of its creation as an independent nation after 
World War I, domestic political developments within Lebanon 
have been more than ordinarily affected by the attitudes and 
activities of its immediate neighbors, by developments 
within the Middle Eastern setting, and sometimes by major 
tendencies within the global system.
For example, as our discussion in this chapter will 
show, recent events within Lebanon have been decisively 
influenced by the existence of the Cold War and by the 
sti11-unreso1ved Arab-Israeli conflict within the Middle
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East. The policies of- the United States and the Soviet 
Union toward Lebanon have quite clearly been affected by 
their Cold War strategies. Washington, for example, has on 
more than one occasion appeared to be mainly interested in 
containing communism in Lebanon and other nations within the 
Middle East. Smaller states, such as Syria, Israel, and 
Iran, have also been influenced in their policy toward 
Lebanon by their larger internationa1 and regional 
object ives.
For their part, political organizations and movements 
within modern Lebanon have not hesitated to "cultivate" 
external support in efforts to achieve their goals. For 
example, the French-Maronite "connection" in Lebanon is 
legendary, going back well into the early nineteenth 
century. In more recent years, the American-Maronite 
connection has been a crucial force in modern Lebanon’s 
political development. Or to cite a different example: 
since the early 1970s, several Arab states have had major or 
minor connections with the Palestine Liberation Organiza­
tion, in its efforts to challenge both the State of Israel 
and the authority of the established Lebanese government.
An even more recent example is the close relationship 
existing between the revolutionary, S h i ’ite government of 
Iran and one or more pro-Iranian factions involved in the 
Lebanese civil war. In all these cases, external sources 
have contributed funds, weapons and military supplies,
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diplomatic and other forms of support to favored political 
groups within Lebanon. In turn, this reality has unques­
tionably made it more difficult to resolve the civil war 
which has engulfed Lebanon since the mid-1970s.
No effort is made here of course to discuss all aspects 
or examples of Lebanon's ongoing political crisis. Since 
our subject is the Lebanese Forces, discussion will be 
confined to examining that movement’s external connections 
with four major outside powers: France, the United States,
Syria, and Israel. It seems evident that the policies and 
behavior of the Lebanese Forces— indeed, perhaps even the 
organization’s very survival— will to no inconsiderable 
degree be determined by this important dimension of Lebanese 
political life.
Tradition Of External Involvement In Lebanon
Proximity to the sea, the preponderance of the 
Christian element in the population, and the westward 
orientation since Phoenician days have conditioned Lebanon, 
rendering it receptive to the flow of new fertilizing ideas 
from abroad and very hospitable to European cultural 
influences. For thousands of years, Lebanon has had 
connections with people and countries overseas.
During the Crusader era in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, for example, the Maronites established close 
contact with the French. From the mid-nineteenth century
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until World War I, Christian Lebanese emigrated to North and 
South America* West Africa and Australia. In the nineteenth 
century, Russia, Britain, and France intervened politically 
and militarily on several different occasions to "protect" 
Christians and Druze from their enemies. French Catholic 
and American Protestant missionaries established schools, 
colleges, universities, hospitals, and printing presses in 
Lebanon. These institutions provided significant links 
between Lebanon on one side, and France and the United 
States, on the other. For example, the American University 
of Beirut, founded in 1866, introduced Western religious, 
social, scientific, and political thought, and it was in 
such societies that the Arab national movement was launched 
(Armajani and Ricks 1986, 199). From 1920 to 19^3 France 
controlled the country under a mandate from the League of 
Nations. In 1958, the United States landed troops in 
Lebanon in the midst of a civil war. Officials in 
Washington feared that the country might be taken over by 
Communi sts.
However, this Lebanese connection with peoples and 
cultures across the seas has been an almost exclusively 
Chr i st i an, and in particular Maroni te, phenomenon. The 
Maronite community has emigrated (mainly to the West) more 
than any other in Lebanon, and it has a world-wide network 
of ecclesiastical and social relations with its historic 
center in Lebanon. Christians are inclined to identify with
1S9
Europe and the West? finding their allies there. By 
contrast) Lebanon’s Moslems have felt themselves to be a 
part of the Arab and Moslem worlds, and the Moslem 
communities of Lebanon have affiliated with persons) 
organizations and countries within Arab and Moslem nations 
abroad.
The beginning of Western intervention in Lebanon took 
place in 1841, when the first religious clashes between the 
Maronites and the Druze broke out. In 1860, after nearly SO 
years of continuous unrest between these two groups, an 
international commission to resolve the crisis was 
established. Its members represented the five principal 
European powers: Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France,
and Russia, along with the governing Ottoman authority. The 
commission authorized a IS,000-man force, but France 
contributed the only 6,000 troops who comprised this force 
(Congressional Quarterly 1986, 168).
As previously noted, after the defeat and disintegra­
tion of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, Lebanon 
became a French mandate. France was granted a League of 
Nations mandate to oversee the political and economical 
development of Lebanon. The dominant political and cultural 
influence of the French is well attested in modern-day 
Lebanon, especially by its strong French ties with the 
Maronite community. The French made several significant 
contributions to Lebanese development during the mandate,
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such as creating the nucleus of a modern army; developing 
ports, roads, and airports; and establishing an excellent 
educational system, symbolized by the Universite’ de St. 
Joseph, which became a training ground for many future 
Lebanese leaders.
Another foreign intervention in the Lebanese affairs, 
this time by the United States, occurred in 1958, when a 
major challenge to the National Pact arrangements erupted in 
the form of a civil war (Qubain 1961, 23-27). Factional 
polarization in the Lebanese political system was a response 
to Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s "pan-Arab" 
crusade.
In Lebanon’s political life domestic and foreign 
factors were closely interwoven and virtually inseparable.
To illustrate this point, during the period 1956-1958 
Lebanon was subject to many internal and external pressures, 
many of which owed their origins to the agitation prevailing 
in the Arab world as a whole. It was a period of growing 
Pan-Arabism in Syria and Egypt, with Nasser as its chief 
symbo1.
There is no doubt that Pan-Arabism was having a 
profound impact on the thinking and emotions of Lebanon’s 
Moslem population. The rank-and-file of Lebanese Moslems 
(especially those of the Sunni persuasion) have never 
developed any deep sense of loyalty to Lebanon, which they 
tended to regard as a somewhat artificial French-sponsored
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creation (Lenczowski 1980* 367). It was natural for them to 
look toward predominantly Moslem Syria for inspiration. 
Syria* in the meantime* was steadily shifting toward Pan- 
Arabism. While Syria definitely chose the camp of Arab 
unity* Lebanon insisted upon its separateness and its right 
to cooperate with the West if it accorded with its national 
interest.
As a result, pro-Nasser manifestations in Lebanon grew 
in number and violence, resulting in bodily clashes between 
groups of different orientation. In time, the tension 
reached dangerous proportions* and only a spark was needed 
to provoke a major inferno. On May 13, 1985, anti­
government riots within Lebanon reached the proportions of
an armed insurrection. The majority of these anti­
government groups belonged to the Sunni sect, and they were
located in the Moslem quarter of Beirut, as well as in
Tripoli. These forces were enjoying the active support of 
the newly-formed United Arab Republic (U A R ), the union 
between Syria and Egypt. From its Syrian province, the UAR 
was supplying them with arms, money, and personnel. The 
Christian community of Lebanon feared that the Moslems were 
attempting to incorporate Lebanon into the UAR.
The Lebanese government was supported by the Kata’ib 
Party, along with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
(SSNP). However, it must be noted that whereas the Kata’ib 
defended the regime because of its deep-seated commitment to
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preserving Lebanon as an independent political entity? the 
SSNP did so primarily because of its hatred of Nasserism 
(Yamak 1966, 71).
In any event, this crisis was initiated and intensified 
by several regional developments outside Lebanon. On July 
1^ , 1958, a coup d ’etat in Iraq overthrew and killed the 
King and established a revolutionary regime that announced 
its support of Nasser’s anti-Western sentiment, which 
appeared to be prevalent throughout the Arab world since the 
Suez crisis of October, 1956. Concurrent 1y , the growing 
influence of Nasser within the Middle East also created a 
sense of fear and uncertainty in Lebanon and Jordan. As 
fears mounted in Lebanon, President Camille Chamoun appealed 
for American assistance under the "Eisenhower Doctrine," a 
strategy adopted by the United States in January, 1957, 
following the Suez crisis. According to the doctrine, 
financial, economic and military aid would be provided to 
the countries of the Middle East which were threatened by 
"international Communism," if they were prepared to accept 
i t .
Washington responded to Chamoun’s request. On July 15, 
1958, 10,000 U.S. troops landed in Lebanon to maintain 
security and defend the Lebanese government against what the 
Maronites feared would be a Moslem uprising to topple the 
existing regime. This crisis left the Lebanese Christians 
wondering how deeply the Moslems were committed to the
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preservation of the National Pact. Accordingly, some 
Maronites began to look toward Israel as a future ally.
The crucial role played by the Western powers 
throughout modern Lebanese history has of course influenced 
relations among the various factions and communities within 
the country. Moreover, Western intervention has unques­
tionably contributed to the emergence of widely differing 
political views and objectives among Lebanon’s diverse 
communities. The most striking example of this tendency has 
been the protection extended by France to the Maronite 
communi t y .
The Maronites’ French Connection
Traditionally viewing themselves as an outpost of 
Christian civilization in the Moslem Arab world, Lebanon’s 
Maronites have long identified themselves with the West, 
particularly with France. France’s protective relationship 
with the Maronite continues to this date. This mutual 
affinity results from what the French and the Maronites 
agree is a "special relationship" that goes back at least to 
the early nineteenth century.
As noted earlier, France initially intervened in 
Lebanon to protect the Maronite community from attacks by 
the Druze in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Nonetheless, this French-Maronite relation developed and 
became more exposed to various forces. For example, France
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introduced her system of government and style of education 
used in Lebanon from the early nineteenth century until the 
present time. Thus, using the means of education through 
the French language and their missionaries in Lebanon,
France could establish the beginning of a colony and thereby 
control the trade, as well as the way of life, of the 
Christians of the Middle East. Consequently, for the 
Maronites, this contact with France through religious, 
educational, political, and trade interests unleashed a 
process of change unknown before. Urbanization grew rapidly 
and a new class of small merchants and craftsmen began to 
emerge. A new but influential political group, mainly 
Christian, originated and consolidated its activities in the 
form of secret movements directed against the Ottoman Empire 
(Dau 1977, 221-43). With the close of the nineteenth 
century there remained no doubt that critical political 
changes were underway.
The twentieth century brought with it World War I, the 
breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, and the French Mandate. 
Contact with France was intensified during the Mandate 
period, and many new reforms were introduced by the French. 
For the first time in the history of the area, a modern form 
of government had been proposed. Lebanon (as well as Syria) 
had a president, a parliament, and other representative 
councils. Under the Mandate, the French High Commissioner 
undoubtedly had the upper hand in all affairs, but the form,
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if not the substance, of government in the modern sense was 
introduced.
Many of Lebanon’s current problems were created when 
France acquired mandates over Syria and Lebanon after World 
War I. France split the Levant into Syria and Lebanon, in 
the process incorporating a major Moslem population not 
previously part of Lebanon. To this day, Syrians recall —  
and resent— this French act.
Ever since that event, the strong bond of religion has 
helped push the French in support of the Christians of 
Lebanon. It is not coincidence, for example, that since the 
civil war began in 1975, as many as 130,000 Lebanese have 
moved to France; many of them carry dual French-1ebanese 
c i t i zensh ip J
This traditional attachment has driven France, 
throughout the civil war, to undertake several regional and 
international initiatives in an attempt to solve the 
Lebanese crisis. As explained in an earlier chapter, while 
the Lebanese crisis originated as a conflict between the 
Palestinian guerrilla groups and militia of the Kata’ib 
party, it quickly developed into a much broader confronta­
tion between the Christian and the Moslem communities. 
Meanwhile, Lebanese political leadership was also 
experiencing the same kind of division within its ranks.
For example, the relationship between the President (a 
Maronite) and the Prime Minister (a Sunni Moslem)
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deteriorated rapidly. Speaking for the Sunni element? Prime 
Minister Karami demanded radical reform of the Lebanese 
political system, which in turn was opposed strongly by the 
Maronite establishment.
With the worsening relations within the Lebanese 
leadership, France, the traditional European friend of the 
Lebanese Maronites, offered its mediation in resolving the 
Lebanese crisis. French President Giscard d ’Estaing 
appointed M. Couve de Murville, chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, to undertake a 
mediation mission in Lebanon in an effort to reconcile the 
contending factions. The mission lasted from November 19- 
30, 1975.
Although the de Murville mission appeared to achieve a 
measure of reconci1iation between President Franjieh and 
Prime Minister Karami, it had little impact in changing the 
increasingly hard line attitudes of the opposing para­
military forces. During this period, the Maronite 
leadership appeared determined to oppose any suggestion for 
the fundamental reorganization or reform of the Lebanese 
political system (Salibi 1976, 1A0-45).
As the fighting continued throughout the 1975 and the 
1976, a second French mission arrived in Beirut on April 8, 
1976, headed by M. Georges Gores (a former Minister of 
Labor ) , who had been a member of M. Couve de Murvilie’s 
earlier mission. The stated purpose of M. Gorse’s mission
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was to express the French determination to make a major 
contribution in resolving the Lebanese crisis* to ensure 
that the institutions were consolidated, and to make certain 
that peace reigned in the country. Moreover, M. Gorse said 
that France stood ready to consider participation in a 
security control system to enforce any agreement reached in 
Lebanon if an acceptable suitable proposal was made (Keesing 
1976, 37-72).
Despite French efforts, the fighting in Lebanon 
continued; and all regional and internationa1 mediation 
attempts failed to achieve an acceptable solution to the 
Lebanese crisis. However, renewed efforts were made by the 
Government of France to find a solution to the Lebanese 
conflict, especially after a new development emerged in 
Lebanon. This time a new player entered the Lebanese arena. 
At the end of 1976, Syria— in the form of what was called 
the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF>— intervened militarily in 
l.ebanon, ostensibly to put an end to the country’s political 
clashes. For to no o n e ’s surprise, Syria, whose 
intervention was initially advantageous to the Christians 
(because it turned the military balance in their favor) in 
time shifted alliances and supported the Moslem -Palestinian 
camp against the Christian community. The Lebanese conflict 
continued after the Syrian intervention, and all attempts to 
reach a solution to the problem have thus far failed.
On October 2, 1978j the French Government revealed its
new peace plan which it hoped to implement through the 
United Nations) while France held the Security Council 
presidency. The French plan involved the imposition of a 
permanent ceasefire; the creation of a suitable environment 
for promoting a dialogue between the Christian and Moslem 
communities in order to achieve a new national accord to 
assure the restoration of unity) security) and guaranteed 
independence of Lebanon; and finally) the intention of 
France to send "several regiments" of peace-keeping forces 
to Lebanon if the Governments and parties concerned so 
desired. Needless to s a y > the new French plan to the 
Lebanese crisis was rejected by Mr. Junblat as well as Prime 
Minister) Rashid Karami (a Sunni Moslem)) who asserted that 
Lebanon would "never go back to the days of the mandate" 
<al-Hawadith 1976> 19). The momentum of the Lebanese civil 
war appeared to be unstoppable. Christian leaders asserted 
their determination to continue the struggle against the 
Syrian forces and expressed their confidence that Christian 
forces could withstand any further Syrian encroachments.
Yet France continued its efforts on the regional and 
the international level to find a peaceful solution to the 
Lebanese war. For example) in 1979) France helped push 
through the UN Security Council Resolution No. ^9^ > renewing 
the UNIFL mandate and calling on the Lebanese government to
139
present a plan for extending its authority over the entire 
country.
Intensive French, as well as international diplomatic, 
activities occurred in 1981, during the Syrian siege of the 
Lebanese (Christian-controlled) city of Zahle. Minor 
clashes between Syrian troops and some members of the 
Kata’ib Party in time escalated into a full-scale attack by 
Syrian forces upon Zahle, causing intensive destruction in 
infrastructure and many human casualties. Syrian forces 
imposed a complete siege on the city, preventing medical and 
food supplies from reaching its citizens. In time, Chris­
tian leaders desperately, appealed for help from the interna­
tional community. France responded by despatching an envoy 
in a new attempt to pressure the parties involved to arrive 
at a ceasefire. In addition, some French officials proposed 
the replacement of Syrian troops by internationa1 forces, 
due to the changing role of Syria in the Lebanese affairs. 
However, pro-Syrian groups within Lebanon demanded the 
continuing presence of Syrian forces on Lebanese soil.
In August, 198S, France participated in the formation 
of an international peace-keeping force to oversee the 
evacuation procedures of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) from Beirut. Unfortunately, two French 
Marines were wounded by Moslem forces when they were jogging 
in west Beirut. Following this, France and the United 
States were targets of a suicide car-bomb. Then on October
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23, 1983, two men believed to be members of an extremist 
S h i ’ite group known as al-Jihad al-Tslami (which had also 
claimed responsibility for the attack on the U.S. embassy in 
April 18, 1983) drove trucks loaded with explosive into the
barracks of both the U.S. and the French multinational 
forces <MNF) contingents. The American barracks near the 
airport entirely collapsed killing 241 Marines. The French, 
meanwhile, lost 57 dead in the collapse of their outpost 
nearer the heart of West Beirut. Such aggressive actions 
towards the French and American troops in Lebanon showed 
dramatically that Western intervention in Lebanon was not 
welcomed by all parties involved in the nation's conflict.
However, what resulted from these incidents was an 
ambivalent response by the two countries. Despite the 
strong condemnation of the bombing by Western media and 
public opinion, no action was taken to punish the group that 
was responsible for the attack. Both President Reagan and 
President Mitterand threatened retaliation against the 
instigators of the car-bomb attacks. But they could not 
identify the group responsible or tactics to counter this 
new kind of suicidal activities.
Finally, on February 22, 1984, the Marines pulled out
of Lebanon, soon followed by the remainder of the MNF. 
Ironically, some of the best-trained troops in the world, 
armed with some of the best equipment, had been forced out 
of Lebanon by a small number of amateurs, whose principal
1 M
weapons appeared to be fanaticism and a desire for 
mar tyrdom!
Although the United States and other Western nations 
thereafter largely abandoned their efforts to affect the 
political outcome in Lebanon) France remained the only 
country willing to make serious attempts to resolve the 
Lebanese crisis. The apparent commitment of the French to 
the Lebanese Christian community is based on part upon the 
belief that Syria has participated in anti-French terrorist 
plots) including the assassination of the French ambassador 
to Lebanon on September k, 1981.
Throughout the Lebanese civil war, the predominance of 
Syrian troops threatened the very existence of the Christian 
community. A brutal campaign was waged by Syria? for 
example? to destroy the constitutional government headed by 
General Michael Aoun. General Aoun has since dedicated 
himself and his Army forces to expelling Syria’s occupying 
army of 40,000 so the Lebanese may work out their nation’s 
political problems for themselves. He declared what is 
called a "war of national liberation" against Syria? which 
directly and through its proxies in time controlled 70 
percent of Lebanese territory. Throughout 1989? Syria and 
its Lebanese allies engaged in extensive shelling of the 
Christian areas causing severe damage and destruction. 
"Beirut is being wiped off the face of the earth," cried the 
Christian Voice of Lebanon radio (Time 1989, 23>.
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Only France made some serious attempts once more to 
create pressure for a political settlement. Two French 
warships were deployed near the shores of Lebanon, when 
Syrian troops and their Moslem proxies threatened to overrun 
Christian East Beirut. Even though the French have claimed 
that the reason for the ships’ presence was to evacuate the 
French citizens still in Lebanon, it is widely believed that 
the real aim was the intimidation of Syria and its allies.
In addition to deploying two warships to the region, 
President Francois Mitterrand dispatched a flood of envoys 
to Moscow and Arab League nations which, it was hoped, 
exercise some leverage over Syria. But Mitterrand’s 
diplomacy achieved only minor results in Lebanon, since 
France is widely regarded as an ally of the Maronites; and 
in Damascus, France is highly suspect because its colonial 
record and, more recently, its support of Iraq in the Iran- 
Iraq wa r . '
In part, the French effort was aimed at evacuating 
wounded Lebanese and delivering a reactive power station to 
the Christian sector. Syrian and Moslem forces, however, 
continued to threaten an attack against the French vessels 
if they attempted to dock on the Lebanese shore. Some 
French diplomats have called for a far more vigorous role in 
open support of the Christians. For example, the leader of 
the conservative opposition, M. Francois Leotard, who is 
also the president of the French Republican Party, called
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for the use of force to keep Lebanon’s Christian ports open, 
despite the Syrian barrages. Despite all these efforts, 
Syria has thus far refused to respond to French diplomatic 
and military efforts; Damascus has rejected any foreign 
intervention concerning its position in Lebanon.
As has been demonstra ted, France’s previous ties with 
the Maronites are becoming less and less important. In 
fact, France appears to be more interested in pursuing its 
national interest in the Middle East and elsewhere than 
getting involved in the Lebanese crisis and, in the process, 
alienating other Arab states. At the present time, France 
has supported and recognized the legitimacy of the political 
movement led by General Aoun. It is unpredictable, however, 
to what extent will France commit itself to this support and 
recognition in the future.
Maronite-U.S. Relations
Traditionally, the Christian community in Lebanon has 
maintained close cultural and economic links with the United 
States, which, for its part, supported Lebanese struggle for 
independence. However, in more recent years these links 
were not reasons enough to place Lebanon at the top of the 
United States’ foreign policy list.
Throughout modern history, only occasionally has 
Lebanon received prominence in decision making by American 
officials. As mentioned above, when the American troops
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landed in Lebanon during the Eisenhower era* the main reason 
for the intervention had more to do with the U.S. contain­
ment policy towards the Soviet Union than with the Lebanese 
domestic political problems.
Not until 1982 did Lebanon become one of the important 
continuing concerns of an American administration. Even 
though the Reagan Administration showed more interest in the 
Lebanese civil war than earlier ones, still this interest 
was not strong or vital enough to influence the course of 
events decisively in Lebanon. The reasons behind the 
subsequent and drastic failure of U.S. policy toward Lebanon 
appear to be due mainly to lack of information in Washington 
about the various factions involved in the conflict; 
ignorance of the dynamics and the complexities of the forces 
affecting the Lebanese political system; and the lack of 
public and congressional support for the commitments and 
promises regarding Lebanon undertaken by the Reagan 
Administration. Moreover, the United States ignored and 
underestimated Syria, as a decisive player in the Lebanese 
war. It seems clear that Washington launched its strategies 
and plans to resolve the Lebanese crisis without adequately 
taking into consideration the interests of other parties 
involved in it, such as Syria, Israel, and the principal 
Lebanese factions.
The Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982 once again 
forcefully attracted the attention of the internationa1
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community to the Middle East. On June 6, 1982, Israel began 
its invasion of Lebanon, with the announced plan of securing 
a 25-mile security zone in southern Lebanon. However, by 
July Israeli troops were surrounding West Beirut, where 
thousands of Palestinian were headquartered.
Following prolonged negotiations conducted by U.S.
Envoy Philip Habib, an agreement was finally reached to 
evacuate the PLO forces to Tunisia. In order to ensure the 
PLO safe withdrawal to this destination, Washington sent a 
force— the Multi-National Forces— to Lebanon, to maintain 
the separation of the combatants. The MNF was not intended 
to be a combat force for the purpose of settling the 
political conflict in Lebanon. Apparently, the U.S. 
expected that the election of Bashir Gemayel to the Lebanese 
presidency would solve the domestic political problems. 
Although the election by Lebanon’s Parliament of the 
military leader of the Lebanese Forces was strongly opposed 
by leftist and many Moslems in Lebanon, the view in
Washington was that Gemayel would give high priority to
seeing that the Syrians pulled out of Lebanon.
After the ensuing departure of the PLD from Lebanon,
the U.S. Marines were also withdrawn in the hope that
Lebanon would begin to restore a normal and stable political 
life. How naive was this conclusion! Unfortunately, events 
did not work out as Americans hoped. As has been explained 
elsewhere, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in September,
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1982. In turn, his assassination set off a chain of events 
which fundamentally altered any hope for an early resolution 
of the Lebanese civil war.
The most important event in that chain of events was 
the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, which resulted in a 
resumption of open conflict within Lebanon. There followed 
the second entry of the U.S. Marines, whose mission was 
establishing a ceasefire, separating the combatant forces, 
and hopefully dealing with basic issues causing conflict 
within Lebanon. However, the general impression prevailing 
in Lebanon by the return of the Marines to Lebanon was that 
the U.S., as well as other Western states, suffered a guilt 
complex because of what had happened in Sabra and Shatilla. 
This belief stemmed in part from the fact the MNF had been 
withdrawn before the deadline assigned to the completion of 
their mission, thereby removing a crucial deterrent force 
from the scene. At the same time, American policy-makers 
realized that what was happening in Lebanon is not a simple 
conflict as they had estimated. Lebanon was a time-bomb 
that would threaten the whole region, and now more than ever 
it was beginning to appear that restoring peace and 
stability to Lebanon needed more than a small observing 
force. There are many issues and dynamics involved in the 
Lebanese arena. To name but one: a direct Syrian-Israe1i
confrontation might drive the whole region into a bloody 
war .
1^7
Meanwhile* Washington was considering another approach 
to solving the Lebanese crisis. Now* Amin Gemayel (Bashir’s 
brother) was elected to the Lebanese presidency; and 
initially he had the approval of almost all the Lebanese 
factions. Neither the Moslems nor the PLO opposed his 
election. In contrast to his late brother* Amin was 
considered more moderate by the majority of the Moslems and 
the PLO. For example* he explicitly denounced the "Israeli 
option" employed by his late brother and declared openly 
that instead he had chosen the "American option" to solve 
the Lebanon’s problems.
Once again* the U.S. had become directly involved in 
Lebanese political affairs. But as events demonstrated* 
President Amin Gemayel placed entirely too much hope on this • 
commitment. It is important to mention here that Amin 
Gemayel during this time was the undisputed representative 
of the Christian Community* as well as of the Lebanese 
Forces after he had consolidated his power in that movement. 
Gemayel visited the U.S. and obtained a promise from the 
Reagan Administration of American aid for Lebanon’s 
reconstruct ion * as well as Washington’s political support 
for his effort to evacuate foreign forces from Lebanon.
The Reagan Administration believed that high priority 
had to be given to strengthening Amin Gemayel’s government, 
as well as to, exerting the utmost influence on Syria and 
Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. George Shultz, Secretary
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of State, believed that a strong central government in 
Lebanon would be the solution for almost all its problems. 
According to Shultz, a strong government was the only 
solution for the problems facing the Lebanese with 
themselves, with their neighbors, as well as the neighbors 
with each other. Moreover, a strong Lebanese government was 
expected to put an end to almost all the international 
terrorism originating in Lebanese territory. The foundation 
of this central government would be to eliminate "political 
confessionalism," as well as the modification of the present 
constitutional structure (Assayad 1988, 18).
American involvement also concentrated on rebuilding 
and equipping the Lebanese armed forces, as well as on 
securing an agreement between Lebanon and Israel. According 
to the Congressiona1 Ouarter 1v Almanac, after the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the United States had 
authorized $251 million in economic and military aid to 
Lebanon in fiscal 1983. The aid included $150 million in 
economic support fund loans and grants, $100 million in 
foreign military sales loans and $1 million in military 
training aid (CQ Almanac 1983, 116).
At the same time, President Reagan again dispatched 
Special Envoy Philip Habib to the Middle East for a series 
of negotiations on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon. On May 17, 1983, following months of negotiations,
representatives of Lebanon and Israel, under the supervision
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of the United States, signed an agreement. Its main points 
dealt with the withdrawal of Israelis troops completely from 
Lebanon; in return, Lebanon agreed to political, economic, 
and military concessions that Israel considered necessary 
for the security of its northern borders (Lebanese 
Government 19S3, 21-38). Meanwhile, the question of Syrian 
withdrawal was temporarily set aside, in the hope that Syria 
would feel compelled to pull out after the conclusion of the 
Lebanon-Israeli agreement. A favorable sign in this respect 
was that the Syrian officials kept telling Mr. Habib and the 
Lebanese that they would "not be an obstacle" to a total 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon).
However, the May 17 agreement in fact became an 
obstacle to resolving the Lebanese crisis, rather than a 
means to achieving that end. Syria and its Lebanese allies 
rejected the main principles of the agreement and in time 
insisted on abrogating it completely. Ultimately, Damascus 
asserted that its troops would not leave Lebanon unless the 
agreement was abrogated. Concurrently, the United States 
and Israel insisted on complete adherence to the agreement 
reached.
As a result, the conflicting pressures imposed on 
Gemayel— by Syria, by Lebanese opposition, and by some Arab 
countries from one side, and the United States and Israel
from the othei left him in a difficult dilemma. The United
States and Israel, disregarding the hardening position of
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Syria towards the Lebanese Government, still insisted on the 
implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, Syria, along 
with other Arab states supporting its view, were insisting 
on abrogating the agreement, else they would treat Lebanon 
as they treated Egypt when it signed the Camp David accord. 
This threat was unquestionably effective, since it was 
economically, politically, and socially essential for 
Lebanon to preserve reasonably good relations with its 
neighbors in the Arab world.
On October 23, 19S3, as a reaction to the role played
by the United States in securing the May 17 agreement, a 
suicide bomber attacked the American military headquarters, 
killing 241 Americans. This development— accompanied by the 
increasing public and congressiona1 opposition within the 
United States toward President Reagan’s policies in Lebanon- 
-accounted for the decision to evacuate the Marines from 
Lebanon on February 26, 1984. Regardless of prior promises
and the announcement by President Reagan that the main 
purpose of pulling out the Marines was merely a tactical 
"re-deployment" of the forces, American troops did not 
return to Lebanon. In light of this development, on March 
5, 1984, President Amin Gemayel felt compelled to abrogate
the May 17 agreement. Almost immediately, the Lebanese Army 
started once again to disintegrate.
American officials have made many miscalculations 
regarding the tiny country of Lebanon. For example, they
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underestimated the role played by Syria; they ignored the 
frustrations of the fanatical Moslems elements such as the 
Islamic Jihad and Hizballah; and finally, in the end, they 
did not stand by their commitments towards Amin Gemayel’s 
Government.
The Americans tended to assume that because they were 
supporting the legal Lebanese authority, this fact meant 
that Washington’s influence was operating fairly for the 
benefit of all the Lebanese communities. Actually, this 
idea was badly mistaken. In addition, according to the Mew 
York Times, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told a 
senior Lebanese official concerning the proposed Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon, "don't worry about the Syrians.
They will make three weeks of noise, then they will come 
around. We d o n ’t have much influence with Damascus, but 
what we have, we will use."
Apparently, for the most part the commitments and 
promises given by the United States to the Lebanese 
Government were not honored. Moreover, ambiguity was a 
leading characteristic of the American approach toward 
Lebanon. After all the ostensible determination and "show 
of force" in dealing with Lebanon, it turned out that 
President Reagan had done what he said he would never do—  
"cut and run" from Lebanon.
Although American policy in Lebanon was a failure and 
ended in a humiliation of the United States by a handful of
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Moslem fanatics? Washington of course continues to be an 
influential player in the region. For example? the United 
States helped in arranging meetings among various Lebanese 
factions in Seneva in 1983 and in Lausanne in 1984. As in 
the past? however? both attempts to achieve national 
reconciliation in Lebanon failed. Ever since the abrogation 
of the May 17 agreement by President Gemayel? the American 
support for the Christian community of Lebanon has weakened? 
and an attitude of seeming indifference prevailed in America 
throughout Gemayel’s period. Than when General Aoun became 
head of the Christian Cabinet? and Mr. Hoss the head of the 
Moslem Cabinet? Washington dealt with both Lebanese 
Cabinets? but at the same time it refused to recognize 
either of them as the legitimate governing authority of 
Lebanon.
The war-torn country of Lebanon was sinking more and 
more into chaos and division. As explained more fully in 
the previous chapter? on October? 1989? the Lebanese 
Parliament arrived an agreement for national reconci1iation? 
known as "al-Ta’if Agreement?" it also agreed upon a new 
charter for governing the country. The United States 
supported these developments and urged all parties to 
support the agreements reached. Unfortunately? these new 
accords did not receive the internal support needed for 
their successful implementation? and their success was? 
therefore? very limited. General Aoun? for example?
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rejected the agreement, proclaiming that the existing 
Parliament did not "represent" the Lebanese people any 
longer.
As matters stand now, the United States has recognized 
the legitimacy of the new President-Elect, Elias al-Harawi, 
who was elected in a Syrian contro11ed-area, after the 
evident approval and blessing of the Syrian Government.
Maroni te-Israeli Relations
The Maronite-Jewish relationship was established, even 
though marginally, in the distant past. After World War I, 
Maronite Lebanese attempted to establish a Christian state 
to avert their absorption within the Arab World. For this 
reason, some Lebanese intellectuals were searching and 
researching the origin of their ancestors, whom most 
Maronites believed were the ancient Phoenicians; the 
Phoenicians were ethnically and culturally different people 
from the Arabs. In order to face the Moslems, the Maronite 
leaders started searching for available allies. Beginning 
in 1933, contact was established between the Maronites and 
the Zionists through a visit of a member of the Zionist 
movement to Beirut (Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983- 
198^, 568-69).
Since Lebanon gained its independence, the majority of 
the Christian Lebanese were either sympathizers with, or 
neutral toward, the newly-established State of Israel. In
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reality, Maronites have no animosity towards Israel. For 
example, Emile Edde, the first Maronite Lebanese President, 
was more sympathetic to the Zionist movement than to the 
Arabs. As early as June E 2 , 1937, Edde had met the Zionist
leader, Chaim Weizmann, in Paris. However, in recent years 
the Maronites have kept a low profile in expressing their 
true feelings towards Israel.
In 19^8, at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, 
Lebanon and Israel signed an armistice treaty. Even though 
no formal relations were established on the governmental 
level, thereafter Lebanon has not been considered hostile or 
aggressive towards Israel. Moreover, until the beginning of 
the Lebanese civil war, Jews were still living in Wadi abu- 
Jammi1, a precinct of Beirut. However, they had to flee the 
country after being harassed by members of the PLO.
In 1976, the leadership of the Maronite community was 
desperate for assistance to prevent the PLO and its Lebanese 
allies from a achieving a major military victory. The 
Maronite establishment found in Israel a logical and 
responsive ally. Each side wanted to get rid of the PLO 
presence in Lebanon; eliminate Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon 
and reduce its military and political influence in the 
region; establish a friendly relations between Lebanon and 
Israel; and install a Maronite government in Beirut which 
would negotiate a peace treaty or formal end to the state of 
war that had existed between the two countries since 19^8.
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In view of these facts, the Lebanese Forces started to 
establish contact with the Israeli government <Ya’ari 1984, 
18-83).
Israel found in Bashir Gemayel, the commander of the 
Lebanese Forces, the leader who had all the characteristics 
which qualified him to be a suitable ally. He was young, 
courageous, and charismatic. In 1977, secret visits were 
exchanged between the two newly-born allies, Israel and the 
Lebanese Forces. Israel started shipping arms, tanks, and 
other supplies to strengthen the military capability of the 
Lebanese Forces. In addition, Israel helped in arranging 
military training for some of the units of the Lebanese 
Forces. One study estimated that the Israeli government 
invested around $150 million in building the Lebanese Forces 
(Schiff and Y a ’ari 1984, 18).
Israeli spokesman announced publicly that Israel would 
not under any circumstances allow the Christian minority in 
Lebanon to be wiped out (Annahar 1988, 6). Indeed, Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin said: "if the Christian Lebanese
are in any danger we shall help them. It applied to 
Christians in the south and in the north of Lebanon."1'
In the south, Israel supported the Free Lebanon Army, 
led by the Major S a ’ad Haddad. Major Haddad had been sent 
in 1976 to southern Lebanon with orders from the Lebanese 
government to prevent the PLO from gaining control over the 
area. Instead, Haddad reached an agreement with the
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Israelis, mainly because of his strong hatred toward the 
PLD, which was attempting to created a state within a state 
in Lebanon. For defecting, Haddad was expelled from the 
Lebanese Army and was accused of treason. As mentioned in 
previous chapter, Haddad ultimately died of cancer and was 
succeeded by General Antoine Lahad, who currently controls 
the Israeli "security belt" in Southern Lebanon.
By 1980, the Lebanese Forces were formally created, and 
its leader, Bashir Gemayel, emerged as the most important 
figure within the Christian community. Bashir Gemayel 
consolidated his power within the Christian area while most 
of Lebanon fell under the control of Syria, the PLO, and 
other leftist elements. Meanwhile, the PLO increased its 
attacks across the Lebanese-Israeli border, as well as 
engaging in terrorist operations overseas.
In June, 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon. The 
immediate justification given for the invasion was an 
assassination attempt by a Palestinian splinter group on the 
Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov.^1
During the period that followed, the Israeli Defense 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, with cooperation from the Lebanese 
Forces, largely succeeded in destroying the military power 
of the PLO and in tightening a siege of West Beirut, the 
last stronghold of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
Sharon demanded the complete withdrawal of the PLO from 
Lebanon. As we have noted, Special U.S. Envoy Philip Habib
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did make significant progress in convincing the PLO to get 
out of Lebanon.
On August 23, 1982, with Israel’s help and the United
States’ evident blessing, Bashir Gemayel was elected 
President of the Republic of Lebanon. Nine days before he 
was to be inaugurated President, however, Bashir Gemayel, 
was assassinated. As a result, Israel lost its closest ally 
within the Christian camp.
Until 1982, good relations were maintained between 
Israel and the Lebanese Forces. However, with Bashir’s 
death, not only did the influence of the Lebanese Forces 
weaken, this was true more generally of the Christian 
community as well. On September 16, 1982, the Lebanese
Forces under the command of Elie Hobeika, and with the 
c o 11aboration of the Israeli Defense Army, committed the 
massacre of Sabra and Shatilla. Initially, however, the 
Lebanese Forces were unwilling to acknowledge their 
participation in the massacre; most of the censure, 
therefore, was directed towards Israel and toward Major 
Haddad’s forces. This massacre forced Defense Minister 
Sharon to resign, and his grand design for a Lebanon closely 
tied to Israel col lapsed. This incident in time persuaded 
Israeli authorities to change their attitude toward the 
Lebanese Forces.
With the election of Amin Gemayel to the presidency, 
the "Israeli option" was dropped by the Lebanese government
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and replaced by what was called the "Syrian option." 
Meanwhile, the Lebanese Forces were becoming divided between 
pro-Gemayel and anti-Gemayel factions. During this period, 
relations between Israel and the Lebanese Forces fell to 
their lowest level. Starting to realize the complexity of 
issues, the diversity of the regional dynamics involved in 
the Lebanese crisis, and the developing divisions within the 
Lebanese Forces, Israel dropped its plan for establishing a 
strong Maronite, pro-Israeli central government in Lebanon. 
Instead, Israel focused on protecting its "security belt" in 
Southern Lebanon.
While the negotiations regarding the May 17 Agreement 
between Israel and Lebanon were taking place, the Soviet 
Union was heavily rearming Syria to restore its military 
capability, which had been seriously weakened by the 1973 
war. With the restoration of its military strength, and 
feeling humiliated by the isolation imposed upon it by the 
government of the United States and Israel, Syria felt 
confident enough to demand the abrogation of the May 17 
Lebanese-Israeli Agreement. As noted above, the May 17 
Agreement was ultimately abrogated by President Amin 
Gemayel.
Israel tried to maintain a close partnership with the 
Lebanese Forces, while at the same time also preserving good 
relation with Lebanon’s Druze community. However, the 
sudden withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Shuf
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Mountains caused a deterioration in the relations between 
the Lebanese Forces and Israel. With Israel’s withdrawal> 
the Druze community, supported by its allies, expelled the 
Christian population, defeated the Lebanese Forces, and took 
over the entire Shuf area. Israel’s pul lout from the Shuf 
area created a wave of anger within the Christian community 
towards Israel, since in the ensuing fighting many Chris­
tians were slaughtered and most of their homes were 
destroyed.
By this period, the Lebanese Forces were becoming 
infuriated with Amin’s pro-Syrian approach. To demonstrate 
their disagreement with the government’s policies, the 
Lebanese Forces decided to coordinate their own policies 
with the government of Israel. Accordingly, in 1984, the 
Lebanese Forces opened an information office in Israel, 
thereby demonstrating their rejection of Gemayel’s pro- 
Syrian orientation. In addition, Fadi Frem, the leader of 
the Lebanese Forces, claimed that it is no longer possible 
to rebuild Lebanon according to the earlier pattern, based 
upon the National Pact. For the future, the only possible 
arrangement was to admit the reality of Lebanon’s religious 
and cultural diversity and, therefore, to partition Lebanon 
into sec tarian-contro11ed cantons (al-Massera 1984, 4).
Israel formally recognized the status of the Lebanese 
Forces and allowed them to open a representation office 
there. Amin Gemayel, backed by his father and other
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prominent Lebanese leaders? moved quickly to contain this 
political deviation by the Lebanese Forces. President 
Gemayel was able to remove Fadi Frem as head of the Lebanese 
Forces? and secured the election of his nephew? F u ’ad Abu 
Nader? to that position. Shortly after this event? another 
division within the Lebanese Forces erupted. On March 13? 
1985? Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika led a coup against F u ’ad 
Abu Nader? and gained control of the Christian area.
Israel considered the coup another pro-Israeli 
development. Yet? Israeli officials showed no interest in 
becoming deeply involved once again in Lebanon’s political 
struggles. Meanwhile? Syria accused Geagea of being an 
"Israeli agent." Despite the support gained by Geagea? this 
was not enough to get him elected to the leadership of the 
Lebanese Forces. On May 9? 1985? Elie Hobeika was chosen as 
the new leader of the Lebanese Forces.
During Hobeika’s leadership? the relations between the 
Lebanese Forces and Israel deteriorated drastically.
Surprising1y ? in his first statement? Hobeika announced that 
he completely rejected the "Israeli option" and supported 
Syria’s role in Lebanon. He criticized vehemently previous 
Christian cooperation with the state of Israel. Moreover? 
he ordered the closing down of the Lebanese Forces’ 
delegation in Israel (Middle East Contemporary Survey 1984- 
85, 541).
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As events turned out, therefore, Israel’s gains in 
Lebanon were very limited. In time, some members of the 
PL.O, with the help of Hizballah, began to return to some 
parts of south Lebanon. Israel’s hope of establishing an 
openly friendly Lebanese government had been shattered. 
Instead, a pro-Syrian president was installed. Finally, in 
19S5, Israel pulled the majority of its forces out of 
Lebanon.
Yet, the Israeli government, however, was not ready to 
abandon Lebanon altogether. With the help of the South 
Lebanon Army, Israel concentrated its efforts on protecting 
its "security zone" in south Lebanon. Israeli officials of 
course remained interested in Lebanon’s internal crisis, but 
to a lessened degree. Currently, relations between the 
Lebanese Forces and Israel are at low web. This is 
indicated by the fact that Israel had not demonstrated 
enough interest in Lebanon’s political future to help the 
Lebanese Forces in its furious warfare against General Aoun.
Syria and the Lebanese Forces
Syrian troops first entered Lebanon in 1976, when the 
Christians were put on the defensive against the PLO and its 
allies. However, within two years, Syrian troops had turned 
against the same Christians they had first intervened to 
save! Syrian officials, worried about their own internal 
instability, entered Lebanon to pursue several goals,
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primarily perhaps to avoid partition of Lebanon, but also to 
foil a victory by the PLO and its allies and to maintain the 
status quo in Lebanon.
In 1976, the Christian leadership of Lebanon cooperated 
closely with the Syrian President. Both had the same goal 
in mind: to get rid of the PLO. During 1976-1978, Syria
and the Lebanese Forces had a compatible relation. They 
joined together in opposition to the PLO and its allies. 
Syrian President Assad denounced Yasser Arafat as a "closet 
moderate," and he reacted furiously against Arafat’s 
leadership of the PLO. Most analysts believed that the 
Damascus regime was determined to control forcefully any 
significant PLO presence in Lebanon, keeping the 
Palestinians under the thumb of Assad’s security apparatus.
This honeymoon between these two "strange allies" was 
short-lived. Slowly, the Syrian forces in Lebanon turned 
into an occupying force rather than peacekeeping force. In 
the Christian areas, the Syrian started to provoke and 
kidnap members of the Lebanese Forces, confiscating cars and 
smuggling them to Syria, and promoting violence among 
various Lebanese factions. Therefore, it seems inevitable 
that the Lebanese Forces would eventually come to resent and 
reject the Syrian presence in their areas. Moreover, most 
members of the Lebanese Forces became convinced of the 




As explained previously? Syria believes that the State 
of Lebanon was artificially created out of Syrian territory 
by the help of the French colonial power. Accordingly, 
Damascus never recognized Lebanon’s sovereignty and still 
keeps no embassy in Beirut. For these reasons, it seemed 
obvious that the Lebanese Forces would have to come to an 
accommodation with the Israelis in order to deter Syrian 
hegemony over Lebanon.
The Lebanese Forces were convinced that the ultimate 
Syrian goal was to annex Lebanon. Evidence to support this 
conclusion was based upon various facts. For example, on 
July 27, 1982, the government of Lebanon refused to renew
the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) mandate upon its expiration. 
Nevertheless, the Syrian forces remained in Lebanon even 
when all other members of the ADF left. In fact, the 
Lebanese Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on July 
1^> 1982, requesting the withdrawal of all foreign troops
gfrom Lebanon. Again, Syria ignored the resolution. The 
Syrian Army has remained in Lebanon to this day without a 
Lebanese resolution authorizing it to do so.
In March, 1983, the Lebanese government decided to 
dissolve the ADF command; and on April 27, 1983, the 
Lebanese Parliament expressed solidarity with the government 
in its efforts to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from Lebanon. Damascus has disregarded all these and 
other official requests to pull out of Lebanon. It seem
evident, therefore, that the Syrian troops do not have any 
intention of leaving Lebanese territory. This was clearly 
indicated by President Assad who, on March 8, 1989, claimed
that Lebanon and Syria "are one people, in one body, blood
and bones. We will not leave because we are a one people
9nation sharing the same common interests...."
Since 1976 the Lebanese Forces have desired and 
demanded the establishment of natural friendly relations 
between Lebanon and Syria, based on equality and mutual 
respect for the two countries’ independence and territorial 
integrity. The Lebanese Forces’ ultimate goal is the 
withdrawal of all armed groups and foreign armies from 
Lebanon, without any precondition. A parallel objective of 
the Lebanese Forces is the "normalization" of Lebanon’s 
relations with Syria, through the establishment of 
diplomatic relations.
By contrast, the Syrian goal remains a Lebanese 
political system in which no one sectarian faction or 
community dominates the country and in which Syria has much 
political influence but bears no governing responsibility. 
In other words, the Syrians want to convert Lebanon into a 
political satellite under the control of Damascus. One 
indication of this intention is the fact that the Syrian 
forces appear to be in Lebanon not to fight Israel, but 
primarily to occupy Lebanon.
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Ironically, an implicit partnership relation in time 
developed between Syria and the leader of the Lebanese 
Forces, Elie Hobeika. Uni 1 atera11y , without the knowledge 
of Lebanon’s Christian Leadership, and accompanied by Nabih 
Berri and Walid Junblat, Hobeika entered into secret 
negotiations with Syria on reforming the Lebanese 
government. Specifically, the Damascus Accord was 
considered by the majority of the Christians, as well as by 
many Moslems, as more of a Syrian mandate over Lebanon than 
a peace agreement designed with Syrian cooperation. On 
December ES, 1985, the three militia commanders signed the 
Tripartite Agreement.
If Syria does not seek to annex Lebanon, certainly its 
determination to dominate the country was revealed by the 
Tripartite Agreement. This Agreement proposed a formula 
for political stability in Lebanon based on "deconfes­
sional i zation," or a kind of "one man, one vote" democracy. 
This concept was at variance with the proposals previously 
advocated by the Lebanese Forces. In addition, the 
Agreement also proposed to give Syria control over Lebanon’s 
internal security, its army, its schools, its information 
media, and its foreign policy. In effect, Lebanon was to be 
transformed, constitutional1y and by its own approval, into 
a Syrian satellite.
Both Moslems and Christians within Lebanon quickly 
realized that the agreement amounted to a clear submission
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of the country’s sovereignty to Syrian rule. Accordingly, 
the Lebanese Forces moved quickly to counteract what they 
considered to be their commander’s "treason." Two weeks 
after the Agreement was signed, forces led by Samir Geagea 
attacked and defeated Hobeika; Geagea then assumed command 
of the Lebanese Forces. Hobeika and his men took refuge in 
the Syrian-controlled areas in Lebanon. Down to the present 
time, it is not clear why Hobeika ever agreed to sign such 
an agreement!
In the view of the Lebanese Forces, Syria represents a 
force of occupation in Lebanon, as well as a formidable 
instrument of repression and the protector of terrorist 
groups. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon can in no 
way be regarded as a force for stability and peace.
Damascus has failed to achieve a peaceful solution of the 
Lebanese crisis acceptable to all factions.
Today, the Lebanese Forces remain in conflict with 
Syria on all fronts--po1itica1, security and military. The 
Lebanese Forces are willing to open a dialogue with the 
Syrians, but only for the purpose of finding the ways and 
means of evacuating the Syrian Army from Lebanon.
Why is Syria still in Lebanon? Syria stayed on because 
it has always presented itself as the arbiter among all 
warring factions, and, as noted, because it claims Lebanon 
is part of "Greater Syria." But now the 40,000 Syrian 
troops are the target of a new "war of liberation" declared
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by the country’s legal Prime Minister, General Michel Aoun, 
the commander of the Lebanese Army.
After fifteen years of warfare, Lebanon is still 
occupied by two foreign nations and victimized by two 
revolutions. Israel and Syria are still at war with each 
other, but limit their own direct confrontation within 
Lebanon. Meanwhile, both the Palestinian and Iranian 
revolutions have also focused on Lebanon as a key staging 
point for the achievement of their aims.
However, Syrian president Assad’s aims in Lebanon are
not difficult to perceive. They are, first of all, to
achieve a dominant role in Lebanon, and after that, a 
leading role in the Middle East so strong that no question 
can be settled there without his consent. Major obstacles 
to Assad’s achieving his goals remains the Lebanese Forces, 
Israel, and recently, the Lebanese Army.
For all its military and intelligence forces which are 
spread throughout the Lebanese territory, and stronger than 
any other in Lebanon, Syria ought to be able to move rapidly 
to impose law and order in the country. Syria is able also,
if needed, to send more troops into Lebanon to achieve its
mission, since the Syrian army today is one of the most 
powerful in the Arab world. However, throughout the last 
fifteen years of the Lebanese war, Syria has been presented 
with many opportunities to end the civil war but has not 
done so. The question then is why?
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The primary reason for Syria’s difficulties in Lebanon 
is that it has been trying to impose a "Pax Syriana" in 
Lebanon) rather than bringing about a peace which most 
Lebanese citizens can accept and live with.
To oppose this "Pax Syriana" strategy, General Aoun, 
who has been backed by Iraq, Syria’s Arab arch-enemy, 
derives his power not only from his American-trained Army, 
but also from Christian and Moslem support. In addition, a 
substantial number of the Lebanese Forces have defected and 
have joined forces with the Lebanese Army.
The Aoun-Hussein alliance has been brought together by 
their common enmity for Syria and Iran. Iraq, besides its 
historical hatred to Syria, is out to get back at Assad for 
supporting Iran in the eight-year Persian Gulf war.
President Hussein of Iraq provided military aid to both the 
Lebanese Forces and General Aoun’s Army.
Conclusion
Though the Middle East is beset by many problems, the 
Lebanese situation is one of the most fundamental and 
dangerous of them all. The various Lebanese factions have 
often invited outside help in their attempt to gain a 
dominant position in the political struggle. In the last 
decade, a succession of foreign powers— from the United 
States to Yemen— has come and gone, managing only to burn 
their fingers in the Lebanese flame. The continuous
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violence in Lebanon seems to be unstoppable* as well as 
acquiring a momentum of its own.
Apparently, these outside links between the Lebanese 
Forces and the various countries mentioned above have had a 
turbulent impact on the Lebanese political scene. For 
example, mistrust increased among the various Lebanese 
factions, especially between the S h i ’ites and the Christian 
commun i ty.
As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese Forces seemed to 
enjoy the confidence of Israel, which had been arming and 
cooperating closely with its leadership. This link between 
the Lebanese Forces and Israel lay behind much of the Moslem 
opposition to Bashir Gemayel’s Presidency— and possibly his 
death. Furthermore, the Israeli invasion had an extra­
ordinary effect on the sectarian politics of Lebanon. The 
Sh i ’ite Moslems had long been the weakest force politically. 
During the invasion, many S h i ’ites were pushed north to 
Beirut; others, remaining in the south, clashed with the 
occupying Israeli forces. The result was to radicalize the 
Sh i ’ites, to make them more insistent on a prominent role in 
Lebanese politics, and to make them more susceptible to the 
revolutionary influence of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Israelis were despised in the Moslem-dominated 
section of Lebanon, and their presence became not the 
solution to Lebanon’s problem, but another important 
obstacle to achieving an agreement for ending the civil war.
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It is true that the Lebanese had always looked to outsiders 
for a solution, but direct intervention by the regional 
superpower, and by a global superpower, succeeded only in 
adding dangerous new dimensions to the crisis. This was so 
because outside allies struggled to tip the balance of power 
in favoring one group against the other.
Along with the Israeli support for the Lebanese Forces, 
the U.S. intervention and support for the Lebanese Forces 
represented by the Lebanese president, Amin Gemayel, 
deepened schisms among the religious communities.
Associated with a Beirut government which many Moslems 
considered as dominated by the Lebanese Forces, the United 
States, as well as France, became parties in what was 
indisputably a civil war. Both the Americans and the French 
became embroiled in a bloody conflict with S h i ’ite 
extremists which appeared to have as much to do with the 
situation in the Persian Gulf as it did with Lebanon.
Because of the connections linking the Lebanese Christians 
with the United States and France, the Lebanese president 
failed to settle the internal differences with his political 
opponents on moderate terms and before they had in turn 
become closely allied with the Syrians.
Instead, the Lebanese army was sent into the S h i ’ite 
neighborhoods, where its power was directed heavily against 
Moslem parties; the army destroyed i11ega11y-bui1t houses in 
S h i ’ite shantytowns without securing other shelters for the
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dwellers. Concurrently, these actions were not accompanied 
by similar steps in the Christian area. The Lebanese 
government virtually ignored the private army of the 
Christian Lebanese Forces in East Beirut and the equally 
illegal ports and quasi-governmental institutions it was 
operating.
Meanwhile, at this stage of Syrian interference in 
Lebanon, it is clear that Damascus would not be able to 
bring peace to Lebanon. It was impossible for Syria to act 
as an impartial force in any effort to bring an end to the 
Lebanese crisis. Syria was in fact a party to the Lebanese 
conflict. It was evident that Damascus was trying to 
achieve for itself local, regional and international 
victories at the expense of the Lebanese population.
Presumably, none of the outside forces engaged 
politically or militarily in Lebanon had proven able to 
impose a settlement there. On the basis of experience there 
could be no solution from any single outside source, because 
the other outsiders and their local proxies could thwart it.
Apparently, as long as outside forces remained at odds 
with one another there would be no settlement of the 
Lebanese conflict. Nevertheless, even though these links 
between the Lebanese Forces and outside forces have resulted 
in weakening the position of the Lebanese Forces, they still 
comprise a major dimension of the problem that has to be
i7a
considered in any calculation aimed at achieving a solution 
to the Lebanese crisis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DATA COLLECTION AND INTERVIEW RESULTS:
PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the 
reader with the nature and rationale of the methodology 
relied upon in this study* to identify certain problems and 
difficulties associated with it, and to indicate the steps 
taken to surmount the obstacles confronting any study of the 
Lebanese Forces.
More specifica11y , this involves essentially four 
objectives. The first is to examine the problem of source 
materials, as it relates to our subject. The second is to 
call attention to the often difficult challenge of obtaining 
useful and accurate responses to interviews pertaining to 
the ideology, goals, behavior, and future of the Lebanese 
Forces. The third is to indicate the efforts made to 
overcome the problems and difficulties faced in obtaining 
reliable data about the Lebanese Forces. Finally, in this 
and the concluding chapter a conscientious effort has been 
made to present and discuss both the positive contributions 
and limitations of this study, in an attempt to gain deeper 
insight into the emergence, behavior, and future of an 




In the author’s view* as a result of this analysis 
certain important insights are offered here, not only about 
the Lebanese Forces specifica11y , but also about more 
general political relationships, such as to the behavior of 
members of political coalitions, the usefulness of the 
concept of "consociational democracy," and the application 
within the contemporary world of the cherished Western 
concept of "pluralism." At the same time, it is acknowl­
edged that certain problems encountered in the study prevent 
our arriving at anything more than tentative, and in some 
cases clearly debatable, conclusions about the Lebanese 
Forces or more general observations derived from this 
particular case study.
In earlier chapters, the reader’s attention has been 
called to the uniqueness of the Lebanese political 
environment. Once again, that reality must be emphasized; 
and the reader is urged to bear it continually in mind.
This key fact presents special, and sometimes serious, 
problems for the collection and interpretat ion of data about 
the political behavior in Lebanon. At this stage, note will 
be taken of several general limitations and conditions 
affecting the task of data collection and evaluation; other 
problems and difficulties will be identified as our 
discussion proceeds.
Initially, it must be remembered that, according to a 
number of criteria at least, Lebanon is a "third world"
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state. (Lebanon’s Maronite elite of course might well 
dispute this assertion.) For our purposes this means that, 
as is characteristic of most third world settings, direct 
questions about their political— and, most especially, their 
military— life are often regarded with deep suspicion. The 
kinds of direct questions, for example, routinely asked by 
public opinion pollsters in the West about an individual’s 
or a group’s political activity are generally not asked 
throughout the Third World. Or, if they are asked, these 
questions are as often as not met with equivocation, 
evasion, or silence. Within Arab societies, for example, 
those to whom such questions are put might well believe that 
the interviewer is "a Zionist agent." A1ternatively, 
individuals asked to respond to such questions might well 
fear the consequences if their responses become known to the 
authorities. Within many third world societies, it must be 
recalled that historically, the studious evasion of the
census take) or anyone who might resemble an official who
is asking questions of citizens— has been developed into a 
fine art! The reason is simple: on the basis of
experience, citizens have concluded that census takers or 
other officials are engaged in missions which bode little 
good for the villages or ordinary citizens. To mention 
merely two example of this phenomenon: census data have
been frequently used to increase the taxes of the ordinary 
citizens and as a basis for assigning "quotas" of young men
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each village was required to supply for "labor brigades" or 
service in the armed forces.
Moreover* it must be remembered also that since the 
mid-1970s, Lebanon has been in a state of what is (perhaps 
not altogether accurately) called "civil war." In reality, 
the existing conflict resembles a kind of Hobbesian "war of 
all against all." Untold thousands of people have been 
killed; property damage has run into countless billions of 
dollars; and, what may be more relevant for our study, the 
conflict has produced a kind of "siege mentality" among all 
participants, making them more than ordinarily resistant to 
arriving at and communicating to others an "objective" 
assessment of the nation’s political life.
The ongoing conflict within Lebanon of course poses 
extremely difficult problems for anyone seeking to collect 
data, conduct on—the—scene interviews, or make first-hand 
observations about the nation’s political system. Much 
important documentary material has doubtless been destroyed 
by the fighting in Lebanon or, at best, will be inaccessible 
for many years. A number of prominent Lebanese political 
figures have lost their lives, been seriously wounded, or 
fled the country. Long ago, nearly all Lebanese remaining 
in the country— along with most who decided to emigrate—  
have "chosen sides" in this destructive and ongoing 
political contest, involving not only indigenous Lebanese 
political groups, but foreign powers as well. As in all
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such encounters, the path of the political moderate becomes 
increasingly difficult, if not in time impossible. (Rel­
atively few Americans during World War II, for example, 
would have been disposed to think and talk dispassionately, 
about the actual or anticipated political behavior of the 
Japanese-Americans within their society.)
Another key fact about contemporary Lebanon is that the 
out come of the internal conflict gripping the country 
remains in doubt. After some fifteen years, it is far from 
clear who will ultimately govern Lebanon (assuming that a 
recognizable nation known as Lebanon emerges from the 
struggle). All major parties to the conflict appear as 
determined to win as ever; none has withdrawn from the 
contest. Moreover, all participants have their spies, 
informants, secret agents, informational and propaganda 
specialists, foreign lobbyists, and others who operate 
energetically to promote the interests and goals of their 
respective communities. In modern warfare, propaganda and 
the "manipu1 ation" of information have come to be accepted 
as useful weapons, now used routinely by parties to the 
conflict. Each side desires to obtain and maintain as 
favorable an "image" of itself and its cause as possible. 
Conversely, relatively few of those involved in the Lebanese 
conflict are primarily interested in promoting the cause of 
disinterested scholarship and objective understanding. This 
fact, for example, unquestionably affects the motivations of
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those who answer (or do not answer) questions put to them 
about political activity in modern-day Lebanon; and in some 
cases* it doubtless affects the kind of responses they give 
to such questions.
Still another condition affecting the amount* kind* and 
evaluation of the data used in this study has been discussed 
in detail in earlier chapters and will be alluded to only 
briefly here. This is the unique nature of Lebanon’s 
"communal system*" a central feature of which is the 
existence of what is often very deep distrust and suspicion 
exhibited toward those who are not members of one’s own 
community. A Lebanese S h i ’ite* for example, might well 
believe that it is literally impossible for a Maroni te to 
have any thing except ill-will toward him— and a Maronite 
could be expected to reciprocate this feeling.
The author of this study is a Maronite* who actually 
participated for several years in the military conflict 
still engulfing Lebanon. While a concerted effort has been 
made during the study to present other points of view fairly 
and accurately, it is acknowledged that, in discussing 
certain political questions (such, for example, as the 
causes of the civil war of the future of Lebanon), the 
author’s Maronite background and orientation have colored 
the conclusions reached. Yet the reader will take note, at 
several key points in the study, the author is also critical
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of the policies and behavior of various groups and 
individuals within the Maronite community.
Finally) it must be reiterated that personal loyalties 
have traditiona1ly been very strong in Lebanon, and they 
remain so even down to the present day. Despite an earlier 
expectation by some political observers that the "moderniza­
tion process" in Lebanon would soon change this reality, 
such predictions proved to be premature. Today, as in the 
past, in Lebanon political ideologies) slogans, labels, and 
formal party memberships often signify little. The crucial 
fact remains the personal alleaiance which powerful leaders 
are able to elicit from their followers. Many years, 
perhaps decades, will be required before this underlying 
reality of Lebanese political life changes fundamentally.
In turn, this fact must be kept in mind when the results 
obtained from the questionnaire used in this study are 
evaluated.
Published Data
Much of the information gathered about this topic came 
from articles and previous works written about Lebanon and 
its history. The only work to date dealing with the 
Lebanese Forces is an article published by Snider <1984, 1-
33). Although this article does provide an excellent point 
of departure, it leaves many problems and questions about
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the Lebanese Forces unexamined. No other major work on this 
subject has been published.
In addition to the above article> a number of other 
primary and secondary sources were of special value for this 
study. However> the reader must always keep in mind the 
difficulty of getting access to primary sources in Lebanon, 
given the conditions prevailing in the country since the 
mid-1970s. Despite this difficulty, many documents and 
publications were mailed to the author from abroad, from 
such sources as Lebanese reporters and members of the 
Lebanese Forces. Documents, histories, religious histories, 
and a wide range of books written about Lebanon were also 
utilized in the research stage. Clearly, the section 
dealing with the ideology of the Lebanese Forces and its 
stand on various Lebanese issues was the best documented; 
Lebanese Forces’ publications, speeches, and other primary 
sources were relied upon heavily. The Lebanese Information 
and Research Center, located in Washington, D.C., was very 
helpful and cooperative in facilitating the author’s use of 
its library and records, as well as in arranging meetings 
and interviews with prominent members of the Lebanese 
Forces.
Interview Data
Sources of research that proved beneficial in 
developing the analysis for this dissertation came mainly
l s e
from interviews conducted with twenty-two leaders 
representing various Lebanese parties comprising the 
coalition and with other governmental officials; interviews 
were also conducted with more impartial independent 
observers of the Lebanese political process. An effort was 
made to interview a larger number of Lebanese elites. 
However, in many cases this proved to be impossible for 
various reasons. First, during the time the researcher 
scheduled the interviews, there were many defections from 
the Lebanese Forces to other political groupings. Second, 
several revolts within the Lebanese Forces took place, 
leading to changes in the composition of the Command Council 
of the Organization. This continuous turnover within the 
leadership of the Lebanese Forces was an indication of the 
partial disintegration of this movement. However, the 
questionnaire used in interviews dealt with the reasons 
leading to the formation of the coalition.
Despite difficulties in securing interviews with some 
defectors from the Lebanese Forces, the author was able to 
acquire meetings with at least some members. Nevertheless, 
twenty-two political elites, representing the leadership of 
four political parties, were interviewed for this study.
The breakdown of interviews by party and backers is as 
f o 11ow s :
183
Party No. of Subjects Percentage
Kata’ib
National Liberal 
Guardians of Cedars 












As can be seen from the breakdown? more members of the 
K a t a ’ib party were interviewed than other groups. This 
disparity was not by conscious design. Instead? the 
relatively lower number of other subjects can be explained 
in term of the complexity involved in contacting most of 
them. Besides, these smaller Lebanese parties are 
considered more as groupings or factions than as true 
political parties. Yet the information obtained from their 
spokesmen usually present basically their official position 
regarding the issues involved. In addition, several of 
these individuals were removed from their official 
responsibilities before the time scheduled to interview 
them. In some cases, political leaders and figures could 
not be reached because, unfortunately, they had fled the 
country and there whereabouts were unknown.
Among the individuals who were interviewed, all but two 
were supporters of the Lebanese Forces. Almost, all the 
rest were identified as important party leaders by the 
positions they held recently, or in the past within the 
Lebanese Forces.
1 8^
An effort was made in this work, to discover some of 
the factors relating to coalition formation, maintenance, 
and termination in a highly conflictual situation, such as 
is provided by contemporary Lebanon. This was done by a 
questionnaire and personal interviews to establish some kind 
of reliability concerning the Lebanese Forces with reference 
to the above-mentioned subjects. Nevertheless, because of 
the small number of respondents <N=22), the computer was 
used only to produce simple descriptive statistics.
As mentioned earlier, interviews with members and 
leaders of the Lebanese Forces were the instrument employed 
to elicit information concerning the issue of coalition 
formation, as well as to complete the information needed to 
fill the gap in some chapters of the study. These questions 
were open-ended, and they were very important to dem­
onstrate: (1) the degree to which these leaders perceived a
cost-benefit type of decision process; (2) what costs and 
benefits they perceived, and how they weighted these 
considerations; and (3) whether the rational choice provided 
the reasonable explanation for the pattern of joining a 
coalition or not.
In this chapter, the findings derived from the 
interviews conducted with members and elites of the Lebanese 
Forces will be discussed. The purpose of this is to 
evaluate the empirical validity of rationa1-choice approach 
to the coalition formation of the movement under study.
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First* a brief section on the gathering of the data will be 
presented. Second, the results of the findings will be 
examined to determine the degree to which the respondents 
had perceived a cost-benefit type of decision process, as 
well as, to how they weighted these considerations.
Finally, an examination of the app1icabi1ity of rational 
choice model to the pattern of joining behavior of the 
Lebanese Forces will be presented.
The Interviews
The author believed that personal contact by phone to 
prepare for the interviews, as well as conducting the 
interviews personally (i.e., face to face instead of mailing 
a questionnaire ahead of time to prepare the interviewees) 
would yield the best results for all parties concerned. In 
reality, the results were mixed. Some of the interviewees 
proved to be more at ease than others, for several reasons. 
First, they knew the author personally or had seen her or 
members of her family in Lebanon or in the Washington area. 
This relationship allowed the interviewees to reveal 
important information about the problems facing the Lebanese 
Forces especially under its present leadership. Unfor­
tunately, a number of interviewees also made the researcher 
promise not publish the disclosed information. In these 
situations, therefore, the author encountered a critical 
dilemma created by the choice between revealing the truth or
1B6
honoring her promise to the interviewees. Assurances of 
confidentiality to some respondents seemed inevitable.
These individuals felt that revealing their answers, as well 
as their identity might lead to undesirable results during 
the present conflict in Lebanon. Furthermore, there are 
practical, ethical, and legal issues involved in the 
question of confidentiality. A researcher should never say 
that responses to a survey or a questionnaire are anonymous 
when they are not (Bernstein and Dyer 19B4-, 93). It was 
deemed essential to honor the author's promise of confiden­
tiality for an important reason.
As mentioned earlier, the matter of revenge is a very 
serious factor to consider in any calculation concerning the 
Lebanese political system (U.S News & World Report 198E,
SB). Because the author is a native of Lebanon, she is 
altogether familiar with the sensitivity and the importance 
of this factor "revenge."
Second, the majority of this group was affiliated with 
the Kata’ib party which is the dominant party within the 
Lebanese Forces. Therefore, these individuals were more 
confident about themselves than the rest of the respondents. 
In contrast to this group, the other respondents were often 
hesitant to disclose any information which the other parties 
might use against them. This fact led the researcher to 
conclude that, despite the fact that their names were kept 
anonymous, there was an element of distrust or possibly
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cautiousness in replying to questions due to the current 
political situation in Lebanon. This difficulty suggests 
that the data utilized in this analysis do not accurately 
measure that which they were intended to measure. It is, of 
coarse, always possible that the tools employed in an 
analysis do not measure the intended target, or at least 
they do not do so accurately. However, the caveats of the 
data in this study are not due to the unsuitability of the 
devices employed, but mainly because of the sensitive 
political situation in Lebanon.
Third, few of those interviewed were nervous about the 
use of a tape recorder, especially a prominent member of the 
Lebanese Forces, who was ousted from the party because he 
had held a critical post during the leadership of Elie 
Hobeika. Nonetheless, in addition to taking notes, 
recording was the most important instrument employed to lend 
precision to the data collected during the interviews.
Interviews were conducted in Arabic and English by the 
author. This procedure was unavoidable because some of 
these individuals felt more fluent in expressing themselves 
in their native language.
The whole process, however, was very time-consuming and 
it put a personal demand on the interviewer. The processes 
of interviewing, interpreting, typing, and researching 
exceeded 600 hours plus traveling to and from Washington,
D.C. and New York City.
18B
The questionnaire used in conducting the interviews is 
of course by no means a perfect device? but it was deemed 
opportune and feasible for the purposes of this study. 
Additional questions could have been added to the 
questionnaire) especially considering that during the period 
of the interviews many important developments took place 
within the Lebanese leadership? and the role of the Lebanese 
Forces within the Lebanese political system also changed. 
Nonetheless? these interviews were conducted throughout 
several intervals of time preventing the researcher from 
modifying the questionnaire.
The questionnaire (reproduced in Appendix III)? was 
organized to begin with general questions regarding the 
overall outlook and coalition experiences of the 
respondents’ parties. The questions which followed dealt 
with specific events? interactions and experiences in the 
coalition process. Following these questions? there were a 
series of questions which attempt to speculate about 
coalition formation? costs? and benefits resulting from the 
coalition experience. Finally? the remainder of the 
questions focused on the particular background of the 
respondent.
An Analysis of the Findings
The objective of this investigation was to determine 
why the various Lebanese Christian factions joined together
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to form what came to be called the Lebanese Forces. For a 
period of time, it appeared that the members of the Chris­
tian community within Lebanon had put aside their personal 
differences in order to achieve a higher interest. However, 
the evidence presented here indicates that the struggle for 
power within this community proved to be more persistent 
than any other political motivation.
The interviews were arranged by calling and making an
appointment in advance with each individual. Initially, the 
researcher believed there would be a greater accuracy in 
interviewing various members representing all the parties 
involved in the coalition. This approach has proved to be
very important in order to avoid the fact or appearance of
deliberate bias to this study.
The study proved very interesting and highly infor­
mative; but, this is not the place to discuss the short­
comings or the inadequacies of the study. One remarkable 
thing is that two individuals have refused to be interviewed 
and to give information upon request.
Table Two
Objectives of the Various Parties Before 1976
Foreign
Nationalism Pluralism Modernization Influence
607. 307. 57. 57.
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The findings in Table Two indicate that 60 percent of 
these interviewees asserted that nationalism was the most 
important objective of their party before the Lebanese civil 
war started. Since Lebanon gained its independence in 19A3, 
the issue of nationalism has been one of the most important 
issues within the nation’s political setting. "Moslems have 
always directed their loyalties to the Arab World and not to 
Lebanon;" said Mr. Robert Farah? the executive director of 
the Lebanese Information Office* Washington* D.C., during 
the interview. Throughout Lebanon’s history, the country 
has been divided between pro-Arab and anti-Arab forces 
(Gemayel 1982, 193-219). To date, the issue of nationalism 
has remained one of the serious obstacles to arriving at a 
solution of the Lebanese crisis (Haddad 1985, 9-23).
Table Three
Criteria Used to Decide on the Faction with Whom to Coalesce
Oppose PLO Military
Right-wing & Syria Nationalism Need
55% 18% 18% 9%
Table Three indicates that all these criteria were 
applicable, to a certain extent, in the formation of the 
Lebanese Forces. Some 55 percent of the respondents 
indicated that right-wing criteria were the most important 
factors in holding the coalition forces together. The
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tenets of the "right-wing" coalition encompass intense 
Lebanese patriotism, modern liberal democracy and state- 
assisted private enterprise. Their main goals are to 
preserve and strengthen the Lebanese state; to reform and 
develop society, the economy and the political system.
As mentioned earlier, even though some prominent 
leaders of the Moslem community were associated with the 
right-wing bloc, the majority of this group consisted of 
members of the Christian faith. Nevertheless, those Moslems 
did not have any military power.
Table Four
Parties Which the Respondents Would Not Even 
Consider to Coalesce With
Trans-national 
Leftist & Pan-Arab Parties Total
38*/. 62*/. 100*/.
Table Four indicates that the majority (62*/.) of the 
respondents were more inclined to distance themselves from 
Pan-Arab and trans-nationa1 parties than from leftist and 
socialist parties. The question that resulted in these 
findings for Table Four was: "Are there any parties with
which your party would not even consider a coalition?" It 
is important to recall here that in 1958, the Kata’ib party 
joined forces with the Syrian Social Nationalist party 
(SSMP), which is considered a trans-national party (Yamak
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1966, 72>. It is obvious, however, that there are many 
variations between the present conflict and the previous 
o n e .
Furthermore, all the respondents believe that Lebanon 
is a separate and distinct nation, with a special mission 
that is not compatible with that of the Arab nations. 
According to their statements, pan-Arabism continues to mean 
Islamic unity, because to their minds the Arabs never 
differentiate between religion and nationalism.
Tab 1e F i ve 
Causes for Coalition
Survival Military Res. Limited Options
38% 48 */. 14'/.
Table Five shows that 48 percent of the respondents 
joined farces together to achieve weighty military 
capability to resist foreign occupation. There was a 
weakness in the question. Apparently, according to some of 
the respondents, the ability to resist opposing forces would 
grant self-preservation and survival. However, the most 
interesting responses were the 14 percent who claimed that, 
at that time, there was no other conceivable coalition to 
consider. Here we are speaking of the period prior to the 
emergence of General Michael Aoun as a rival to the Lebanese 
Forces. As explained earlier, many members and groups
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defected from the ranks of the Lebanese Forces and joined 
the movement led by General Aoun.
It will be recalled that the Kata’ib party comprised 
the majority of the coalition, and this party dominated the 
decision-making process within the Christian community 
(Gilmour 198^, 155). Later, the Lebanese Forces broke away 
from the Kata’ib party and formed an autonomous movement 
unconnected with any other party. The emergence of the 
Lebanese Forces as a new political party confirmed the lack 
of unity within Lebanon’s Christian community.
Table Six
Personalities that Had Impact on the Coalition
Bashir Gemayel C. Chamoun Others
85*/. BY. 7*/.
The question from which these results were extracted 
was "Do you believe that Bashir Gemayel’s personality had 
any impact on this coalition? Who else?" It was noted that 
85 percent of the respondents indicated that Bashir Gemayel 
had an important impact on the formation of this coalition. 
It is important to note that Bashir Gemayel was a dominant 
force behind the formation of the coalition. During his 
leadership, the Lebanese Forces reached the peak of its 
power and popularity within the Christian community. In a 
country, such as Lebanon, charisma is an important factor to
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consider in any political calculation. Gemayel was 
charismatic* young, and determined (Schiff and Y a ’ari 1984, 
11-30). His charisma had a crucial impact, not only on 
unifying the various militia groups, but also on the 
Christian community as a whole.
After his assassination, the leadership of the 
Christian community started to weaken and collapse. The 
lack of leadership within the Christian community was 
demonstrated by the growing number of intracommuna1 
conflicts and divisions. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
premise underlying the rationalist approach that human 
conduct is wholly determined by rationality, the political 
and military behavior of the leadership of the Lebanese 
Forces was not characterized as such (Rogowski 1978, 399). 
The factor of revenge, in some cases, was the only incentive 
to conduct any military and political actions. For example, 
after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the leadership of 
the Lebanese Forces committed a great mistake when they 
executed the bloody massacre of Sabra and Shatilla.
Table Seven 
Concessions Made to Form Coalition
Nothing Some Independence Missing Cases
537. 347. 347.
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Table Seven indicates the responses of the interviewees 
to the question "In the process of forming the coalition, 
what were the things your party made concessions on? Why?" 
The responses were 52 percent who said "nothing," while the 
rest of the remaining 98 percent were divided equally 
between "some independence" and "missing cases." The 
missing cases were because 29 percent of the respondents 
refused to answer this question. It is interesting to note 
that some of these 29 percent respondents did not come 
solely from the small parties but were also members of the 
Kata’ib party, who were not impressed by or fond of the 
rival political movements. Instead, some leaders of the 
Kata’ib party did not support the idea of "equal representa­
tion" in the Command Council of the Leadership of the 
Lebanese Forces.
Tab 1e E i gh t 
Consider Other Coalition
Yes No Don’t Know
52*/, 29*/. 29*/.
The response to the question, "If in the midst of the 
coalition, some other parties offered your party a more 
accommodating alliance, would you accept it? Why?" was an 
interesting and complicated one. Although, during that 
time, this question was considered a little unrefined
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because the Lebanese Forces comprised of all the rep­
resentatives of the Christian community, except for the 
Franjieh’s clan. Nevertheless, it was possible from these 
responses to determine the strength of this coalition. The 
responses indicated that 52 percent claimed that if there 
was any other accommodating coalition, they would have 
considered joining it.
At the present time, those results show the seriousness 
of the respondents in considering to join another coalition 
if and when that alternative is available. As mentioned 
earlier, the emergence of General Aoun as a dominant figure 
on the Lebanese scene gave these parties such an 
alternative. The result was that the majority of the 
parties in the existing coalition shifted alliances and 
joined forces with General Aoun. One could speculate that 
the element of fear played, to a certain extent, an 
important role in the decision process of the small parties 
to join forces with the Kata’ib party. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, on July 7, 1980, Bashir’s Lebanese Forces 
attacked the various locations belonging to the National 
Liberal party, killing around five hundred people (Randal 
198^, 136). This conflict between both parties created an
atmosphere of anxiety and cautiousness within the Christian 
community. Consequently, the coalition formation of the 
Lebanese Forces was not the outcome of a normal bargaining 
procedure among the various Christian groups. Instead, the
197
formation of the Christian coalition was the result of 
political and military pressure exerted by the Kata’ib party 
upon the various political groupings- Nevertheless, despite 
this decisive reality, Bashir Gemayel had brought, in time, 
order and unity to the Maronite community.
Table Nine 
Gains From Joining the Coalition
Military Personal
Survival Unity Effectiveness Satisfaction
52’/. 29V, 10% 9%
It became evident from Table Nine that 52 percent of 
the respondents claimed that survival and preservation of 
the Christian community were the most important benefits 
they had gained from joining the coalition. (It is essential 
to note that the Lebanese civil war has been going on for 
almost fifteen years.) It was obvious that the ability of 
the Lebanese Forces to resist and to maintain its influence 
as a major player within the Lebanese arena came as a 
surprise to almost all interested observers of the Middle 
Eastern region. There certainly is no doubt in the mind of 
the author about the crucial significance of this survival 
factor in explaining the political behavior of the Christian 
community of Lebanon. United strength had appeal; division
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None Some Independence Missing Cases
627. 297. 97.
The findings for Table Ten show the results of the 
responses to the question? "What has your party lost from 
joining the coalition?" The total responses do not 
necessarily indicate any outstanding results. Some 29 
percent of the interviewees said that they had lost some 
independence to act freely after they joined the ranks of 
the Lebanese Forces. However? it is important to recall 
that at the end of 1989? the Guardians of the Cedars were 
dismissed from the Command Council of the leadership of the 
Lebanese Forces because they preferred to maintain political 
cooperation with Israel rather than with the Arab nations. 
Thus? the emphasize on policy conflict as a cause of 




Gained More by not Joining
No Missing Cases
90*/. 10'/.
The responses to the question, "Would your party have 
gained more by not joining? Why?" was overwhelming in the 
negative <90'/.). The respondents asserted that small armies 
or political groups are able to achieve little or nothing in 
and of themselves. Furthermore, it was noted that the 
majority of the respondents emphasized the rationality 
behind the formation of the coalition. However, some of the 
interviewees complained about the internal struggle for 
power within the ranks of the leadership claiming that, 
"everyone wants to be a chief and not an Indian." It is 
important to mention here the critical role played by a 
leader in establishing a strong command in order to preserve 
the existing coalition. Apparently, there have been no 




Big Parties Small Parties Both
43'/. 40'/. 9'/.
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The findings for Table Twelve presents the results of 
the responses to the question, "Are the bigger or the 
smaller parties in the coalition gaining more? Why?"
Again, the responses do not necessarily manifest any 
noteworthy results- As the researcher expected, 
representatives of the K a t a ’ib party asserted that small 
parties were gaining more by joining the coalition because 
they acquired equal representation on the Command Council of 
the Lebanese Forces, even though their resources were 
scarce. Thus, confirming the premise underlying the 
coalition formation process which prove that the larger the 
party, the more the party will insist on payoffs 
proportionate to its resource contribution (Groennings 1970, 
^65). Concurrently, since the creation of the Lebanese 
Forces, none of the small parties’ leaders was ever elected 
to the leadership of the Lebanese Forces; members of the 
Kata’ib party always controlled the leadership of the 
Lebanese Forces.
According to the results of the interviews, nine 
percent of the respondents suggested that all parties 
participating in this coalition were gaining more by 
coordinating their efforts in order to achieve common goals. 
In fact, as long as the goal of this coalition was to defend 
and to preserve the survival of the Christian community, all 






Table Thirteen was prepared to anticipate the 
possibility that the Lebanese Forces would become the 
unifying force among the various groups within the Christian 
community. The question, "What did you expect to gain from 
the coalition?" was asked to determine what gains the 
interviewees were expecting to achieve, thereby indicating 
the possibility of the kind of changing attitudes of 
divisions and struggles for power that have in fact 
prevailed within the Christian community.
However, the results indicated that 50 percent of the 
respondents claimed that their goal was only to win the 
Lebanese civil war, if it were possible. (The question 
implicitly suggested that the brutality of the civil war 
might in time promote unity among the various Christian 
groups. Apparently, however, deep differences and divisions 
are enduring qualities within this community, as well of 




Yes No Missing Cases
55% 40% 5%
The findings shown in Table Fourteen resulted from the 
question: "In negotiating towards a merger with another
party, is it important that your party maintains its 
identity after the merger? Why?" The answers indicated 
that 40 percent of the interviewees seemed to reject the 
idea of integrating their party with the various groups and 
political factions included within the Lebanese Forces. 
These findings are compatible with the results shown in 
Table Thirteen, which confirmed that only 50 percent of the 
interviewees desired to achieve political unity, while the 
other 50 percent indicated that their goal was only to win 
the civil w a r .
Tab 1e Fifteen 
Goals of the Lebanese Forces
Preservation Unity No Foreign Pluralism
of Christian Intervention
Communi ty
The results presented in Table Fifteen were based on 
the question: "What do you think are the most important
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goals of the Lebanese Forces?" All of the interviewees 
responded that these four variables represent the goals and 
objectives of the Lebanese Forces. Nevertheless* ^5 percent 
of the respondents asserted that getting rid of foreign 
occupation was the primary objective of the Lebanese Forces; 
30 percent claimed that preservation of the Christian 
community was the next highest objective.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, these objectives- 
-were and still are— the main concern of the Lebanese 
Forces. However, down to the present time, none of these 
objectives has actually been accomp1ished. On the contrary, 
the evidence indicates that perhaps military power is not 
the appropriate method for achieving these goals.
Table Sixteen 
First Interest in Politics
Student Family Others
85*/. 15*/. 0%
In replying to question number nineteen: "When did you
first become interested in politics? Why?"— 85 percent of 
the respondents indicated that their initial interest in 
politics stemmed from their college or university years. It 
ought to be noted here that the Lebanese society is 
extremely politicized. Discussing, debating and reviewing 
various Lebanese, regional, and international political
so*»
events are usually the main "focus o"f any social conversation 
among Lebanese people. A major reason for this phenomenon 
is that the Lebanese environment is highly susceptible to 
nearly any major regional or international development.
Cone 1usion
This chapter has attempted to investigate, by means of 
interviews, the particular motivations leading individuals 
and groups to join in the formation of the Lebanese Forces.
A carefu11y-designed questionnaire was used to elicit 
information; and personal interviews helped to pinpoint the 
subjects’ attitudes towards the coalition.
The findings proved beyond real doubt that in this case 
the actors’ preferences were based on the minimization of 
policy distance--i.e ., the distance between an actor’s 
policy position and the expected policy to be adopted by the 
coalition. During the process of coalition formation, all 
the respondents indicated that they had the same objectives 
and the same "shared values," even though these might vary 
in degree of importance. It must be noted that the 
questionnaire concentrated on the issue of c o a 1i t i on 
format ion.
From the evidence, the leaders of the various groups 
joining the coalition followed a rational mode of decision 
making in the process of forminq this coalition. However, 
this apparent rationality proved to be shallow and short­
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lived. As we have seen* leaders representing the various 
Christian movements were not able to maintain their 
solidarity. As a coalition representing the various 
Christian groups* the Lebanese Forces, collapsed before 
achieving any of its principal objectives.
Why did the coalition of the Lebanese Forces collapse 
before achieving its main goals? An important element which 
influenced the collapse of the Lebanese Forces was the t i me 
factor. Several regional and global developments influenced 
the future of this coalition. For example, the withdrawal 
of the Israelis from Lebanon clearly had a negative impact 
on the continued unity of the Lebanese Forces. After that 
event, many leaders of the Christian community began to look 
towards the Arab world for new allies. This event also 
created divisions within the leadership of the Lebanese 
Forces. While the "shared objectives" that had initially 
united the various Christian groups remained the same, 
nevertheless, the approaches or means to achieving these 
aims became more and more controversial and were behind the 
apparent division.
It is a fact that the Christian community is now more 
vulnerable or politically weaker than any other community in 
Lebanon: Christian political behavior are too ambiguous and
lacking in consistency to offer a reliable guide— it is 
possible that not even Christian leaders fully understand 
the forces motivating their behavior. The Christian
ao6
community* at the present time* is in need of a strong 
leadership that is able to incorporate and organize various 
groups and prominent figures within the Christian community.
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS
This research has attempted to provide* by means of 
descriptive statistics, a test of the rational choice theory 
of coalition behavior as it applies to the formation and 
activities of the Lebanese Forces. A carefu11y-p1anned 
questionnaire was used; and personal interviews helped to 
pinpoint the subjects’ attitudes toward this coalition.
Some of the questions were designed to indicate and evaluate 
the degree to which Lebanese political leaders operated on 
the basis of a cost-benefit model of decision making and how 
they weighted these considerations. A major purpose of the 
questionnaire was to call attention to the applicability of 
the rational decision-making model in providing a reasonable 
explanation for pattern of joining and maintaining a 
political coalition in an intensively divided society.
The findings indicated that what might be called 
"right-wing" criteria played an important role in the 
formation of this coalition. As will be recalled from 
Chapter two, the "right-wing bloc" comprised most of the 
Christian community who were, in time, defenders of the 
existing status quo. Besides, this bloc was calling for the 
allegiance of the nation’s Moslems to Lebanese nationalism, 
instead of to Arab nationalism. The bloc also demanded the 
preservation of the democratic concepts underlying the
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Lebanese political system. The factors leading to these 
beliefs stemmed from the Maronite community’s fear of its 
future under a Moslem-ruled Lebanon. Table Three? Chapter 
Five? indicates that 55 percent of the interviews had joined 
the Lebanese Forces not on the basis of the “size principle" 
or the "minimal winning coalition criterion," but because 
the "distance" between the party’s existing policy position 
and the expected policy position of the coalition was 
thereby minimized.
From the evidence of this case study, apparently, the 
app1icabi1ity of the "minimum winning coalition" theory in a 
conflictual political situation has little or no utility for 
Lebanon. The actors in Lebanon were more concerned about 
surviva1 than about any other tangible rewards. This is not 
to say, of course, that tangible rewards, such as higher 
position, a seat in the Command Council, and the like— were 
unattainable during the bargaining process involved in 
creating the coalition. However, the emphasis on gaining 
rewards declined in importance with the passing of time. 
Meanwhile, intangible rewards— such as personal satisfaction 
and acceptance of a belief system— increased in importance. 
To emphasis this criterion, Table Four, Chapter Five, 
demonstrates that the leaders of the Lebanese Forces 
distanced themselves from both the leftist and transnationa1 
political parties. From the beginning, the coalition of the 
Lebanese Forces had given primary emphasis to the concept of
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nat ionalism and had called for directing the allegiance of 
citizens to the Lebanese state? rather than to various 
regional and internationa1 political movements.
The results of the statistical findings for the 
question? "What do you think are the most important goals or 
objectives of the Lebanese Forces??" were an amaz ing ^5 
percent who said that the main goal was to prevent foreign 
intervention? while 30 percent said it was the preservation 
of the Lebanese Christian community. Apparently? the 
occupation of Lebanon by foreign military and political 
forces was a common concern to all these groups. There was 
a common enemy? the defeat of Syrian forces? the PLO? and 
their allies served as a common incentive to cause the 
creation of this political coalition.
These results indicate the contradiction between the 
rat ionali ty of these ends or goals? and the irrationality of 
the means or strategies employed? of the Lebanese Forces in 
the process of achieving these objectives. The point to be 
made here is that the Lebanese Forces were not consistently 
rational in adopting and pursuing these goals. For example? 
on several occasions the factor of revenge was the only 
motivation for conducting and implementing a military 
strategy? such as? the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla.
While the Lebanese Forces began originally as a para­
military movement to resist foreign occupation? their acts 
were far from being purely military. For example? unlike
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the European resistance movements during World War II, the 
Lebanese Forces did not extend their activities to the whole 
area of Lebanon under occupation. The Lebanese Forces’ 
activities were limited to preserving only the Christian 
area.
Contrary to the principle of rational decision-making 
theory, which stresses the consistency in pursuing a 
particular "goal," the Lebanese Forces in fact deviated from 
this expected consistency to achieve proclaimed goals. In 
time, the Lebanese Forces became highly "consistent" and 
busy in fighting other members of the coalition, rather than 
fighting their common enemy.
As noted in Table Thirteen, Chapter Five, 50 percent of 
the respondents claimed that they expected unity to emerge 
among the various factions comprising the coalition, while 
the other 50 percent asserted that their main expectation 
were to win the civil war. Obviously, neither of these 
dominant expectations has been accomp1ished, for reasons to 
be discussed later in the chapter.
It is evident, therefore, that rational decision model 
can be applied in this case only to the process of coali t i o n 
forma t i on. Although uncertainty about the fate and the 
future of the Christian community are now greater and more 
threatening than ever, at the present time irrationality and 
unpredictabi1ity are dominant features characterizing the 
political behavior of the Lebanese Forces.
SI 1
The findings in Table Nine? Chapter Five? to the 
question, "What has your party gained from joining the 
coalition??" are interesting. Some 52 percent of the 
respondents claimed that sur v i va1 and preservation of the 
Christian community were the most important gains to be 
expected from joining the coalition. Apparently, in reality 
these gains were never achieved. Instead, the irrational 
behavior of the Lebanese Forces turned out to cause 
destructive defeat for the Christian community as a whole.
In time, the disastrous irttra-communal conflict among the 
Christian factions threatened the very existence of this 
community. Ironically, the continuing bloody conflicts, the 
costly destruction, increasing political divisions, as well 
as the internal infighting within the Christian community, 
had a more serious impact upon its survival than any 
external threats experienced throughout the civil war.
Assuming that leaders of the Lebanese Forces operated 
upon the basis of a rational approach to decision making, it 
was evident that their calculations were completely 
erroneous. Such considerations as the urgency of the 
situation and the pressure to take action quickly had 
probably resulted in irrational political decisions.
Although there existed a definite desire to maintain and 
preserve the survival of the Christian community, in fact 
there occurred a prevalent, worsening trend of deviating 
from this objective. Instead of reducing or containing
s i a
their internal struggles until they achieved the common 
goals, the Lebanese Forces appeared to concentrate their 
efforts upon contradicting what they had been committed to 
defend— survival of the Christian community.
What factors explain the disintegration and collapse of 
the Lebanese Forces? As noted in previous chapters, the 
Lebanese civil war has introduced a new kind of leadership 
to the political system. In recent years, these leaders 
have been young, inexperienced and often ignorant about the 
political and cultural dynamics of Lebanon, as well as the 
Middle East as a whole. The Lebanese civil war has been 
going on for fifteen years, creating paralysis within all 
sectors of the Lebanese government. As a result, a state of 
chaos and the collapse of all aspects of civilization has 
prevailed within Lebanon. The older traditional leaders who 
ran the country after independence were being replaced by 
more rad i c a 1 street fighters. Frequently, the latter were 
not ready to compromise and preferred to obtain all the 
goals demanded by their own bloc, even at the risk of 
ultimate victory by the political opposition!
As a coalition representing the various parties and 
groups within the Christian community, the Lebanese Forces 
has disintegrated for many reasons. First, a bloody 
struggle for power within the leadership of the Lebanese 
Forces in time took place. For example, a struggle ensued 
between the forces of Samir Geagea and those of Amin Gemayel
ei3
for the leadership of the Maronite community. This contest 
created new divisions and weakened the role of the Kata’ib 
party within the Lebanese Forces. Then another struggle for 
power took place between the forces of Samir Geagea and 
those of Elie Hobeika, leading to a new split within the 
Lebanese Forces. Moreover in 1989, representatives of the 
Guardians of the Cedars were dismissed from the leadership 
of the Lebanese Forces’ Command Council, for political 
reasons discussed in previous chapters.
Vet, the "great division" within the leadership of the 
Lebanese Forces occurred in 1989. Before stepping down from 
the presidency, Amin Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as Prime 
Minister. Aoun’s new position of power led to a conflict 
between his army and the Lebanese Forces. Aoun, who 
perceived himself as the sole and legitimate leader of 
Lebanon, chose to focus his offensive on abolishing the 
Lebanese Forces as an "illegal" military power and to 
assimilate its members within the Lebanese Army. Meanwhile, 
leaders of the National Liberal Party, el-Tanzim, and the 
Guardians of the Cedars broke away from the Lebanese Forces 
and joined forces with General Aoun. The continuous 
"uprisings" within the leadership of the Lebanese Forces had 
indicated the need for the existence of a strong, as well as 
popular, leader within the Maronite community. It is 
important to note here that all these uprisings within the 
Lebanese Forces were led by members of the Kata’ib party.
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This clearly indicated the dominance of that party within 
the leadership structure of the Lebanese Forces, as well 
underscored the continuous divisions within the Kata’ib 
party. Evidently? the various parties and groups who 
comprised the Lebanese Forces ultimately lost faith and 
commitment in supporting this kind of coalition.
It is necessary to remember also that the National 
Liberal party had suffered a major blow from the Kata’ib 
before joining the coalition. Apparently, the National 
Liberal party saw, and took the opportunity to liberate 
itself from, the dominance of the Kata’ib, as well as to 
assert its independence and freedom of action. To 
illustrate this point, Nr. Danny Chamoun in time replaced 
his late father, Cammille Chamoun, as the leader of the 
Lebanese Front. < As pointed out earlier, the Lebanese Front 
was created originally as the main center of political 
decision making for the Christian community. Even though 
its role and authority were challenged repeatedly by the 
Lebanese Forces, it is still regarded as an influential 
political grouping comprising prominent Christian 
representative.) At the present time, the Lebanese Front is 
in complete support of General Aoun, who has vowed to 
dismantle the militia of the Lebanese Forces.
In addition, there is an old and special relation 
between el-Tanzim party and General Aoun, which is highly 
relevant for this discussion. In 1975, Nichel Aoun, who was
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an officer in the Lebanese Army* was training the militia of 
el—Tanzim. His nick name was "Raad" (thunder). The moment 
Aoun was selected to head the interim Cabinet? the leader­
ship of el-Tanzim party acknowledged its support for his 
leadership? as well as for his "war of liberation".
Third? as mentioned above? the consecutive leadership 
core of the Lebanese Forces consisted of military men? not 
experienced politicians. Although their proclaimed goals 
were to change the old Lebanese political system and? create 
a new and more modern system? in most cases these leaders 
proved to be corrupt? dishonest? and exploited the trust of 
the Christian community to promote their own personal 
interests. This not to claim that all the earlier leaders 
of the Christian community were conspicuously more honest 
and selfless. It is only to emphasis the need for 
uncorrupted and honest leader in order to represent 
effectively the silent majority of the Christian community.
Nonetheless? these emerging leaders usually lacked 
needed political and cultural knowledge about the various 
regional and international trends and dynamics affecting 
Lebanon. For example? the Lebanese Forces’ relations with 
Israel had an extremely negative impact on the inter- and 
intra-communa1 relations within Lebanon. Concurrent 1y ? the 
continuous and increasing complexities of the internal 
Lebanese crisis imposed more demands and strain upon the 
leadership of the Lebanese Forces? reducing their ability to
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manoeuver politically and to manipulate events to their 
benefi ts.
Fourth, a crucial factor having a negative impact on 
the future of this coalition was the death of the most 
influential figures, within the leadership of not only the 
Lebanese Forces but also the entire Christian community.
This included, for example, Camille Chamoun, the leader and 
founder of the National Liberal party? Pierre Gemayel, the 
leader and the founder of the Kata’ib party; and certain 
other prominent and politically knowledgeable figures. This 
weakened the impressive image of the Christian community, 
regionally and globally. The death of such figures helped 
to bring about the declining prominence of the Lebanese 
Forces, leading to its eventual decomposition.
Another factor contributing to the termination of the 
Christian coalition was the declining popularity of the 
Lebanese Forces. To illustrate the significance of 
Christian public opinion and its impact on the declining 
status of the Lebanese Forces, one might note the recent 
developments in East Beirut (the Christian area). It seems 
evident that this support proved to be an essential factor 
in accounting for the survival and the termination of this 
coalition. Today, the Maronite community is extraordinarily 
so 1i t. Intra-communa1 fighting have become a common 
occurrence within the Maronite community. Either you 
support Aoun or you are backing Geagea’s forces! The
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important point to emphasis here is the strong popular 
support within Lebanon backing General Aoun. With his rise 
to power, General Aoun acquired phenomenal public support 
not only from the Christians, but also from many members of 
the Moslem community. Evidently, there is a correlation 
between Aoun’s increasing popularity and the Lebanese 
Forces’ decreasing prominence. The continuing bloody 
conflict between Aoun and the remaining segment of the 
Lebanese Forces is highly paradoxical. Logically, one might 
have expected the formation of an alliance between the two 
competing factions— the forces of Aoun and Geagea. For 
example, both m e n ’s political preferences were at "minimum 
distance," in contrast to the other political actors in 
Lebanon. In 1975, Aoun and Geagea were fighting side by 
side against the PLO. In 1986, General Aoun and the Army 
helped Geagea and his militia fend off two infiltration 
attempts by the previous leader of the Lebanese Forces, Elie 
Hobeika, and his pro-Syrian allies. Why? What happened?
A coalition, therefore, was widely expected between the 
Lebanese Forces and General Aoun. Yet in reality, ferocious 
fighting between the two Maronite leaders erupted. This 
fighting between the Lebanese army and the Lebanese Forces 
left a devastating imprint, not only upon the Christian 
infrastructure and the people’s life, but also upon the 
Lebanese political scene. Both Aoun and Geagea believe in 
the idea of Lebanon as a democratic and liberal nation, if
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that goal is attainable. However, the tragedy of the 
Lebanese political situation is that egos, personalities, 
and political ambitions have become major obstacles in 
consolidating the Christian forces to achieve that goal.
Evidently, within Lebanon, confessional ism, geography 
and tribalism still remain more influential political forces 
than any other ideological or other factors. This is well 
demonstrated by the present war between the Lebanese Forces 
and the Lebanese army. This on-going conflict within the 
Christian community might well also be perceived as another 
civil war. It is a war waged by the Lebanese Forces, which 
consists at the present time only of "Northern" forces, 
against the inhabitants of Beirut and the Mountain. In 
effect, it is a revolution of the peasants of the north 
against the bourgeoisie of the city and the mountain. In 
many aspects, this revolution is similar to the rebellion 
led by Tanyus Shahin in 1858. The 1858-1860 rebellion was a 
peasant uprising to eliminate the feudal lords. The peasant 
revolt changed the economic orientation of the system and in 
time gave way to the rise of a new middle class derived 
solely from the peasantry. Evidently, Geagea’s revolution 
in the contemporary period is directed towards the 
elimination of the dictatorship of the nation’s traditional 
leaders. Yet, Geagea’s vision of transforming Lebanon into 
a modern, liberal, and progressive society faces many 
obstacles hindering its implementation.
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From the time of Lebanon’s independence to the 
beginning of the civil war * almost all the political 
decisions concerning the Christian community were made by 
the Beiruties and the prominent leaders of the Mountain.
Most of Lebanon’s economic development was concentrated in 
these two Maronite-contro1 led regions. As a result, the 
present intra-communal conflict is in part due to the 
deprivation experienced by the north from having a role in 
this crucial political decision making.
Nevertheless, the forces of Samir Geagea have committed 
many major mistakes during the recent bloody in-fighting.
For example, his forces proved insensitive to the needs of 
his Maronite community, as well as to other groups whose 
trust and support he had gained throughout the years. 
Geagea’s followers alienated, detained, and killed many of 
their co-religious supporters. To promote the role of a 
successful leader, Samir Geagea should have engaged in 
compromises and cultivated the role of a political broker.
The Lebanese Forces that was created by Bashir Gemayel, 
as a coalition representing various Christian parties and 
groupings, was in time terminated, mainly due to a policy 
conflict among the leaders of the various groups 
participating in the coalition. As noted in a previous 
chapter, the reason for the creation of this coalition was 
that by joining together, each party would be able to 
achieve at least one of the goals that it could not
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otherwise accomplish. The most important goal for the 
Lebanese Forces was to defeat their common enemy. Their 
reasoning was that united strength has appeal; that division 
causes weakness, wasted efforts and finances, and 
ineffectiveness; and that divided political groups lack 
appeal, create confusion, produce apathy, and cannot win 
popular support.
As noted, what remains of the Lebanese Forces today is 
only Samir Geagea and his "Northern forces." In reality, 
Lebanon is becoming more and more a nation not of 
institutions, but of strongmen. The continuous struggle 
between General Aoun and Samir Geagea has resulted in 
exposing the political vulnerability of the Maronite 
community, as well as the entire Christian community. 
Moreover, the two factions— the Lebanese Forces and the 
Lebanese Army— are still engaged in strengthening their 
military power in order to eliminate what is left of the 
Christian entity within Lebanon.
Down to the present time, the various wars and 
conflicts in Lebanon are still in progress, leaving behind 
more uncertainty and confusion about the nation’s future. 
Meanwhile, one has only to understand the cultural and the 
political dynamics of the Middle East to realize the 
importance of structuring Lebanon by establishing a new 
federal model. According to the Lebanese Forces, self- 
preservation and autonomy are perceived as the best possible
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solution for achieving peace within Lebanon. Therefore* the 
federal model would be the most feasible solution for 
implementing this design. Within the Middle East, only in 
Lebanon have various religious and ethnic groups 
traditiona11y been able to practice their religion freely 
and to maintain their individual liberty. Despite all the 
mistakes committed by the Lebanese Forces, they have been 
able to keep the concepts of modernization and democracy 
alive not only in Lebanon, but also throughout the entire 
region. Meanwhile, the continuation of the Lebanese 
internal conflict raises fundamental questions related to 
the survival of democracy, as well as the problem of 
protecting minorities inside the Middle East.
An approach to the problem of the protecting minorities 
is the concept of p 1ura1 i s m , proposed by the Lebanese 
Forces. Theoretical1y , in all democratic societies, various 
religious, ethnic and linguistic groups coexist, and solve 
their problems through democratic means. Pluralism can best 
be applied through a federal political model, like these 
found in the United States, Switzerland and Belgium. To 
date, however, in Lebanon this pluralism has not been 
accompanied by a strong sense of nationalism; and this in 
turn is one of the serious obstacles that must be taken into 
account before proposing a solution for the Lebanese crisis.
To the Lebanese Forces and its supporters, the above 
concepts are very rational ideas designed to put an end to
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Lebanon’s internal conflicts. Yet critics> such as the 
Moslem leader > Dr. Salim Hoss, have claimed that there is no 
difference between the federal model and the partition of 
Lebanon.
To the present time, all attempts made to solve the 
Lebanese crisis have failed. A major factor often excluded 
from many proposed solutions is what the Lebanese people 
rea11v want. It is quite possible, of course, that today 
Lebanese Christians and Moslems do not want to live and 
coexist in the same country. Based on recent experience, 
this is a reasonable conclusion. The continuation of 
Lebanon’s internal conflict and the failure to arrive at any 
political solution acceptable to all parties to it can be 
interpreted as convincing evidence of this depressing 
rea1i t y .
Some Western observers have claimed that Lebanese 
Christians have sometimes created what is called complexity 
of fear, for the sole purpose of keeping control over the 
country. Yet, to the author this observation seems 
unjustified. The historical record of persecution of 
Christians and, more recently, the emergence of the 
political extremism and religious fanaticism within the Arab 
world and their support among groups within Lebanon, are 
reasons enough for the Christian community to defend itself.
This research was both challenging and fulfilling 
during the entire time the writer used to seek out
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information* make personal visits* and conduct interviews. 
However, it is important to mention some of the limitations 
and reservations concerning this research. The study was 
approached from the perspective of a Maronite background.
The author was personally involved in the Lebanese civil war 
during the years 1975-1982.
Another important limitation is related to the conduct 
of the personal interviews. Perhaps one of the dis­
advantages in these interviews was the fact that some of the 
responses received were obviously not given objectively* 
since the interviewer was observed as a friend to some and a 
foe to others. This may have caused some individuals within 
the Christian community to be restrained or cautious in 
giving completely objective answers, especially when they 
realized that the researcher is also married to a Druze!
While it is certain that one study cannot lead to firm 
generalizations, nevertheless, this research can serve as 
access to another indepth study on the Maronite Lebanese 
political leadership. It may also serve as an example for 
comparable research on coalition formation and maintenance 
in civil war situations, involving diverse and conflictual 
groupings in settings similar to Lebanon.
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1951 1953 1957 1960 1964 1968
Parties No. Z No. X No. Z No. Z No. Z No. Z
Dastur Party + + + 5-8 6.60 5 5.05 3 3.03
Najjadah Party + + + 1 1.01 1 1.01
Tashnaq Party (Armenians) 2 2.58 2 4.54 3 4.53 4 2.04 4 4.04 4 4.04
Progressive Socialists Party
and its allies 3 3.87 2-4 6.80 3 4.53 6 6.06 6 6.06 6 6.06
National Liberal Party 4-5 4.50 6 6.06 9 9.09
National Bloc 2 2.58 3 6.71 4 6.04 6 6.06 2 2.02 6 6.06
Kataeb Party 3 3.87 1 2.27 1 1.51 6 6.06 4 4.04 9 9.09
Party-linked
Parliamentarians (total) 10 8-10 11 32-36 27 38
Total of parliamentary
Seats 77 44 66 99 99 99
Percentage of Party-linked
parliamentarians 12.90 20.32 16.61 34.33 27.27 38.38
^Percentages of those of seats held by a party in relation to the total of parliamentary seats. 
+No information available.
Sources: Data for 1951-64 were compiled by Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of Fragmented Political Culture (Ithaca,




Patterns of Cabinet Coalitions* 19*»3-196*»
Size of Cabinet 6 B 9 10 10 10 1^ 17 l<f
Sunni 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 h 3
Maronite 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Druze 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Greek Orthodox 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Greek Catholic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Sh i’i te 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 2
Armenian Catholic 1
Armenian Orthodox 1
Source: Elie Salem, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," The
Middle East Journal, VOL. NO. (Fall, 1967): A90.
23^
Patterns of Cabinet Coalitions* 1965-1971
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Size of Cabinet 10 10 10 1 1 16 16 12
Sunni 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sh i ’i te 1 1 1 1 3 3 2
Greek Catholie 1 1 1 1 1
Greek Orthodox 1 1 1 1 3 3 2
Maroni te A 3 3 5 3 3 3
Druze 1 1 1 1 a 2 1
Armenian Orthodox 1 1
Source: Data collected by the researcher from various
documents and newspapers.
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1976 1976 1978 1979 1980
Size of Cabinet 18 22 6 8 8 11 10
Sunni A 4 1 2 2 3 3
Sh i’i te 3 4 1 1 1 2 2
Greek Catholic 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Greek Orthodox a 3 1 1 1 2 2
Maroni te A 4 1 2 2 2 2
Druze 2 3 1 1 1 1
Armenian Orthodox 1 2
Source: Data collected by the researcher from var i ous
documents and newspapers.
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Si:e of Cab inet 55 10 10 10 8
Sunni h 5 5 a 1
Sh i ’ i te A 5 5 5 a
Greek Catholic 5 1 1 a i
Greek Orthodox 3 5 5 1 a
liaroni te 5 a 5 a i
Dru2e 3 i 1 i i
Armenian Orthodox 1





1. What are the most important objectives that your party 
had before 1976? Any others?
2. What criteria did you use in deciding on the faction or 
party with whom you coalesce?
3. Are there any parties with which your party would not 
even consider a coalition? Why?
Of these parties* which would you least want to 
coalesce with? Which next? ... Finally?
5. What factors have most commonly caused coalition
formation with your party to succeed?
6. In the process of forming the coalition, what were the
things your party made concessions on? Why?
7. What things did your party refuse to concede on? Why?
8. If in the midst of the coalition, some other parties 
offered your party a more accommodating alliance, would 
you accept it? Why?
9. What has your party gained from joining the coalition?
10. What has it lost?
11. Would your party have gained more by not joining? Why?
12. Are the bigger or the smaller parties in the coalition
gaining more? Why?
13. What did you expect to gain from the coalition?
1^ . In negotiating toward a merger with another party, is
it important that your party maintains its identity 
after the merger? Why?
15. What do you think are the most important goals or 
objectives of the Lebanese Forces?
16. Do you believe that the Lebanese Forces will ever 
become a majority party? Why?
17. What do you believe are the most serious problems 





What offices have you held in your party? When? What 
office do you hold now?
Have you ever belonged to any other political party? 
When? Any other?
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